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Abstract and Key Words 
 This thesis argues that the interior space of each individual mind has infinite 
potentiality to do or create x new reality in one’s life via possible worlds. I use Lawrence 
Durrell’s short story “Zero” (1939), Gustave Flaubert’s “Un coeur simple” (1877), and 
Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865) as literary representations of 
how readers outside of the literary text share an unbreakable bond with universal space. I 
discuss the infinite potentiality of the finite being, and the experiential data in the process 
of entelechy, or epistemological maturation of the mind. I bring Leibniz’s theory of the 
continuum of infinitesimals and Henri Bergson’s metaphysics of duration and 
consciousness into the argument to advance the premise that the only limiting factor on 
the mind’s ability to shape its own actual world environment via possible-world ideation 
is the mind itself. 
 
Key words: Metaphysics, epistemology, Possible Worlds, Bergson, Leibniz, Durrell, 
Flaubert, Carroll.  
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Epigraph  
 
 
 
 
 
 
“L’essentiel est invisible pour les yeux.” 
-Antoine de Saint-Exupéry 
 
“Our minds are finite, and yet even in the circumstances of finitude we are surrounded by 
possibilities that are infinite, and the purpose of life is to grasp as much as we can of that 
infinitude.” 
-Alfred North Whitehead 
 
“That you are here—that life exists and identity, 
That the powerful play goes on, and you may 
contribute a verse.” 
-Walt Whitman 
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Dedication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In loving memory of my Grandfather, 
Douglas Wray, 
Who would always sing, 
“She shall have music wherever she goes.” 
 
 
 
And to Sophia Persephone, 
La Regina delle Oche—“Come fly with me.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Never call retreat”— 
 
Passion is Potentiality 
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Terminology 
 
 
Actual World: Ruth Ronen defines actual worlds from three different stances of 
narrative theorists in general, and these are the views of modal realism, moderate realism, 
and anti-realist. One definition cannot be highlighted is “more true” than another, simply 
because the actual world is measured by its counterpart, the various possible worlds, 
which are purely theoretical and their existence depends upon human perception, which 
is always subjective and relative to that which surrounds it. Moderate realism is the 
definition that I develop into a revised version of possible worlds, and Ronen defines the 
moderate system’s definition of actual worlds as having “possible worlds . . . within the 
confines of the actual world and are viewed as components of the actual world. The 
actual world is a complex structure that includes both its actual elements and non-actual 
possibilities, that is, the ways things might have been (whether these non-actual 
possibilities exist as mental constructs, as postulated by Rescher, as non-obtaining states, 
as proposed by Platinga, or as a set of propositions about things in our world, as 
suggested by Adams)” (22). I develop the moderate realist approach in its most 
fundamental points, that being that possible worlds exist within the actual, which is prior 
to them; that in the actual world there are non-actual possibilities that can be viewed as 
mental constructs; but I diverge from Ronen’s definition when she states that “Possible 
worlds in any case are the result of rational behaviour which only admits one world” (22). 
My analysis operates in opposition to this final point, and I argue that both possible and 
actual worlds are experienced concurrently by each individual, and that possible worlds 
are places with infinite potentiality to create new data of consciousness, and integrate 
parts of these data into the individual’s actual world. I contend that it is most rational for 
one to take advantage of possible world psychical creations and data, and use the 
newfound data as a means of supplementing one’s existence in the actual world. The 
actual world definition used by both Ronen and myself apply both to works of fiction 
analyzed through the lens of narrative theory, as well as the world in which we, as 
readers, exist in relation to each other. 
 
Aggregate: I use the term “aggregate” to describe a unit in itself that is in constant flux 
as it changes and expands in space—the space that we understand as the fabric of the 
universe: space allows the existence and engagement of matter and energy simply be 
providing it with the space, in the literal sense. The aggregate, in the case of my 
argument, refers both to people—who are composed of their own experiences and who 
are shaped by the events of their lives—and to the collective of all individuals in the 
universal and infinite space (i.e. the universe), who continue to grow and expand as a 
multiplicity of beings. The aggregate is a whole in itself, but it can never be complete; it 
seems counter-intuitive, but it is the whole at x-given moment, but is prone to expansion 
and evolution all of the time and into infinity. There is no limit for the aggregate in 
space, because space is infinite. I refer to the parts of the aggregate as “building blocks,” 
and I refer to any individuated aggregate (i.e. and individual being) as functioning as a 
building block itself. Arthur describes the aggregate that is the whole in constant flux as 
“the continuous whole” (xxxix). 
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Brute Fact: Rhetorician John Searle explains that brute facts are “Intrinsic features of 
reality [that] exist independently of all mental states,” and that “Brute facts exist 
independently of any human institutions . . . [they] require the institution of language in 
order that we can state the facts, but brute facts themselves exist quite independently of 
language or any other institution” (14; 27). One example of a brute fact would be a 
mountain, which is indisputable matter in the world, and its existence is not relative to 
that which surrounds it; instead, it exists in spite of subjective beings and its existence 
depends on nothing related to human consciousness and perception.  
 
Consciousness: I define consciousness via Bergson, who explains that consciousness is 
characterized its “most obvious feature,” which is “before anything else, memory” (Mind 
3). Bergson’s approach to explaining consciousness informs my usage of this term, 
because memory implies a cognitive being who engages with the world and experiences 
phenomena, and memory signifies an external event that is internalized within the mind. 
Continuum: Philosopher Richard T.W. Arthur explains the continuum via Wilhelm 
Gottfried Leibniz’s philosophy and mathematics. Arthur states that “In order for the parts 
of a body to cohere together continuously through time, there needs to be a continuous 
sequence of endeavours propagated across it, in other words, a continuous motion” (xl). 
This continuous motion can be considered synonymous with Bergsonian duration, which 
is one unending flow of energy and matter through space. The continuum is, in its 
essence, akin to space, which Bergson argues is the same thing as duration; therefore, the 
continuum is the space or fabric of human consciousness upon which each individual 
who exists as an “event” on the continuum leaves a trace of their existence through the 
passage of time. The continuum is composed of infinitesimals; and the continuum begins 
with one whole number, which is akin to the one particle that gave way to the universe in 
which we live, and thus it divides infinitely (i.e. it divides with no foreseeable 
termination) to infinity. As a result, the continuum—and Bergsonian duration—are the 
terms with which we can understand space, which is not visible to the eye, aside from our 
perception of the matter that exists within space. I equate each infinitesimal upon the 
continuum as a life, which I consider an event, and that since each infinitesimal divides 
infinitely (i.e. each individual creates data that enters universal space, and each datum 
becomes in itself an autonomous unit). As such, we see that one point, or one individual, 
can expand as an infinite multiplicity in space, and a significant portion of the data that 
propels the expansion is of possible worlds. 
 
Duration: Bergson defines duration as “the form which the succession of our conscious 
states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating the present 
state from its former states” (Time 100). Furthermore, Bergson notes that in recalling 
these states of consciousness, the mind “does not set them alongside its actual state as 
one point alongside another, but forms both the past and the present states into an organic 
whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one 
another” (100). The successive states of being that melt each into another allow the 
nature of duration to be homogeneous in spite of the fact that all the events are separate 
and are not all of one source of being or consciousness.  
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Entelechy: There are several definitions of this term that speak to the complex nature of 
a philosophical principle that has existed at least since the Ancient Greeks. Aristotle 
understood entelechy as a process of actualization, which he describes in De anima (On 
the Soul); Leibniz expands upon this to say that entelechy is “the soul or principle of 
perfection of an object or person” (Collins, “Entelechy”), and he explains in the 
Monadology that each “monad” (a term that describes the essence of a unit, or the 
presence of one simple substance at the core of a unit, or a substance that exists a priori 
to the unit) is one indivisible substance. I branch out from Leibniz’s theory of the 
indivisible substance in order to argue that each monad could be considered a unit or 
whole-in-itself, even if it is an infinitesimal; and I will explain how an infinitesimal 
whose ontology is of one simple substance is not strictly dividing infinitely, but rather 
expanding to infinity. I unite these definitions to create one that is designed to describe 
each infinitesimal, which I describe as a being in consciousness upon the continuum, as 
a unique unit that expands infinitely via the process of entelechy, where the being 
recognizes the potentiality of x-substance within the self and endeavours to actualize it 
to some effect in the actual world.  
 
Infinite Progress: Infinite progress is a formula borrowed from mathematics, and 
formulated as follows: 𝑝1 therefore 𝑝2 therefore 𝑝3 . . . 𝑝𝑛, with the last figure indicating 
that the process continues to infinity. I explain infinite progress in greater detail in the 
Flaubert and Carroll chapters. 
 
Infinitesimal Regress: The equation for infinitesimal regress is drawn from 
mathematics, as opposed to logic, and is formulated as such: 𝑝1 if 𝑝2 if 𝑝3 . . . 𝑝𝑛, with 
the last term indicating the process of division continues to infinity. I explain the 
conceptual framework of infinitesimal regress briefly in the Flaubert chapter, and in 
depth throughout the Carroll chapter. 
 
Infinitesimals: Infinitesimals are the points that exist upon the continuum, and each is 
derived from the first number in the sequence. From a conceptual application, each 
infinitesimal will be considered a human being in consciousness, who exists in space, 
and is of space. I will offer an explanation as to why I equate the continuum with 
space/duration, so for the purpose of this thesis, the “first number” can be considered the 
first particle that gave way to matter and substance in space via energy, or motion. As 
such, each infinitesimal—each being—is a partial reflection of the first particle, because 
each being finds its ontological roots in this particle. Likewise, for each infinitesimal-
being that divides to infinity, all matter that is of the specific infinitesimal in turn reflects 
the infinitesimal as its ontological genesis. In terms of possible worlds, each possible 
world that composes each internal duration in one being, exists as a part of the 
infinitesimal that initiated the possible world, which means that all possible worlds of one 
being in the actual world unite in the infinitesimal-being as the homogeneous 
identification of the self, known by the pronoun “I.” 
Infinity/The Infinite: Infinity, or the infinite, though it is a mathematical term, does not 
represent a number or a composite number; in fact, it cannot represent a number, because 
a number by nature is finite (e.g. there are three apples means simply there are three, and 
only three, apples; if an apple is added, it is no longer three, but now four, but this does 
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not change the association of the number 3 that signifies only three of any visible matter). 
There have existed debates between mathematicians and physicists as to whether space is 
truly infinite, or if it is simply our inability to “catch up” with its constant expansion. 
Max Tegmark explains that space is in fact infinite, as suspected by Euclid, and proved in 
Einstein’s Theory of Relativity (33). I refer to space according to the premise that it is 
indeed infinite. 
 
Institutional Fact: Searle defines institutional facts as a “subclass” of “social facts,” and 
he explains that this subclass is governed by human institutions (i.e. manmade realities). 
Institutional facts “can exist only within human institutions,” and Searle uses the 
example, “Clinton is president” to differentiate institutional facts from brute facts, where 
the former exist only through and in human consciousness, and cannot exist 
independently of the “collective” mind (26-7). 
 
Internal Duration: Bergson explains that there is in each individual an internal duration, 
which “grasps a succession which is not juxtaposition, a growth from within, the 
uninterrupted prolongation of the past into a present which is already blending into the 
future. It is the direct vision of the mind by the mind” (Creative 20). 
 
Intuition: Bergsonian duration and internal duration exists relative to intuition. Intuition 
is the realization of the conscious self and its presence in space. It is intuition that allows 
“the direct vision of the mind by the mind” (Creative 20). 
 
Merism: This is a term that dates back to Ancient Greek philosophy and rhetoric, and the 
Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology explains that a merism is a whole, or an 
aggregate, that is a united whole, although it is composed of seemingly opposing parts. 
 
Mind-Space: I combine the terms “mind” and “space,” akin to the formulation of space-
time, to create one unified concept, which describes a quasi-Cartesian explanation of the 
body occupying space, and the mind giving the body (a type of matter) form. Where the 
body is the corporeal portion of the dualism, the mind crafts an identity for the body via 
experiential data in universal space, and in the actual world. Therefore, the mind-space 
is quite similar to the Cartesian mind-body dualism, but I simply reconfigure the idea in 
order to match the given context of the individual being in space. 
 
Possible Worlds: Ruth Ronen defines possible worlds in the context of narrative theory 
as spaces that “legitimize an interest in referential problems and in everything that 
concerns the relations between literature and the actual world” (20). I expand upon this 
definition slightly to argue that possible worlds are subjective spaces within the mind of 
the conscious being that assist the individual in sorting the data of consciousness from the 
actual world; they are spaces of potentiality for the data of the mind-space to be 
actualized and brought into one’s actual world in the form best suited to the individual’s 
best interests. 
 
Potentiality: I use this term to describe one’s recognition of that which could be if x 
action is taken. It is to recognize something in oneself and to act, which is the initial stage 
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of entelechy. Potentiality is a quality within the begin that can assist one in one’s process 
of self-amelioration. 
 
Space-Time: Space-Time is a term developed to describe the four dimensions of matter 
in space (i.e. extensity); it is a concept derived from applied mathematics, and it 
combines the length, width, and height of matter with the additional fourth dimension of 
time; thus together, matter and the system of time are understood as space-time. 
 
Substance: Christian Moevs describes the Aristotelean-Ptolemaic system of substantial 
forms, which are “material,” and “invariant (apparently self-subsistent) things of which 
changing attributes (accidents) are predicated, as ‘fat’ or ‘old’ is predicated of Socrates, 
who can be more or less fat, but not more or less Socrates” (79). I use this term to signify 
the presence of matter that occupies a dimension of space-time, and whose substance—
that which is unique to that being, or essential to that being, and that which is at the very 
core of a being—informs the nature of the being and its form in “spatiotemporal 
identities” (39). Moevs elaborates on matter and its relation to form, the latter of which is 
that which “gives being to matter,” or that which defines matter as one specific thing, as 
opposed to another; the form allows matter to be identified, but it is the substance that is 
integral to that specific matter that defines its nature. I use “substance” in reference to 
human beings, and that which is within the individual, but must be recognized in order to 
take form, which is the end-process of entelechy in that given evolution. 
 
Worlds within Worlds: This is a phrase developed by Leibniz that describes the nature 
of expansion of infinitesimals upon the continuum. Due to the fact that each 
infinitesimal can itself divide infinitely, the division creates a multiplicity, and from each 
new product of the division of the infinitesimal, there is a new “world,” or new source of 
potentiality that will, in turn, divide infinitely itself. I equate this with possible worlds to 
support my claim that the mind-space—in which the possible world exists—is infinite in 
potentiality, because it is a mirror image of infinite space that is specific to the individual. 
Therefore, each individual is a fragment of infinite space—each being is an 
infinitesimal—that has the possibility to create new experiential data in the mind-space of 
the individual, and which can enter the process of entelechy, which creates new worlds, 
or realities, that are transferred from the possible world to the actual, and are integrated 
into the actual-world modes of being. 
1 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1. 
Introduction 
 Neuroanthropologist Terrence Deacon provides a fascinating new way to 
reconcile modern sciences with the more qualitative phenomena of life—the matter that 
exists and behaves with no apparent algorithmic formula. Deacon studies the behaviour 
and function of matter and quantum phenomena, but Deacon’s most prominent message 
concerns potentiality: the possibility of non-actualized matter to become matter. “Modern 
sciences,” argues Deacon, is interested in understanding and explaining “how physical 
objects behave under all manner of circumstances” and “what sorts of objects they are in 
turn composed of” and the manifestation of their “physical properties” of one given 
moment (3). Here, we see the danger of empiricism in relation to the potentiality of “non-
actualized matter” (3), especially if we were to consider what exactly this “non-actualized 
matter” encompasses.  
 I use the term “non-actualized matter” in reference to any thought, idea, and all 
potential outcomes imaginable in the context of the human mind, which is contingent 
upon Deacon’s description of non-actualized matter. That is, any potentiality—something 
that could happen if x-idea crosses neurological paths with y-knowledge or experiential 
data in the conscious mind. The space in which this occurs is what I refer to as the “mind-
space,” which is the subjective and individuated space of one’s mind, facilitated by the 
brain, which is of the corporeal body; and in this space, experiential data is both 
recognized and created by the mind in spaces we refer to as “possible worlds,” which I 
will explain in more depth shortly to follow.  
 Possible Worlds theory offers various angles and definitions that define their 
purpose, therefore offering an array of lenses through which human beings come to 
understand the nature of the universe—a vast nature, which includes the nature of human 
thought, the potential for human thought to create new matter, and the use of language to 
create fictional literary texts that capture specific moments in being relative to human 
existence. Of course, we must also acknowledge the dynamic nature of Possible Worlds 
theory, because not only does it operate as a vehicle to assist the study of human 
existence in the world, it also offers new ideas that concern the nature of conscious 
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beings in existence, and additionally, the nature of actualized matter and the potentiality 
of further non-actualized matter beyond the scope of the human eye. By its name alone—
Possible Worlds—there exists the necessarily implication: that “possible” could be 
considered synonymous with “non-actualized matter,” which is in fact matter, but has yet 
to register in one’s consciousness. This matter exists and it is immanent within the being, 
but it must be recognized and actualized by this being in the process of entelechy. 
Though this matter lacks the necessary form to register in human consciousness, it cannot 
be considered “absent,” as Deacon explains, but simply not apparent.  
 Before I offer a more detailed account of Possible Worlds theory, in addition to 
my argument that possible worlds should be considered entelechial spaces of potentiality-
cum-actuality, I want to bring Gilles Deleuze’s take on the various purposes of literary 
texts into this discussion. Daniel W. Smith’s Introduction to Essays Critical and Clinical 
(1993) underscores Deleuze’s approach to literary texts, which he considers instances or 
various “series of concepts like so many motifs that appear and reappear in different 
essays . . .  which could likewise be said to find a place in a logic of literature, or rather, a 
logic of ‘Life’” (xiii). Smith explains that “Deleuze extracts links from literary works that 
bring together literary arts and philosophy” (xiii), and he argues that “if Life has a direct 
relation to literature, it is because writing itself is [according to Deleuze] ‘a passage of 
Life that traverses both the livable and the lived’” (xiv). Smith illuminates Deleuze’s 
understanding of the “purpose” of literary texts, which act both as entertainment and as 
vehicles through which one can better understand the nature of one’s self relative to the 
“actual world,” or the space of brute facts that are non-interpretive data of consciousness 
presented as universally true—an indisputable reality. For Deleuze, the domain of 
literature and its analysis is not reserved solely for narratology and other methods of 
disseminating textual-fictional ideas—ones that remain under the illusory terminology 
“fiction.”  
 The concept of fiction—that which is not based on historical data or empirical 
evidence, and all that is imagined and has not yet occurred in the actual world, or is not 
imagined ever to occur in this world—is not one that can be easily defined. Of course, 
there are various words in common parlance, like “fictitious,” and phrases such as “in 
fact”; these syntactical constructs are designed to signify only one meaning; that is, in 
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using these words, one is asserting a binary system of truth, one that states that x-phrase 
is either true or false. This phrase can be true or false alone, and the application of such 
phraseologies as counter-attacks on alternative perspectives has the ability to assign 
immediate finitude to x-content. If a claim is true, it cannot be false; but at the same time, 
it is limited only to being true. Thus, when Smith argues via Deleuze that artists and 
philosophers are “‘physicians of culture’ for whom phenomena are signs or symptoms 
that reflect a certain state of forces” (xvii), it quite reasonable that “artists and authors can 
go further in symptomatology than doctors and clinicians” precisely because “the work of 
art” allows authors, artists, and philosophers to develop a “new means” of understanding, 
or a Proustian “optical instrument” with which one can view the world through an 
alternative lens (xvii). Such a lens may perhaps be rather far removed from the 
institutional norms of each society and its structure, but this method of using the literary 
text to uncover truths concerning the nature of one’s own world—and even one’s own 
self—is exactly how I define potentiality: the possibility to do or create x in a possible 
world of the mind, which is an individuated fraction of infinite universal space. 
Potentiality finds its ontology in the mind-space, because that which is not actual is not of 
the actual world. What is more, we have possible worlds in our actual world as readers of 
literary fiction, and we are able to craft working and functioning possible worlds that are 
of the literary text—which are fictional.  
 If the fictional possible worlds are created by the human mind in the actual world 
of empiricism and brute facts, this necessarily implies that possible worlds have existed a 
priori to their fictional representations. Thus we see that the term “fictionality,” 
developed in the field of narratology, is a limiting force on potentiality, because if readers 
are designed to view the text as solely fictional with the connotation of being untrue, then 
the possible worlds of the text function only as points in a plot. As a result of this 
limitation, readers may forget that possible worlds existed first in their own world; and if 
the possible worlds existing in every mind of each conscious being are not recognized, 
then literary terminology manages to extinguish the potentiality of the reader to see 
possible worlds in fiction as representative of states of mind and being in the actual 
world. If one cannot recognize potentiality for what it is, the non-actualized matter cannot 
enter the process of entelechy within the mind-space, which is designed to actualize or 
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give form to that which is not yet actual. The infinite potentiality of the individual mind-
space of the finite and corporeal being is lost in a sea of anonymity; it is immanent, but it 
cannot be recognized by one’s conscious state of the logical mind, (i.e. cause and effect 
empirical and replicable knowledge), if the mind has already assigned the word “untrue” 
to possible worlds. If possible worlds created by beings in consciousness presented in the 
literary text are viewed as an artifice of fiction, then the perceiver forfeits his or her own 
potentiality simply in failing to recognize that the ontology of fiction is rooted in the 
mind and housed in the brain, which exists in the finite corporeal body in the actual 
world. Thus fiction becomes an untruth that forges the illusion which denies the bond 
between actual and possible worlds of both the literary creation and the space of 
existence for all readers. Deleuze, then, highlights the “fictitious” illusion that the literary 
text bears no meaning or parallel to the world of its readers. The denial of the relevance 
of fiction combined with its status as leisurely perpetuates the finitude that one places 
upon oneself in dismissing the fictional possible world’s relevance outside the act of 
reading. Therefore, Deleuze subverts literary criticism in such a way that the literary text 
becomes a tool that allows the individual to understand the nature of one’s world, rather 
than an escape from this world in the conviction that fiction will divide oneself from the 
so-called realities of the actual world. I adopt Deleuze’s approach to literary sources as a 
means of understanding the actual world of readers with a simple question that he asks of 
the text: “how does it function?” (xxii).  
 I mobilize Deleuze’s question concerning function in the context of possible 
worlds, and the effect that they have on readers of the text; and, consequently, how 
fictional possible worlds inspire “actual” possible worlds for readers in the shared space 
of the actual world. In order to acknowledge the various sources from which I draw my 
own definition of possible worlds and their function, I will describe in brief several 
examples of the various established definitions and applications of Possible Worlds 
Theory.  
 The fields which utilize the concept of Possible Worlds Theory have many 
premises in common, but they also bear marked differences. David Lewis, a logician, 
approaches possible worlds via modal realism, which narrative theorist Ruth Ronen 
describes as the most “radical” understanding of possible worlds, where “all modal 
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possibilities we might stipulate, as well as the actual world, are equally realized in some 
logical space where they possess a physical existence” (Ronen 22). Lewis defines modal 
realism as the acceptance of a “plurality of worlds,” which “consist of us and all our 
surroundings, however remote in time and space; just as it is one big thing having lesser 
things as parts, so likewise do other worlds have lesser other-worldly things as parts” 
(Lewis 2). Furthermore, Lewis describes possible worlds—those which are potentialities, 
but not current objective realities—as “unactualized possibilities” (5). Here, we see the 
groundwork for non-actualized matter to enter the process of entelechy within the 
individual mind-space; but what is more, that “unactualized” is followed directly by 
“possibilities,” which necessary implies the existence of potentiality inherent to matter, 
but relevant only when a stream of consciousness in one individual recognizes the matter 
and seeks to provide it with the form it demands for its existence in the actual world. This 
is a process of the subjective mind-space, and Lewis adds: “if my perceptual experience 
would be the same no matter what was going on around me, I would not be perceiving 
the world” (23). Perception is individuated, and necessarily subjective, and I return to the 
issue of perspective shortly. But first, I want to underscore a fundamental principle of 
possible worlds—both in fiction and in life—that is, the principle of action signified by 
Lewis’s use of the phrase “going on,” which can only validate further that the universe in 
which we live is an aggregate of all experience: possible, actual, sensorial, 
hallucinatory—simply stated, all experiences of all individuals. This aggregate is what I 
will later refer to as the world in constant flux, which works on the larger scheme of the 
actual world beyond the novel, and the possible worlds both of fiction and of experience 
in the actual world. 
 In my fourth chapter I discuss in detail the idea of both actual and possible worlds 
existing in a constant state of flux, so the last point made by Lewis that I wish to touch 
upon speaks to the idea of an aggregate as a whole of many parts in constant flux. Lewis 
argues that “a world is unified [ ] by the spatiotemporal interrelation of its parts” (71); 
and I argue in accordance with Lewis in the context of possible worlds in both fictional-
actual worlds and the actual world of readers, whose various internal possible worlds 
exist relative to others surrounding them. 
6 
 
 
 
 When I refer to the “actual world,” I will make a clear distinction as to whether I 
speak of the work of fiction or the world of readers; and though this differentiation is 
important, it is more for purpose of context, because the actual worlds which I discuss 
both concern what Ronen would call the “states of affairs” (21). I cannot deny that the 
term “actual world” is without its problems, because each individual in the actual world 
perceives that which is “actual” or “real” differently. However, for the purpose of this 
analysis, I define the actual world as a shared space between all conscious beings and all 
matter in the universe; and thus, there can be fictional universes with their own actual 
worlds, which are modelled according to the actual world in which the readers of fiction 
exist. Amidst these readers there are writers, and the literary text sustains possible and 
actual worlds as a simulacrum of the writer’s actual world. Ronen’s explanation of the 
actual world is the best definition in the context of my analysis, but I do move away from 
her definition of possible worlds, which are “other ways things could have been, that 
there exist other possible states of affairs” (21). Lubomir Doležel has a wider scope in the 
ideation of possible worlds than Ronen, and his research parallels some significant points 
made by Lewis, most specifically the idea of “non-actualized worlds” and their potential 
to spread in “uncountable” amounts (13). However, Doležel stipulates that possible 
worlds in the framework of his argument are of “empirical disciplines,” and that these 
worlds are necessarily “finite [in] possible particulars” (15). Doležel relies on 
empiricism, and it is here that my argument diverges from theories of narratology and 
linguistics. 
 Metaphysics is the study of first principles and abstract concepts concerning time 
and space, (and many other concepts, but for this study time and space are most 
prominent) and it has an unbreakable bond with natural sciences, or physics. In order for 
philosophers to study first principles, there must be substance, space, and energy that 
exist prior to x-given first principle. And in addition to the existence of this first principle, 
there must be already a conscious being, who can only exist within the framework of 
space and its status as a priori to metaphysics. Thus, where I part from Doležel, I 
converge with physicist Brian Greene. Though I will continue to argue that empiricism 
limits the potentiality of the human mind by assigning finitude in determining a definitive 
and deductive fact, there are concepts from physics—specifically theoretical physics—
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that elucidate some metaphysical concerns that I address in terms of the mind in space 
and the mind as space. The overarching concept that I aim to elucidate in an analysis of 
conscious beings with infinite potentiality is that of infinite space. I do not attempt to 
validate the infinitude of space, because the best possible answer remains indefinite and 
vague; we cannot, at this time, see the “beginning” of space, and thus we conclude with 
the most reasonable scientific data that space is infinite, because it expands faster than the 
speed of light, and its nature cannot be defined by formulaic expression. My intent is to 
provide an analysis that argues in favour of infinite space, and I do this through the 
literary text and the various worlds created in these texts, as well as beyond the pages of 
the book.  
 Just as Deleuze questions the ways that the literary text functions in the actual 
world of its readers, I, too, adopt this approach because literature can in fact inform a 
greater body of knowledge that transcends the solitary reader. The initial step to this 
method seems rather apparent; that is, we must consider the literary text as impacting 
larger discourses in the actual world of readers. Unfortunately, this initial step is often 
overlooked simply based on the affiliation of the word “fiction” with the literary text. In a 
world where empirical sciences are the most prominent and influential discourses 
concerning the advancement of the human mind and all of which it creates, the non-
empirical nature of theoretical sciences and metaphysics is not recognized by the 
collective consciousness as an unquantifiable resource for knowledge. This sole reader, 
however, is the vehicle through which the literary text asserts its relevance and presence 
in the actual world. The reader of the literary text can be either passive or active in their 
investment in the novel; it is the active reader who sees potentiality in the pages of the 
fantastical, the childish, the ridiculous, or the seemingly impossible nature of the text.  
 To read actively is a choice, but it is also indicative of the reader’s pre-established 
definition of his or her own self. As Gregory Chaitin states: “Mathematics is a wonderful, 
mad subject, full of imagination, fantasy, and creativity that is not limited by the petty 
detail of the physical world, but only by the strength of our inner light” (Pickover ii). 
Thus in the process of self-definition, the thinker chooses either an existence which 
adheres to empiricism, or the thinker chooses to believe that the unanswerable and non-
empirical questions are similar to non-actualized matter as potentiality to. That a question 
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has no definitive answer does not speak to an impossible or impenetrable truth, but rather 
to an immanent truth that has yet to be recognized by the thinker. Possible worlds that 
exist in the literary text whose ontological origin is of the mind of a conscious being in 
the actual world—the infinite space of all existence—are prototypes of what could exist 
in the actual world if an immanent truth is recognized in the possible world as possessing 
a certain truth-value applicable to life in the actual world. Once identified, the conscious 
being sweeps up the non-actualized data of consciousness and brings it into the process of 
entelechy—the process that makes the non-actual actual. The only limitation upon the 
potentiality of the human mind is itself, and one must choose to break free from the 
institutional chains of finite thinking that operate only as a means to an end, nothing 
more. That which is finite offers nothing more than what is apparent to the eye or 
believed by the mind; but that which is unanswered is freed of its potential finitude. As 
such, the way by which a reader may profit from the literary text in his or her own life 
demands the acceptance of the undefined existence of something—a “something” that is 
not absent, but rather present in space, though undiscovered by the mind. 
 A temporary approach with which we may embark upon the study of possible 
worlds of the literary text is simply the idea of a change in perspective. Karsten Harries 
discusses René Descartes’s approach to the world, whose nature was commonly 
perceived as a labyrinth—and could justly be considered as such today. Harries explains 
the Cartesian approach to the nature of the universe through reference to anamorphic art, 
where the viewer continually shifts positions in order to view the painting from a 
different angle or perspective, only to find that the original perspective is now clouded by 
something not apparent to the eye in the original observation. One could in theory move 
through the entirety of the one-hundred and eighty-degree spectrum and note additional 
details that did not appear present at the former degree—a mere shift of one degree in 
perspective. Therefore, Harries contends that various perspectives “prevent us from 
taking even the second point of view too seriously. It, too, is incapable of giving us more 
than appearance. What is thus revealed is the deficiency of all perspectives” (314). It 
appears, then, that those who choose to venture into the realm of unanswered questions 
and non-actualized data are, in a literal sense, living in the moment, because the 
perspective of one individual’s comprehension of the nature of the universe is but a 
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fragment of the infinite space that hosts the unanswered questions, or the immanent 
truths. Nonetheless, possible worlds are the equivalent of a perspective, one whose 
interiority projects a variant of the perceived onto the fabric of universal space—the 
space of the actual world. The nature of this variant idea relies upon the mind-space and 
the various possible worlds within; and moreover, the nature of this variant relies heavily 
upon how the possible world “functions,” and how the being understands the mechanics 
of his or her own creation within the mind-space. Possible worlds, once removed from 
the actual world in which we exist, are those of the literary text; and just as one must 
recognize the potentiality to do or create x in the act of recognizing non-actualized 
internal matter, so too must the reader develop the aptitude that will allow these 
prototypical possible worlds to reveal themselves as potential actualized truths in the 
actual world. 
 I have outlined in brief several theoretical approaches to Possible Worlds Theory, 
all of which have informed my redefinition of possible worlds. I use the term “actual 
world” in its standard definition, and I acknowledge the value of current scholarship with 
the commonly defined notion of possible worlds; but more can be done—we can push the 
mind forward and expand our knowledge concerning the nature of the universe with a 
minor shift in perspective—by the revision of our current notion of possible worlds.  
 Possible Worlds Theory is loosely based upon the philosophy of Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz and his phrase “worlds within worlds.” In reading Leibniz’s research on 
metaphysics, physics, and mathematics, I mobilize his argument concerning the 
continuum—which I introduce in the Flaubert chapter—and for the purpose of this 
introduction we can consider it as the universal space that facilitates the redefinition of 
possible worlds as spaces of the mind, whose consciousness can recognize non-actualized 
matter and bring it into the actual world via entelechy. As I have stated earlier, there is an 
unbreakable bond between physics and metaphysics—or, more plainly, there is an 
inherent link between each individual mind—which is in itself a space—and universal 
space, that which we know as the universe. I argue that mind-space and universal space 
are akin to fragments of the infinite and the infinite aggregate in constant flux, 
respectively; and that if space is infinite and unbounded, then the human mind can also be 
conceived of in this way. Of course, the human mind relies upon the brain which is of the 
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finite body in the actual world, but there are no limitations on the mind’s potentiality to 
do or create x in a possible world. Said otherwise, the mind cannot exist into infinity, 
although in its finite existence it has infinite potentiality to recognize non-actualized data 
in the possible worlds of the mind-space. The prominent discourses within the mind that 
are founded in actual-world logic are the only limiting factor on the magnitude of 
knowledge within reach of the mind-space. However, in order for the infinite potentiality 
of the mind-space to be true in the actual world, one must first accept that non-actualized 
matter exists in the immediate present, and that its absence of form does not signify 
nothingness, but rather something-ness that is yet to be given form by the conscious mind 
in the process of entelechy. 
 The literary text allows readers to identify with greater ease the presence, 
existence, and necessity of possible worlds, because it is not often that one will ponder 
the infrastructure of one’s own mind. We do not recognize possible worlds in the self 
without some exterior indicator that prompts us to turn inwards; this is because our 
consciousness is the flow of duration between our internal possible worlds and the actual 
world. Most importantly, this duration of the self is homogeneous, because we do not 
juxtapose each event of each day with the one prior to it or the one to follow, simply 
because this disharmony would disrupt the cognitive functioning of the being in the 
actual world. The events of one being of one lifetime are united by the self-defined 
pronoun “I,” and thus the universe hosts these homogeneous individual mind-spaces that 
continue to infinity.  
 To take this concept of homogeneous mind-spaces expanding to infinity to a 
meta-analytic level, I argue that each homogeneous mind-space that exists in infinite 
space has in itself infinite potentiality, which brings us full circle to Leibniz’s “worlds 
within worlds.” If each mind-space is perceived objectively, we should find that the being 
in universal space extends itself in various dimensions as it compiles the events of life 
and the experiential data that ensues. An individual mind-space is of universal space in its 
ontology, hence the mimicry in nature of spatiality; both bear features of the infinite, but 
where the mind-space has infinite potentiality in itself, this privilege is a result of the 
existence of universal space that allows the epistemic evolution of the mind and its 
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extension in space to occur. Mind-spaces are infinite in potentiality; space is, quite 
simply, infinite. 
 Following Greene’s argument that “each of these ballooning universes has its own 
infinite spatial expanse, and hence contains infinitely many of the parallel worlds” (7), I 
approach the literary texts as vehicles through which a clearer understanding of the nature 
of infinity and the role of matter and energy allows a deeper understanding of the 
metaphysical properties immanent in the minds of all conscious beings.  
 The first body-chapter addresses the notion of an internal “void” within each 
individual, and how this void acts as a zone of transmission and continuity of thought 
between one’s internal and external duration. I discuss the void in the context of 
Lawrence Durrell’s short story “Zero” (1939), which presents itself as incoherent 
sentences that are syntactically correct, though there appears to be no coherence in the 
flow of sentences. What is most striking about this short story is that its very title 
signifies the problematic nature of the number 0, which can often be affiliated with 
nothingness or non-existent matter; and moreover, the nonsensicality of the sentences 
suggests that there is no “meaning” to the text as a whole, but this idea of “nothing” or 
“void” is problematic in itself. Therefore, I discuss the void as a space of the mind that 
exists in the being of universal space, and how words such as “zero,” “nothing,” or 
“void” are not indicative of null-value of matter, but instead imply that the absence of 
matter is not the equivalent to “nothing,” but simply “something” that has yet to be 
recognized by the conscious being. 
 I move from an analysis of the void as non-actualized matter to the concept of 
infinite potentiality of the mind-space, and I discuss this premise in the context of 
Gustave Flaubert’s “Un coeur simple,” or “A Simple Heart” (1877). And in developing 
an argument that expresses the potentiality of the mind-space to do or create x in a 
possible world, I move into the final chapter in which I argue in favour of Leibniz’s 
“worlds within worlds” theory. I argue that the individual is a part, or building block, of 
the aggregate of all existence in infinite space; and at the same time, I explain how each 
homogeneous self-defined “I” is a whole of many parts, and thus we find that there are 
cycles of expansion in the mind that actualize experiential data, which, in turn, contribute 
to the ever-expanding matter in space that extends to infinity.  
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 In the final body-chapter I discuss Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland (1865), where I discuss the theories of infinite progress and infinitesimal 
regress as systems of expansion of matter in space, which includes both mind-space and 
universal space. These systems of progress and regress are, again, systems that speak to 
perspective, or one’s spatiotemporal position, because infinite progress unveils 
knowledge from a given point in space moving forward, whereas infinitesimal regress 
uncovers knowledge at a specified point of space moving backwards through the events 
in duration that lead to the current state of x-given matter or phenomenon. 
 My design is to illuminate the metaphysical nature of the human mind and its 
potentiality by way of storytelling. Each life is much like a narrative, and when we 
recount events in the flow of time, we compose them as narratives. Therefore, the literary 
text is a narrative that has the potential to expose various metaphysical features of the 
mind-space relative to universal space, because it is an account which beckons 
interpretation, which may suggest possible realities external to our own. Furthermore, 
possible worlds in the literary text are identifiable, and now the word “fiction” supports 
the epistemic development of the reader. When the reader recognizes the fictional nature 
of the literary text, there is no judgment as to whether the events are possible or 
impossible; the reader sees such events taking place in possible worlds, and the text itself 
can act as a possible world accessible by the reader. In turn, we find that the literary text 
has the ability to expand the consciousness of readers, which may allow them to become 
increasingly aware of their own internal discourses, and which may encourage them to 
question or redefine their understanding of what is possible or impossible. These 
processes occur in the mind-space, and in our textual analyses we come to identify the 
constant presence of possible worlds within the self. These possible worlds ensure the 
infinite potentiality of the mind, but only upon their recognition as existing spaces 
invisible to the eye. The mind-space is a possible world, but if we wish to capitalize on 
our own potentiality, we must find what is immanent within—that is, that the mind-space 
is a possible world that exists with or without our permission. Potentiality, on the other 
hand, comes into fruition only once one comes to accept the presence of possible worlds 
alongside the infinite potentiality of the mind-space of readers, and all conscious beings 
in our actual world. 
13 
 
 
 
Chapter 2. 
Durrell’s Excursion into Reality: Zero as a Place and the Void as a Space 
“Humans are the horizon between the immaterial and the material, the infinite and the 
finite, the timeless and the temporal. In humans the ultimate ontological principle becomes 
aware of itself [ ] this is human consciousness or self-awareness.”—Christian Moevs.1 
  
 Lawrence Durrell’s short story, “Zero” (1939), is the second and final installment 
of Zero and Asylum in the Snow: Two Excursions into Reality, a work that resembles in 
many ways French Surrealism, yet one that defies not only the left-wing politics of 
Surrealism, but politics en masse. In the late 1930s, Durrell was an enthusiastic follower 
of Henry Miller, an American author situated in Paris at the Villa Seurat. Miller’s work 
was generally obscene in terms of sexual content, but Durrell praised Miller’s Tropic of 
Cancer (1934), which was banned in the United States under pornography laws; and in 
1938, Durrell published his homage to his authorial muse—a work which supported free 
speech in fiction—The Black Book. Strikingly obscene in nature, The Black Book seemed 
as if it were an emulation of The Tropic of Cancer, and it is undeniable the influence that 
Miller had upon Durrell’s work; yet this mimicry was not for a lack of ideas of creativity, 
but rather a lack of direction.  
 After a lengthy epistolary correspondence, Durrell met Miller and Anaïs Nin at 
the Villa Seurat in Paris. The Villa Seurat became a hub for the exchange of artistic ideas, 
and a space in which the Orwellian “politics of the unpolitical” was expressed freely due 
to the bond between a group of antiauthoritarian artists and writers. “Zero” and “Asylum 
in the Snow” were dedicated to Henry Miller and Anaïs Nin, and the stories underscored 
the brand of anarchism prevalent in the Villa Seurat network during the Second World 
War. Durrell scholar, James Gifford, explains that the brand of anarchism to which the 
Villa Seurat members ascribed was a sort of “non-hierarchic” form of “mutualist 
individualism” (“Introduction” x), and thus there was no leader—no manifesto declaring 
a stance or a goal; it was simply those who wished to express themselves in writing, free 
from the confines of propriety and censorship.  
                                                 
1 The Metaphysics of Dante’s Comedy (6). 
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 Durrell’s two short stories act as unintentional manifestos, in that they declare no 
stance, but state every thought. The stories are an act of free associative discourse—one 
that occurs within the mind of the protagonist: “Lawrence Durrell.” Very little academic 
scholarship has come out of these dynamic stories—these tales of interiority and 
introspection, with no care for those outside of the self. Gifford is the only scholar who 
has provided in-depth analyses of these stories, and though they receive mention in larger 
monographs concerning Durrell’s work, the references are fleeting and vague; no one has 
engaged what is arguably the true labyrinth of Durrell’s literary corpus. Gifford explains 
that the two stories are “the first works being considered in this tracing of the 
development of [Durrell’s] epistemological skepticism” (“Foucault” 71). Undoubtedly, 
the stories are unique and mimic no one;2 and though one might find the quasi-surrealist 
tendencies in the Excursion, Durrell removes his art from the realm of politics which 
dominated wartime continental Europe and Britain. In fact, it seems as if the politics of 
war surrounding Durrell3 encouraged his defiance of politics: he neither supported nor 
refuted the war—he did not care to be involved. Gifford notes that “Unlike defined 
movements, such as Imagism or Surrealism, a definite manifesto and adherence to it is 
antithetical to the personalist and anti-authoritarian spirit of this group” (Personal xix), 
and in the stories we find an anti-manifesto, which in turns serves as a manifesto of the 
self, a self that does not defy hierarchy, but simply refuses to acknowledge its presence. 
Most importantly, as per the concept of the politics of the unpolitical, Durrell’s “Zero” 
and “Asylum” do not shy away from controversy, nor do they escape the scathing eye of 
the more prominent publishing houses.  
 Gifford approaches the two short stories through the lens of madness, and the 
reason is rather apparent given the syntactical-semantic disconnect. In a sort of stream of 
consciousness, each sentence follows the previous, of course; but often readers find there 
is no necessary connection between a paragraph of sentences: it is, rather, an aggregate of 
many parts, which are related only by their situation relative to each other on paper. Thus 
                                                 
2 It could be argued that “Zero” and “Asylum” resemble Anaïs Nin’s early short work of fiction, the House of Incest 
(1936), but I would suggest that the style of writing is more a reflection of the antiauthoritarian—thus anti-structure—
mentality, and likely inspired, though differentiated, from French Surrealist free association or stream of consciousness. 
3 Durrell was living in Corfu in 1940, and when Germany invaded Greece, he escaped to Alexandria, but was forced to 
leave behind many of his manuscripts, including the original scripts for “Zero” and “Asylum in the Snow.” However, 
in this relocation to Egypt, the scene inspired Durrell’s Alexandria Quartet (1957-60), which is the work that was most 
widely read, and the one for which he is best known. 
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readers see the illusion of madness, and Gifford argues that the protagonist, Lawrence 
Durrell, fears the “collapse of the dominant form of ‘sanity,’ which inspires the 
segregation of the asylum” (“Foucault” 76). But this sanity, given the temporal and 
political context, is insanity; it is the mechanistic devotion of young men who wish to die 
for the freedom of those whom they love; it is romanticized militarism, and a despicable 
ignorance according to the anarchists of the Villa Seurat network.4 But this segregation is 
important if we wish to consider the two stories beyond the heuristic of madness, and 
from the exterior of the dominant World War II politics. Though we can consider Durrell 
an affiliate of the Villa Seurat network, it was individuation that made each writer a part 
of this group; the common ground was self-definition and pure autonomy. Gifford states 
that: 
The sense of identity most prevalent in anarchist theory as well as across 
the later 1930s writers I have identified as personalist is not necessarily 
immutable despite being individual, and it need not be stable nor essential. 
It need only be one’s own. This is to say, the self may not be fully known 
even to the individual living it or who brings the self into being by living 
it; yet its necessary dream is of an existence beyond the determination of 
its material conditions. (Personal 54) 
For Durrell, his writing was an act of self-definition and autonomy; his life was not pre-
determined, but rather self-determined. As such, it seems that in the midst of wartime 
chaos and the anti-pacifist discourses that an interior space would be best both in terms of 
self-amelioration and artistic freedom. This interiority is the prevailing feature of “Zero” 
and “Asylum in the Snow,” and though these stories are together one excursion “into 
reality,” I focus on “Zero,” simply due to its suggestive title. That is, can we accept the 
word “zero” as meaning nothing? Or does it mean anything? After all, zero is a 
placeholder between the positive and negative whole numbers. But if we consider that the 
Ancient Babylonians solved numerous mysteries in the “discovery” of zero, I hold that a 
deeper analysis of that which feigns nothingness is truly something-ness. 
                                                 
4 Orwell was very well oriented in the politics of war, and he fought in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) in the anti-
Stalinist pro-Marxist division, and he was disgusted by the pacifism of Henry Miller and others at the Villa Seurat. But 
more notably, in his essay Inside the Whale, which unfavourably reviews Miller’s Tropic of Cancer, Orwell uses the 
term “boy scout mentality” to refer to the generation of author’s (the High Modernists), like Virginia Woolf, D.H. 
Lawrence, Ezra Pound, and T.S. Eliot, to name a few. Many of these writers were opposed to the war, or were known 
pacifists, which angered Orwell due to his Marxist attitude towards social responsibility. At the same time, Orwell had 
no problem accepting Miller’s overcoat after they met while Orwell was en route to Catalonia. 
16 
 
 
 
 Between every actual and possible world lies a void—an equilibrium point 
between the two co-existing worlds of the possible and the actual. Terminologically 
speaking, “the void” sounds empty, and the phrase raises feelings of discomfort of the 
unknown and the indecipherable; but I want to suggest an alternative route around this 
obstacle in thought. In this chapter my aim is to configure a working definition of the 
void—what it means to be a void—and to illuminate the indisputable value of this space 
within the self as a means to assess, sort, and integrate new information into actual and 
possible worlds. 
 “Zero” exemplifies my conception of the void. A rendition of French Surrealism, 
“Zero” invites numerous readings, and I draw upon this text to explain the nature of the 
void that I claim exists between possible and actual worlds.5 If we were to view the void 
as a sort of quantum phenomenon, whose nature is “often described in terms of possible 
physical properties not yet actualized” (Deacon 3; emphasis mine), then we find that the 
infinitely small or the possible has substance, though often indeterminable by the eye. 
Thus, if quantum phenomena have substance, then they must necessarily be considered as 
matter, which receives its form—its fundamental structure—from substance (Moevs 50).6 
 Zero and infinity are two semiotic creations: the absence of substance and the 
unbounded nature of reality, but these are not numbers, these are symbols which attempt 
to quantify reality, when they are in fact qualifiers of the nature of the universe. It seems 
that Durrell’s “Zero” is a perfect place to begin an inquiry into the nature of human 
potentiality—even when one might suggest there is none, or that there is zero 
potentiality. If zero implies nothingness (le néant), then it might logically be said that it is 
a “void.” The qualifiers “zero” and “void” are easily likened to the “nothingness” of 
Sartrean existentialism; but I want readers to consider the void as a space, because if 
qualities are meant to describe space and its substances, and if the word “void” is a 
qualifier that signifies substance, (i.e. a void between layers of sediment and stone is a 
                                                 
5 Of course there are numerous definitions for the term “void,” but in using the definite article with this term, I refer 
specifically to a void space between possible and actual worlds, one that is void of substance. 
6 This stream of thinking finds its roots in Ancient Greek philosophy, but it remains a valid mean of understanding the 
nature of the universe, in spite of the fact that the mathematics and sciences have long since abandoned Ancient 
sciences. However, the concept of zero was revealed by the Ancient Babylonians, and perfected in terms of division by 
zero much later by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Isaac Newton; so in spite of many antiquated ideas, most apparent in 
cosmology and science, the numeric universe requires existence for all formulas which needed to express absence of 
substance. See Amir D. Aczel’s Finding Zero: A Mathematician’s Odyssey to Discover the Origin of Numbers. 
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canyon, but was once akin to the rock walls by which it is now surrounded), then the void 
is something; in fact, it is the space with the strongest potentiality to develop or to host 
substance, whether it is the Bergsonian mind-energy or physical matter. The void awaits 
matter: it anticipates actuality. But prior to the textual analysis, I want to provide some 
context for the discussion of the nature of the void, as well as the processes which can 
occur within the space of the void. 
 Northrop Frye describes the void in terms of Buddhist thought, where “the world 
is everything within nothingness. As nothing is certain or permanent in the world, 
nothing either real or unreal, the secret of wisdom is detachment without withdrawal” 
(156). I look at this detachment as an objective and intentional action on behalf of the 
thinking individual, but what is more, this detachment allows the thinker to advance on 
what Lawrence Durrell describes as the “self-subsisting plane of reality towards which 
the spiritual self of man is trying to reach out through various media” (“Heraldic” 72). 
Frye would categorize Durrell’s plane of reality as “the medium by which the world 
becomes visible . . . an opportunity for human energy, not a stifling darkness or a 
concealed revelation” (157). The mind is the unbounded counterpart of the corporeal 
body, and it is observed by others as consciousness; and while the brain is physical 
matter, it is the mind that explores new planes of reality—the mind-space—the creative 
undercurrent of psychical energy and being. Time is the human construct which allows 
the thinking individual to situate events via temporal markers, like sequences or 
perceived cause and effect; as such, time signifies consciousness, because it is a system 
that aids memory, and therefore it exists in consciousness as each mind evolves in 
duration. Bergson sees consciousness simply as being characterized by its “most obvious 
feature: it means, before everything else, memory” (Mind 3). The duration experienced 
by consciousness is akin to internal, individuated duration within the mind; and thus the 
status afforded to universal, homogeneous duration, is that of the record-keeper of all 
substance, missing, potential, or present. (Time 154). In fact, Bergson states that duration 
is space (163)—an open plane or conceptual canvas upon which physical matter and the 
data of consciousness impress themselves upon this conceptual spatial fabric.  
 The recognition and experience of universal space, however, is by way of human 
consciousness, which is the ontological origin of the acknowledged presence of space. 
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We cannot confirm that space exists if there is no human consciousness, because if there 
were no consciousness, then the potential to deduce facts via experience is non-existent. 
Though human beings were born into universal, or homogeneous space, the existence of 
human consciousness is the only objective validation of the existence of a priori space.7 
If there were not human consciousness, space may very well exist—and may do so with 
some sort of purpose—but in the context of perception and consciousness, if there were 
not such human faculties, we cannot say one way or another whether space exists. 
However, at this moment the study of space continues, and we know that the term 
“space-time” explains four-dimensional space; that is, the length, width, and height of 
matter impressing itself upon space, and thus the fourth dimension is the human construct 
of time—the quantification of perceived phenomena in motion and the relation between x 
and y matter. Space-time is a helpful definition of that which is difficult to conceptualize, 
therefore I will adapt this definition to explain the many dimensions of the mind, which is 
a part of space. At present, physicists argue that there are twenty-six dimensions in space 
(Gubser 3); but given that space is unbounded and infinite, and that the mind exists in this 
space and is limited only by itself, then I argue that mind has infinite potentiality to do or 
create x under the premise that anything is possible, though not necessarily plausible or 
immanent. Nonetheless, with infinite potentiality to do or create x, which I will return to 
shortly, it seems reasonable to consider the mind as having infinitely many dimensions.8 
Therefore, I will use the term “mind-space” to refer to the subjective interior of 
individual consciousness, which exists as a part of the whole of space—much akin to 
Bergsonian duration, where an event does not place itself: 
Alongside its actual state as one point alongside another, but forms both 
the past and the present states into an organic whole, as happens when we 
recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another.” 
(Bergson, Time 100) 
                                                 
7 I say this under the assumption that human beings are the only form of life with analytic and cognitive-reasoning 
capacities due to consciousness, although in Physics one might argue that there exists a parallel universe where you and 
I both exist as you and I exist here—a duplicate world, and thus a duplicate reality. But this argument is also strongly 
opposed, so I make this statement concerning human consciousness under the supposition that Earth is the singular 
human reality. 
8 If we accept the premise that the mind has infinite potentiality to do or create x, it is due to the mind’s relation to 
infinite space that I say the mind has infinitely many dimensions. If space is in fact a flat and open plane that expands at 
a speed faster than we can account for, then the mind is similar in this construct, because it is a part of space. But this 
requires the ability to perceive the mind as hosted by the brain of the body, but it relies on the body only for its 
existence, whereas its sustenance is of itself, and infinite. As such, there must be infinitely many dimensions, because 
there is no geometric shape the confines the mind to n-many dimensions. 
19 
 
 
 
The mind is relative to others, and it is part of the composition of homogeneous duration, 
or space; and as such, the mind-space is an unique unit in itself, while maintaining its 
position as a part of a whole of universal duration. 
 We have established the mind-space, but how does this relate to the void? And 
importantly, can we in good conscience dismiss the void as empty or as nothingness? I 
propose that this space of seeming nothingness has definite substance due to the presence 
of human energy, psychical or otherwise; and due to its linguistically qualified nature, it 
exists at least as psychical data, which may or may not be actualized into objectively 
existent data. Said otherwise, the syntactic structure that defies nothingness is the verb 
“to be,” which necessarily implies that it “is,” and therefore it exists as a linguistic and 
symbolic reality9 known to consciousness. 
 I have explained the use of Possible Worlds theory in terms of narrative theory, 
but to take this further, let us consider these imagined or fictional spaces as the 
counterpart to the actual world of each individual. It seems sensible, then, to consider the 
void as the point of equilibrium. This void is within the self, as a space of transmission, 
where data from the possible world are actualized and integrated into one’s actual-world 
reality, and likewise in reverse—between the actual and the possible. Let us say that the 
void within the self is a space of contemplation, self-creation, and the processing or 
ordering of new information—the immanent relative truths waiting to be uncovered 
within the self by way of the possible world, and which are characteristic to the 
individual thinker. I say relative, because what is true for one may have diminished or 
null truth value for another. Further, I want to clarify that these relative data unearthed in 
possible worlds are not the product of one’s decryption of hidden truths, but are rather 
fragmented data that have become relevant to the individual through his processes of 
becoming, or epistemic evolution.10 Much akin to a fractured mirror, the shards of which 
reflect the heterogeneous whole of the self, these heterogeneous parts of an individual 
that are made homogeneous by way of the self-identifying “I” will join the homogeneous 
                                                 
9 Linguistic and symbolic reality can be an either/or. For example, data in consciousness may allow for a linguistic 
definition—the mobilization of the logos, syntax and phonetics of spoken language; but on the other hand, the data of 
consciousness may only provoke an image, thus an intuitive knowledge or awareness of x, which cannot (yet) be 
described in words. 
10 I equate the metaphysical concept of becoming to the epistemological concept of psychical maturation or evolution, 
because in both cases the self is in constant motion and flux through duration, and continually adapts according to 
experiential data in manifest in the mind-space. 
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duration of all that exists, all that is possible, and all that is missing yet immanent. The 
result of much like a mirror in its complete form: it reflects nothing, because it is 
everything; there is nothing beyond it, because there is not beyond. 
 If we consider the void as the equilibrium point between actual and possible 
worlds, then we must delve further into the purpose of this intermediary space. A 
defining characteristic of the void is memory; it is the act of recollection of experiences 
in worlds on both ends of the spectrum—actual and possible. Henri Bergson explains that 
memory “is just the intersection of mind and matter” (Matter 13), which is precisely how 
I define the unstable notion of the void. This equilibrium point is where the psychical 
events of the possible world of the mind cross paths with the physical matter of the actual 
world, but crossing paths is not necessarily synonymous with the pairing or bonding 
practice that unites mind and matter. Rather, it is through the individual processes of 
becoming that consciousness and matter unite in duration. Becoming is just as much a 
psychical event as it is physical; just as one’s body ages based on its evolution through 
space-time, the mind engages with external data, thus determining the relevance of each 
material stimulant, or each experience that merits psychical response. But let us turn 
towards a fictional example of becoming in the void, so as to draw upon a solid 
framework through which we can assess these claims. 
 Durrell provides a compelling analysis of the void in “Zero,” where he delves into 
the space of implicit nothingness through the perspective of his alter ego, Lawrence 
Durrell.11 Lawrence exists in the actual world,12 yet his mind flourishes in the possible 
space of an oil painting. “Zero” problematizes the concepts of relativity and reality, so 
there are no “givens” in this story; rather, readers are left to determine the status of 
Lawrence’s understanding of reality. One’s initial rendering of this quasi-surrealist13 
narrative would likely err towards fictionalized madness expressed in free-associative 
                                                 
11 I will refer to the protagonist as Lawrence, and to the author as Durrell. 
12 For the sake of clarity, when I use the term “actual world,” I am referring to the actual world of the fictional 
character; but if I refer to the actual world in which we as readers live, I will make this explicit. 
13 “Zero” and “Asylum in the Snow” are two short stories of the English Surrealist rendition of French Surrealism in 
the 1930s, but where the French erred towards socialism, the English group (especially the Villa Seurat Network) 
veered towards anarchism: a “non-hierarchic” form of “mutual individualism.” See James Gifford’s Personal 
Modernisms: Anarchist Networks and the Later Avant-Gardes and “Introduction” in Panic Spring by Lawrence 
Durrell. 
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discourse, or stream of consciousness, but there is deeper substance to this void, this 
nothingness. 
 Prior to our inquiry into this vast space and substance of zero, I want to bring 
Durrell’s personal notion of the sensible into the discussion. The foundation for the 
entirety of Durrell’s writing is within the principles of his “Heraldic Universe,” his space 
of creative energy; and in a sense, it acts as his personal manifesto, which elucidates his 
antiauthoritarianism. Durrell writes that “Nonsense is never just nonsense; it is more like 
good sense with all the logic removed” (“Heraldic” 73). Logic, according to Durrell, is 
the ill-equipped means of accounting for one’s world, and he notes that “Logic tries to 
describe the world; but it is never found adequate for the task. Logic is not really an 
instrument: merely a method. Describing, logic limits. Its law is causality” (72). The 
Heraldic Universe will be integral to our understanding of “Zero,” in that readers must 
forego initial “logical” deductions concerning Lawrence’s state of mind, because as he 
declares, “EVERYTHING ILLOGICAL IS GOD: AND I AM GOD!” (“Zero” 8). Thus, seeming 
madness must be peeled back in order to reveal a layer of deeper substance. Readers must 
dismiss the superficialities of fictional “meaning,” and stare deeply into the depths of the 
story to illuminate the less prominent features of the narrative, one example being 
Lawrence’s process of becoming in nothing. 
 Durrell explains that logic limits, and while there exists both verbal (rhetorical) 
logic and numeric formal logic, each system is simply a set of symbols indicating that a 
and b therefore c, the standard format for logical syllogisms. But let us consider for a 
moment the natures of zero and the void in a metaphorical sense. Zero cannot be 
quantified, represented, reduced, or deduced by any number; and what is more, the void 
is not wholly conceivable to the mind, because the logic of language bars us from a 
logical explanation: how does one visualize nothing? It seems counter-intuitive to 
conceptualize the appearance or nature of nothing, but this is precisely what Durrell 
explains: “logic limits.” But if we were to call upon Bergson’s explanation of intuition, 
he would say that it is “the direct vision of the mind by the mind” (Creative 20). Intuition 
is the mind-space becoming conscious of itself as a mind-space, and thus understanding 
its infinite potentiality to create new realities and new durations, because as Bergson 
notes: “in duration, considered as a creative evolution, there is perpetual creation of 
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possibility and not only of reality” (10). Following this train of thought, then, it is valid to 
present the unquantifiable zero and the unqualifiable void as infinite in potentiality to 
create x simply because they are not limited by logic; our inability to comprehend these 
in full ensures their freedom from the limitations of the organizational logic that is 
inherent in the social systems that shape how human beings think as the progress through 
stages of life. 
 On entering Lawrence’s world, we encounter the algebraic expression of 
nothingness, though the solution is open to speculation, crafted intentionally as such: 
sin 
2𝜋 (𝑥+3𝑎) 
𝑎
 = sin 
2𝜋𝑥
𝑎
    (8).  
I would argue that 3a=0 can be qualified as something=nothing, and thus we embark into 
a maze of nonsense that is good sense. At the same time, for 3a to equal 0, it is necessary 
that the variable a=0. Stated otherwise, it seems that the equation constructed of both 
numeric and linguistic semiotic systems undermines itself: the letter is without meaning, 
and the letter therefore supplants the meaning of 3 based on their relation to each other, 
and consequently 3a becomes 0. The equation is the breakdown of two semiotic systems, 
yet once the mathematics crusader or the linguistic formalist pursues the solution, the 
solution thus informs the discoverer that the systems of semiotic representations of reality 
are meaningless—because if 0 is equal to 0, what is left to conceptualize? We must 
conceptualize the equivalency: nothingness, which is, of course, something-ness.  
 The short story, arguably crafted with the intent to confound more than to 
facilitate comprehension, is precisely what Ruth Ronen would call “fictionality”; this 
fictional space that represents the consciousness and mental traversing of space or spaces 
by the protagonist. Though “Zero” is indeed a work of fiction, it is also a tangible 
document that invites numerous interpretations. I suggest that the fictional mind-space 
offers data equally pertinent to life as the experiential data of the actual-world being in 
the here-now space-time. In terms of the opening equation, the avid reader will not accept 
that substance (3) is the equivalent of nothingness (0=0), because “0” itself signifies that 
nothing is there, therefore, the presence of the word “is” necessarily implies its existence. 
This word-play is not the semantics of nonsense, but rather the reality of the finite 
language that artificially and unnecessarily demarcates the possible from the actual—the 
plethora of sensorial and experiential data from both worlds. This story chronicles the 
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rich substance of the void within; that is, the narrative, penned as a journal by Lawrence, 
draws readers into the interiority of his individuated void, where he ponders the data 
pertinent to his processes of becoming, and integrates it into his thinking. In our analysis 
of Lawrence’s reality, we may feel tempted to juxtapose Lawrence’s actual world and his 
possible world, but there is a means by which we can avoid binaries and come to see that 
such divisions are quite often merisms14 for one complete idea. Bergson explains that: 
If one considers two sufficiently divergent meanings, they will almost 
seem to be mutually exclusive. They are not exclusive because the chain 
of intermediary meanings links them up. By making the necessary effort to 
embrace the whole, one perceives that one is in the real and not in the 
presence of a mathematical essence which could be summed up in a 
simple formula. (“Creative” 22) 
From Bergson’s argument arises the idea of heterogeneous wholes; said otherwise, the 
merisms of one body, or one mind, or any aggregate. Each part should be identified as the 
thing in itself, which is whole and complete in its own context; but it should also be 
observed in a larger context—the environment in which it is a support system, a part of a 
whole, because without this single unity, the whole could not be whole, therefore every 
part is requisite to its corresponding whole. In terms of Lawrence’s possible and actual 
worlds, they synthesize and become one unit, but I will return to this in more detail 
shortly. 
 The void within does not change in accordance with time, but rather with one’s 
engagement with the possible world, and consequently, the data of consciousness 
transmitted between actual and possible worlds. Lawrence moves from his own actual 
world to the possible by way of the oil painting of an alluring woman: “I draw you aside 
to the corner,” he writes, “and put my hands on your body to assure myself that you are a 
woman, and to recollect what you mean” (9). That Lawrence lusts after the woman in the 
oil painting is unclear until the end of the story, but already we can see that he engages in 
a possible world—an alternative universe, where this woman is matter embodied—and 
we are given a hint as to her ontological status: Lawrence aims to recollect what she 
“means.” Art often elicits the desire to comprehend the meaning or the inspiration behind 
the art-work, and this urge is equally present in readers of literature. But in accordance 
                                                 
14 The earliest use of the term “merism” is dated to Ancient Greece, where rhetoricians use this word (merisimos) to 
mean a whole or totality expressed by seemingly opposing terms which are truly synonyms. See Oxford Dictionary of 
English Etymology. 
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with Durrell’s Heraldic Universe, we must surrender our desire for logical meaning, and 
advance into the piece of art, or literature, which is “affective [ ] rather than causal” 
(“Heraldic” 72). Lawrence engages with the painting on an affective and internally 
sensorial level; the creative energy of the art-world and his actual-world response to the 
painting unite in the void—within Lawrence’s self—and thus readers embark on the 
excursion into Lawrence’s possible world, a realm relative to no world exterior to the one 
with which he presently engages. This excursion is one of self-amelioration, of re-
creation and self-individuation. Frye notes that “When we turn to human creative power, 
we see that there is a quality in it better called re-creation, a transforming of the chaos 
within our ordinary experience in nature” (143). Lawrence’s excursion within the 
possible world is the genesis of a new duration in an expansive mind-space, and before 
the reader’s eyes, Lawrence engages with a new reality far more fruitful to his epistemic 
evolution than that of the actual world. 
 “I will tell you who I am,” writes Lawrence, “and what I am doing here. I will 
speak with a nicety of language that would give ears to the blind, and eyes to the deaf 
who hear me, but you do not understand what my glossary is” (Durrell, “Zero” 8). 
Lawrence feels ostracized and misunderstood in the actual world, and therefore invests 
his energy in the possible world of his imagined lover in the depths of the painting. 
Equipped with a glossary foreign to those in his actual world with whom he co-exists, 
Lawrence explains his isolation with the language of illogic; “ears for the blind” is the 
implicit signifier of the disconnect between Lawrence and the actual world. Lawrence is 
surrounded by material excess—eyes for the deaf mock what Durrell believes is the crush 
and uninspired logic of the actual world. As a result of this actual-world deficiency, he 
becomes enraptured with the painting, thus investing his energy in the painting’s hysteria 
of snow, or “moments in time” (8). While the animated world of the painting exists only 
in the realm of Lawrence’s own possible world, the painting itself exists undeniably 
within Lawrence’s actual world. Bergson argues that “the object exists in itself, and, on 
the other hand, the object is, in itself, pictorial, as we perceive it: image it is, but a self-
existing image” (Matter 10). To Lawrence, the painting exists with or without him, just 
as Durrell’s story exists with or without the reader. While possible worlds and their truths 
are relative solely to the creator of that world, the creator’s existence is relative to 
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nothing; there is no indexical referent that validates the creator’s existence, because the 
creator, or individual, exists regardless of external perception or validation. Here, I want 
to point out the relationship between relative possible worlds and what rhetorician John 
Searle would call “brute existence”; that is, brute existence is non-negotiable—one exists 
not as an institutional creation, but as a brute fact15—and while the mind is the source of 
creation for the possible world, the mind could not exist without the physiological brain 
in the physical body of the material word. Therefore, possible worlds should enjoy the 
status of “actual” even if their presence is but a trace in one’s behaviour in the actual 
world. Though the mind has unlimited potential to create new realities, it is still a subset 
of the body in spite of the fact that the mind can achieve more dynamic evolution than the 
body alone. Additionally, the status “actual” requires potentiality, which is sensed by 
individual consciousness, so as to bring matter from the possible into the actual world. It 
is the self-reflexive recognition of one’s own consciousness, and the potentiality for all 
unformed matter that can enter the process of actuality. This transfer of data signifies the 
unified mind—that the possible and actual are one part of a whole—and that, described 
alone are wholes in themselves, though they also act as building blocks for larger 
frameworks that constitute a whole. It seems apparent, then, that possible worlds have 
their ontological roots in the actual world—a claim that demands further investigation, so 
let us continue the examination of the validity and function of Lawrence’s possible world, 
and the void in which he deciphers all possible-world data. 
  The possible-world structure crafted by Lawrence is a framework wherein he has 
the potential to uncover immanent relative truths, or data pertinent to his own epistemic 
maturation. The new information is then processed in the more objective or detached 
space of the void; it is meditative thought without awareness of anything beyond that 
thought. The possible world at play in Lawrence’s mind allows for unexpected 
encounters with interior truths, which are neither cast in darkness nor hidden from the 
eye. These truths are steps forward in Lawrence’s active process of becoming, his 
evolving epistemological existence; they are immanent and immediate because 
epistemological maturation will eventually discover these truths, but only following 
                                                 
15 Searle classifies brute facts as objective matter that does not require conscious validation to exist, like a mountain; an 
institutional fact however, is a reality imposed on, adopted by, and acted upon by the institution, i.e. the whole of the 
people of that given context. See The Construction of Social Reality. 
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truths that must be known or learned first. Lawrence’s becoming is movement towards 
self-amelioration. This practice of self-amelioration need not be a complex system of 
actions, but can simply be understood as the process of becoming that satisfies one’s 
creative and sensorial needs; said otherwise, it is a process of separation from the 
unwanted, (in Lawrence’s case, the sane, actual world), and subsequent unification with 
desired existence.16 Lawrence’s possible world begins with a gaze, and progresses into 
the imaginary as he begins a monologue with the object of his desire: 
The memoryless hysteria of the snow closes on us like a man-trap, your 
arm in my arm. Do you think I do not understand? I see myself sitting here 
stiffly, like a robot, behind the taciturn driver. I am a figure of fun perhaps 
because I cannot find the right word, and you do not dare to speak to me. 
(8) 
Lawrence perceives the monotony of the actual world as a hysterical blizzard closing in 
on him, and here he is robotic, and thus lacks the freedom to express himself, or to move 
in directions that best serve his self-interest. In the present temporality of the actual 
world, Lawrence experiences the crushing affect of loneliness and enslavement to a 
world filled with meaningless matter; therefore, the genesis of a possible world that offers 
substance is the most appropriate way to recover the mental energy necessary to his 
existence in the actual world. He is in a process of epistemic maturation in which he must 
craft space for his mind’s substance. 
 Though it seems that the actual world errs towards the unpleasant, whereas the 
possible world is the space in which substance is beauty, the understanding of these 
worlds as reciprocal counterparts is imperative to our understanding of becoming within 
the space of the mind, and correspondingly within the space of the actual. The framework 
of the actual world consists of brute and institutional facts; all that we might consider 
entities exists not according to relativity, but to empirical and verifiable data founded in 
logic and reason (Searle 66). As such, an individual has finite options in terms of his 
existence, because the strict binary between actual/real and possible/imaginary makes the 
actual world of physical matter finite, simply due to the reality that matter is finite in 
nature, and in order to transcend this finitude one must look beyond that which is visible 
to the objective eye. Such limitations spur the genesis of possible worlds as spaces to 
                                                 
16 I draw the concepts of unification and division from Kenneth Burke’s A Rhetoric of Motives. 
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consider which substance is beckoned by the inviting nature of potential-cum-actual 
within the void. For every scientific discovery or institutional norm that we accept as 
factual and valid, a possible world was at play in the establishment of this fact. For 
example, in 1638 the first noted work of science fiction surfaced in England. Under a 
pseudonym, The Man in the Moone17 was published and passed through the hands of the 
literate, introducing them to the notion of space travel on a goose-propelled flying 
machine. Naturally, Francis Godwin feared public scrutiny: travel to the moon was 
heretical, yet three hundred and thirty-one years later, man did set foot on the moon. Thus 
we can see that innovation begins in possible worlds; what we now take for granted in 
terms of space travel, would once be deemed preposterous, but the possible world—an 
alternate reality—existed within Godwin nonetheless. Bergson makes a valid point, 
arguing that: 
images themselves are not pictured in consciousness without some 
foreshadowing . . . of the movements by which these images would be 
acted or played in space—would, that is to say, impress particular attitudes 
upon the body, and set free all that they implicitly contain of spatial 
movement. (Matter 13-14) 
The foreshadowing of the images contained in possible worlds is pure potentiality fuelled 
by that which is missing or lacking. A possible world can fill this actual-world omission, 
and more importantly, the knowledge acquired in possible worlds apparent in images and 
data is processed and contextualized in the void, and then integrated into one’s behaviour 
and actions in the actual world. The spatiotemporal position of the mind informs the 
attitudes of the body, and what was once impossible is set free into the empirical world of 
fact and logic, quickly becoming a verifiable reality. Possible worlds are a vehicle with 
which one can create a new reality, often out of that which is missing in the actual, just as 
Lawrence does with the painting. 
                                                 
17 Interestingly, Godwin’s novel was published during the Scientific Revolution at the time of the rise of Baconian 
Empiricism, so the fact that an action such as space travel that would require a command of the sciences must be 
hidden beneath a pseudonym speaks to the en masse epistemic evolution through history. Ideas must be proffered 
according to a given social context—they must be hypothesized only when what is currently possible is available to put 
the plan into motion, which is precisely the short fall of strict actual-world reasoning, because true innovation identifies 
an opportunity and develops it in such a way that the materials become readily available, even if they were unavailable 
at the time of the new idea. Instead, Godwin’s idea of space travel was considered fiction rather than potentiality; and 
though we do not fly geese to the moon, we have in fact flown human beings to the moon, and the world accepts this as 
empirical data. 
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 Lawrence navigates the possible world by recording his thoughts on paper, and 
his imagined lover is the answer to his questions—she is his muse—and Lawrence looks 
to her for answers: 
Vasec says you must bring the canary: he will not believe until he sees it 
with his own eyes . . . how can he believe that the cage was created round 
it by God? It is slightly redundant: if God gave it wings, then why the cage 
which is too small for it to use them? (10) 
Lawrence, as the creator of this asylum life, views himself as the teacher and the scribe of 
the world’s truths, and he tells his lover that he is “teaching everyone how to experience 
phenomena. In this sector of experience there is only the creative activity. We are nothing 
ourselves: we do not let our imaginations even imagine that we have a part in the cosmic 
dance” (10). Creative activity in the possible world is fundamental to the actualization of 
psychical phenomena in the actual world, where the individual exists amidst brute 
realities and institutionally created facts. One who feels anonymous in the sea of 
empirical and impersonal data can return from the mind-space—the possible world—and 
in the transition between possible and actual worlds, one can transmit psychical data into 
the actual world, thus furnishing it with the manifestations of possible-world realities. 
What is more, one can adapt to the black-and-white binary logic of the actual world by 
extending the navigational skills of reality—skills that come to fruition in the possible 
world. These skills are designed with the intention of overcoming obstacles and keeping 
the self safe from all that could harm it; therefore, it is not as if in the possible world one 
is learning the art of flying—it is more likely that one develops a set of skills that are 
used to ensure a sense of well-being and contentedness: a set of skills that assist 
epistemic fruition. Lawrence’s possible world exists within Bergsonian duration, freed 
from the shackles of institutional and organizational time, thus allowing events in the 
fabric of space to melt together like notes of a tune. Processes of becoming and the 
subsequent maturation exist in duration, and indicate that the finite mind within a worldly 
body has infinite potentiality to create new realities, because the mind-space enables this 
practice to occur. It comes as no surprise, then, that the void within each thinker is 
brimming with new and immanent information that must be realized and integrated into 
an actual or possible world. The void configures multiple durations of one being, and 
each duration has substance which holds the potential to influence its other sub-durations, 
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or planes of consciousness in the individual in both actual and possible worlds: the data 
moves to and fro continually, without interruption.  
 Vasec, though a manifestation of Lawrence’s consciousness, is a part of 
Lawrence’s internal duration in this specific possible world; and as a result, Vasec—as a 
fragmented portion of one person encapsulated in the form of Lawrence—would 
theoretically shape Lawrence’s own consciousness when he returns to the actual world. If 
we consider the void as the internal, personal space between actual and possible worlds, 
then it seems that Lawrence desires to demarcate his void from the actual world, so as to 
exist wholly in the psychical realm. Durrell crafts this possible world within the painting 
as a narrative written by Lawrence, who seeks refuge from the actual. Noting that the 
world outside of the painting is suffocating like the hysterical snow, he writes that this 
space “would be fatal to [his] peace of mind if [he] had a mind” (9), therefore 
emphasizing the homogeneity and anonymity he sees in the actual world, which cannot 
suffice his epistemic craving to evolve and move forward unceasingly. What is more, 
Lawrence jettisons the identity imposed upon him by the institutional norms of the actual 
in his stark division from tangible matter: “I am no longer fish nor fruit, vegetable, 
mineral, oracle” (11). Instead, Lawrence finds autonomy only through the imaginary, 
through the channels of the mind projecting potentialities18 onto the open canvas—the 
space—of his possible world. But in this division from the actual world, Lawrence 
restricts his overall potentiality, that is, the combination of actual and possible worlds that 
form his “whole” self. Each duration has the potential to create new realities, but with 
one less world—as is the case with Lawrence—there is one less reality and one less 
chance for self-amelioration that leads to epistemic maturation. 
 Lawrence even goes so far as to populate his possible world, with each character 
as dynamically diverse as the last. One of the imagined beings, Hamlet, has “died in the 
future—how far ahead of us all we could not tell. Even the physicist could not tell. It was 
a moment of great nicety—because we could not bury him until he joined us in the 
present” (10). The concept of temporal structure, here, is reorganized: the character can 
                                                 
18 Here, I use the word “potentialities” to mean all alternative possibilities in possible worlds. Of course it appears to be 
an illogical term, because one is not likely to imagine one has grown large wings and can fly, so one would not attempt 
to actualize this in the actual world. However, no individual has the foresight to ban with certainty any potentiality, 
regardless of its seeming illogic. And in keeping with Durrell’s Heraldic Universe and the notion that nonsense is good 
sense, the term, in this context, seems appropriate.  
30 
 
 
 
exist beyond the body; but more specifically, Lawrence seems to believe that corporeal 
boundaries limit the creative and exploratory potential of the mind. Hamlet has travelled 
into the future, which suggests that Lawrence’s possible world has neither temporal 
constructs nor corporeal limitations. Though he uses words to acknowledge the 
institutional acceptance of time, the linear structure of actual-world temporality is 
abandoned—past and future are always present, and “present” is this very moment, 
now—now, ad infinitum. Bergson argues that: 
even those few who have believed in free will, have reduced it to a simple 
“choice” between two or more alternatives, as if these alternatives were 
“possibles” outlined beforehand, and as if the will was limited to “bringing 
about” (“realiser”) one of them . . . But a real evolution, if ever it is 
accelerated or retarded, is entirely modified within; its acceleration or 
retardation is precisely that internal modification. Its content and its 
duration are one and the same thing. (Time 8-9) 
Bergson’s argument offers several critical ideas in relation to duration, and, albeit more 
indirectly, possible worlds. In terms of duration, Bergson’s conception of one’s content 
revised by epistemic evolution is the equivalent of duration; and what is more, Bergson 
discusses internal processes of becoming where one comes to terms with duration and 
begins to understand the self intuitively, familiarizing the self with the self, just as 
Bergson adds later the idea of the mind vis-à-vis the mind. In terms of free will, Bergson 
offers an ideal definition for the relation of choices in time; that is, when existing by the 
laws of institutional time, nothing can be planned in advance, simply because as each 
second crosses the threshold from present to past, one’s consciousness is able to focus 
solely on the immediacy of the now.19 I want to suggest that if we consider possible 
worlds as a rejection of time due to the immediacy of the now as a limitation on one’s 
intellectual freedom, we should logically discard numeric quantifiers of space, just as I 
described earlier the inability to quantify zero and infinity.20 Time is but the finite, 
institutional structure that is designed to quantify unquantifiable space. As a being in 
existence there is still a world in motion in front of one’s eyes, but to reject time is not to 
                                                 
19 I should note, here, that although one can entertain a possible world within the actual world, this implies that the 
actual world slows while the body is in a state of rest. Alternatively, one could take a stroll on the actual-world 
sidewalk and quickly find that full presence in two worlds is an impossibility, and thus each is able only to influence 
the other within one mind-space. 
20 I recognize that this is a project in itself—it is the foundation of my next research project, but I think it is worth 
pointing out in this context. 
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reject life, but rather to embrace duration as the unifying force between any and all 
durations.  
 Hamlet’s situation mirrors closely the Platonic dialogue concerning the soul and 
body, wherein the body is temporal, while the soul has the potential to be eternal (Plato 
42). Without diverting too far from Durrell’s text, this conception of the eternal soul and 
temporal body speaks to my premise that time does not permeate the possible world or 
the imaginative faculties of the mind, because time is finite. It is duration which is 
omnipotent, and nothing can exist outside of this force. Following Bergson’s logic that 
duration is space (Time 163), then if space is infinite, so too is duration, it being 
synonymous with space, hence the infinite potential to expand the epistemic horizon of 
the mind-space. 
 Duration is the infinite host, enabler, and record-keeper of matter in motion. As 
such, duration has in its presence entities and non-entities, bodies and souls, actual and 
possible worlds, and every potential conception of each cognitive, thinking individual. 
Therefore, Lawrence’s statement that Hamlet had died in the future is not necessarily 
illogical in the context of possible worlds, where everything that exists is a product of the 
individual mind within the cerebral structure of the corporeal body, and is necessarily an 
entity in the actual world. Said otherwise, the solipsistic knowledge of one’s own mind 
verifies that the individuated data and relative truths exist, but in terms of a more 
objective position, such truths cannot be verified, although opinions concerning one’s 
own state of mind and Being are valid.21 The point I want to make clear is simply that 
“illogical” is synonymous neither with “impossible” nor “ridiculous”; it is often that 
when an idea seems most ridiculous that it requires careful consideration. The human 
mind is finite, but the potentiality of this mind is infinite; thus when the human mind 
cannot conceptualize an abstract thought or illogical expression, the subject of discussion 
should not be rendered incorrect, but rather in limbo. A subject in limbo must simply wait 
until the human mind can join it, like Hamlet’s body joining the soul, following an 
evolution of consciousness: one awaits the immanent in the void. 
                                                 
21 Searle argues that opinions are always valid, although beliefs are subject to interrogation in the objective sphere. An 
opinion is subjective, then, and while a belief can be equally subjective, it is often dependent on some fragment of 
external, shared reality. 
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 As Hamlet awaits his soul, he lies on a cot with “his claws holding the sheets” and 
Lawrence notes that “if you stare down on him you are drawn down, in ever-widening 
vortices, to a level of concentration which is magma. The lotus-depths in which my mind 
is the only one really at home” (11). Lawrence describes the fluidity of his thought, 
where amidst the murky waters of the lotus, he finds spiritual awakening and 
enlightenment; and this awakening is that his mind “is.” The present tense of the verb “to 
be” may go unnoticed in its esoteric nature, which mimics closely that of Tibetan 
Buddhist esotericism and epistemological revelation—a theme throughout the story. To 
say that one “is” implies a sense of presence-of-mind, which speaks to the syntax and 
seemingly discordant semantic content, and though “Zero” and “Asylum in the Snow” 
are of the English rendition of French Surrealism, as demonstrated by their lesser focus 
on free-associative revelation, Durrell crafts the stories as uncensored versions of 
Lawrence’s internal discourse. Quite similar, though far earlier, is the chapter in James 
Joyce’s Ulysses (1922), where readers are privy to the internal discourse(s) inside the 
mind of Molly, as she revisits and re-enacts moments from the past, but the dialogue is 
presented as private and internal, thus we find a striking similarity between Molly’s 
thoughts and those presented as Lawrence’s. This act of narrating one’s past in private is 
an act of self-definition. Readers encounter the opening line in “Zero”: “The night opens 
with a Tibetan delicacy; the shadows fall across the long nosed sun-dial and tell me that I 
exist, I exist” (8). The revelation is self-reflexive: Lawrence faces his definitive 
existence, so defined by the dialogue of conscious engagement with his inner space, and 
he does so in the “shadows” within which the sun-dial reveals its own nature: it is the 
keeper of time, and for time to exist there must be human consciousness, because time is 
a finite and man-made construct. As such, Durrell’s presentation of Lawrence’s 
interiority and revelatory self-definition acknowledges the existence both of Lawrence’s 
actual world, and the actual world in which the readers of Durrell’s fiction exist—but this 
task is completed via possible-world knowledge. 
 Buddhist thought runs through the veins of the narrative; Lawrence refers often to 
the Tibetan monks—their delicacies (8), and the monasteries in which “the aura of the 
mind” leads them to the divine (12). The lotus is yet another reference to Buddhist 
thought, and Lawrence declares, albeit inadvertently, his spiritual emancipation in the 
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murky realm of his mind where he feels “at home.” But where, to readers, Lawrence’s 
mind is far from transparent, it is he alone who possesses the tools to navigate this space; 
it is, to him, a space of clarity and creative energy, and from this space he gathers 
experiential data upon which he ponders in the void between the actual and possible 
worlds. The void is pure duration, an uninterrupted flow of thought which is not divided 
or defined by temporality, and in which each event in actual and possible worlds flow 
each into the other via the human consciousness of an individuated duration with space. 
 Lawrence records an interesting shift in consciousness when he begins to see 
himself through his own eyes and the eyes of his lover in the painting. Becoming aware 
of her thoughts, Lawrence writes to her in observation of her concerns:  
That is why when you sit on the chair and do not know how to speak to us, 
I want you to realise our blood-brothership. Do not stammer and blush—
you are beautiful enough as you are. It is impossible to believe that you 
are tribal . . . Are you one of them? If you were not you would not puzzle 
over this ... I think of you, and my mind is whirling with a million chisels, 
I am apostate, heretic, traitor ... would you say ‘hallucinated by the 
absolute?’ (12) 
Lawrence’s possible world is his own craft, so the “absolute” (12), or the deified creator 
of his possible world is also self-created. Lawrence simply cannot be hallucinated by the 
Absolute in the possible world, because it is he who creates the Absolute; however, on 
the other hand, the actual-world Lawrence could plausibly hallucinate into existence his 
own possible world, which becomes his sole reality between actual and possible world, 
so if the creation is a hallucination, then the hallucinated Absolute can hallucinate 
Lawrence according to the ontological parameters of the possible world’s ontology, 
which is within Lawrence, himself. Lawrence uses the pronoun “I,” which indicates the 
cognitive recognition as himself as an individual. Even if Lawrence is the Absolute in his 
possible world, he cannot hallucinate himself into being, because he must be a priori to 
his hallucinated self. Stated plainly, a hallucination must follow an a priori thinker, and 
this thinker is one who creates a reality out of nothing, therefore if Lawrence is in a self-
created space and the Absolute is a hallucination, there can be no grounds for the 
Absolute’s hallucination of its creator. It seems only logical, then, that considering the 
earlier fragment of his monologue he continues to view himself through a quasi-objective 
lens—through the eyes of his lover. Although she is not a hallucinated product of 
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Lawrence’s mind, she is imaginary, and this practice of intuitive objectivity—seeing 
himself through her imagined eyes—operates only in possible worlds; that is to say, to 
attempt to see oneself objectively is common, but for the subject to see itself objectively 
through the eyes of subject-created-object is an extraordinary benefit of possible worlds. 
 The defining feature of all possible worlds is their subjectivity; these spaces are 
not only personal, but personalized, and thus there is no center, no location, or temporal 
framework for such spaces. Possible worlds exist outside of time, but as I noted earlier, 
they exist within duration, because duration is space, and space is undeniably every-
thing; it hosts all content, imagined or otherwise. Furthermore, the ontological status of 
the possible world is in the mind of its creator; the mind is housed by the brain, and the 
brain by the body, so even these imaginary or alternate universes have their ontology in 
the actual world. Thus we must consider that Ronen’s “non-entities” do have a place in 
the actual, that they are valid and relevant, though personal and intangible. Lawrence 
writes: 
I tell you, now that the defined limit of language has fallen open on its 
hinges, there is no room for chicanery. We are more valid than human 
beings . . . It is a state of being more lucid than Euclid. We are an 
insoluble proposition, to which the hypotenuse has been lost. Perhaps you 
will enter Golgotha one day yourself in a tragic attempt to find me. All 
this data which I gather up for you: a chart written in a fine deft hand: but 
the treasure is buried. X marks no spot at all. (14) 
Language is a logical construct meant to communicate, but Lawrence is not trying to 
share logical information here, but rather illogical disinformation. But if we were to 
accept this premise—that this illogical ramble is uninformative—then we have become 
lost in the superficialities of language. Lawrence’s monologue demands readers to extend 
their thought to maximize the semiotic system of language, and in maximizing this 
system, we are able to gaze into Lawrence’s dream-like possible world. This world has 
no center—X marks no spot at all. Yet Lawrence explains his lucidity amongst the other 
personalities populating his world; he is lucid amidst the murky waters of the lotus, 
because he has become enlightened with the relative truths of the possible world of his 
own making. To find enlightenment within the self—within the mind—is to engage in 
one’s own epistemic evolution, and with each truth one’s mind-space is shaped further in 
the constant evolutionary process of intentional practices of self-amelioration in possible 
and actual worlds. Possible worlds are the spot which X cannot mark, because they exist 
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in one duration of many, and consciousness is their source—a source that is itself non-
tangible. Each instance of individual consciousness—any engagement with matter, 
imagined, perceived, generally excepted, or otherwise—is recorded by duration, and joins 
the whole, whose homogeneous nature is exemplified in its heterogeneity. Each 
individual is the homogeneous whole of its parts, and also becomes a part of the 
homogeneous, infinite space. Duration is the force that verifies one’s own existence both 
subjectively and objectively, and the matter with which duration engages can “create 
sensation out of a zero of consciousness, why should not consciousness in its turn create 
movement either out of a zero of kinetic and potential energy, or by making use of this 
energy in its own way?” (Bergson, Time 152). Thus it seems only logical to conclude that 
one’s conscious states in possible worlds can create substance through the potentiality of 
the mind’s energy, even if it is simply a manifestation in an actual-world behaviour. 
Furthermore, just as the infinite is the constant expansion of all existence, so too is the 
mind the expansion of the self, whose consciousness is consistently evolving. The mind 
is finite due to its corporeal limitations, but its epistemic potential to create new spaces of 
reality, new matter, and new energy is unquantifiable, and infinite so long as there are 
thinking, reasoning, self-reflecting beings. 
 The void within is the unifying force of opposites: possible and actual worlds 
should not be in juxtaposition as if each were its other, but should rather be in pure 
harmony with the collected durations of one mind-space, figuratively dancing gracefully 
in unison with all others. All relative entities or matter, all non-entities and invisible 
matter, possible, alternative, and actual worlds, all potentiality—the void unites all, 
because one’s consciousness is itself homogeneous in nature—it is the unified aggregate 
of many parts. By the end of the story, the void within Lawrence becomes more apparent 
as he faces the threat of returning to the actual world. In a panicked state, Lawrence 
records his fear of returning to the asylum of the actual space:  
The pith of my thought is the silk girl, trampled in the late corn among the 
poppies, stuck in a framed oil-painting, out of date as mud, but instinct 
with pain . . . I run to where the old man is. I am in great agitation: 
“Look,” I say to him with the old gesture, “I throw my hand in. I am not 
understood here. Let me go . . . Send me back into the painting.” (18) 
Agitated by his inability to live in the “equilibrium between two worlds” (18), Lawrence 
wishes to envelop himself wholly in the possible world, without using the void as an 
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objective buffer between actual and possible worlds. Yet in spite of Lawrence’s rejection 
of the actual, all is not lost in this lesson. Lawrence is wholly unable to reject the actual 
world: his language, his syntax, physical sensations, desires, and knowledge are all 
products of his existence in the actual world. In fact, the actual world is a priori to the 
possible world, because even on the first instance of imaginary or alternate realities, the 
thinker has already existed in the actual world, which is evident by the fact that in order 
to conceive of an alternate reality, one must have first experienced the primary reality. 
 The void within is the site of synthesis: on entering a possible world, the mind 
departs from the actual-world obligations of the brain in the body in which it is housed, 
but upon returning to the body, and thus the actual world, the psychical and physical 
forces meet in the void. This void is where one deliberates on new data and integrates it 
into the actual; and in reverse, the void is where certain facets of actual-world knowledge 
or facts are woven into the atmospheric fiber of a possible world, Lawrence’s syntax and 
glossary being one example. In spite of the oddities of Lawrence’s thoughts, readers are 
still able to read and comprehend his language, a direct result of his a priori actual world. 
What is more, the value of relative data from actual and possible worlds is assessed in the 
void, a process recorded by duration. Frye’s void encapsulates the infinite—the field of 
everything—and thus each thought, each action that Lawrence takes in these spaces is a 
part of the infinite space of existence within the void. Therefore, it is necessarily so that if 
the infinite is “in” the void, then the infinite is the void and its substance is plentiful. If 
the infinite is unbounded, then the void, too, is unbounded; and I would suggest that they 
are one and the same. The corporeal body, which necessarily implies that possible-world 
ontologies are an actual-world entity: they are the “quantum phenomena” described by 
Deacon, and since both worlds exist in duration, then the possible can become the actual 
when potentiality comes to fruition in the mind-space, thus beginning entelechial 
processes.  
 Apparent in Lawrence’s preference for the possible world is that the void within 
is always at work, because each moment amidst the possible allows the opportunity for 
Lawrence to define further the state of being in which he exists in both actual and 
possible worlds concurrently. To reject or divide from the actual world in order to unite 
with the possible world is to assess and compare the data of both worlds, because in order 
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to compare, one must have the corresponding part with which to juxtapose. The void is 
the space where this juxtaposition occurs: it is within actual-world time, but it is the 
essence of pure duration—the uninterrupted flow of data and events—and the effortless 
movement of the mind between possible and actual allows one’s consciousness to 
consider both worlds that are one within the self. Of course, if one divides from the actual 
world, one’s physical existence is not terminated, so the fallout would likely be perceived 
as madness, but this is not the issue here.  
 “‘Be at peace,’” the old man tells Lawrence, “‘You are there already, but have no 
compass, nothing magnetic’” (18). Lawrence believes there is “no way forwards” in the 
actual world, and though he is ill-equipped in terms of a compass and maps of the oil-
painting world, this is of no consequence. A compass is tangible matter from the actual 
world that shows the “correct” direction, and thus in the possible world it is arbitrary; he 
must forget and dismiss this contraption, because the possible world is the space where 
the right direction is intuitive, not prescriptive. And in discarding the shackles of the 
actual world, Lawrence continues to shape his mind-space in its epistemic evolution 
through the void, which represents both actual-world physical matter and possible-world 
psychical matter as a plethora of actualized potentiality in the form of experiential 
knowledge. Though his physical existence will pose a confusing case for those in his 
actual world, Lawrence weighs the merits of existing in the actual or possible world, and 
he chooses the path most suited to self-amelioration: to engage his potentiality, and 
sweep it into the motion of becoming, so as to capitalize on the satisfaction derived from 
the joy of new experiential data discovered in the depths of the mind. Lawrence’s great 
achievement, then, is that he detects the void of which substance is not present, and he 
creates the missing substance in his individuated duration, which flows between actual 
and possible worlds, thus contributing to the ever-evolving self that strives constantly for 
wholeness in the grand scheme of infinite space. 
Chapter 3. 
Une Belle Simplicité: La Potentialité Infinie de l’Esprit Libre dans Flaubert 
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“Mathematics is a wonderful, mad subject, full of imagination, fantasy, and creativity that 
is not limited by the petty detail of the physical world, but only by the strength of our inner 
light.” –Gregory Chaitin.22 
 
Gustave Flaubert’s genius is that he is able to convince readers that a character is 
a rather than b, and I would argue that this characterization acts as a veneer for a more 
dynamic and complex character, assuming the reader considers the deeply imbedded yet 
implicit issue of space and time relative to the specific character. Flaubert’s narratives, 
like Madame Bovary (1856) and Bouvard et Pécuchet (1881),23 appear straightforward 
and linear, but in truth they are filled with the complexity of human emotion, outlandish 
behaviour or sheer stupidity, and the other inherent qualities one sees in others daily. 
Stated otherwise, Flaubert’s artistry makes the ordinary and quotidian appear exceptional 
and beautiful, if not sublime. Though “Un coeur simple” from Flaubert’s Trois contes 
(1877) seems to fit the prescriptive title, which implies the uncomplicated or linear 
narrative, and I argue that the so-called simplicity of the protagonist, Félicité, merits a 
more skeptical analysis. 
In his discussion on Flaubert’s treatment of sainthood in Trois contes, Andrew 
Lytle argues that there is more substance to the adjective “simple” than meets the eye. Of 
Mme Aubain, Lytle writes that “she is not a bad woman. She is selfish. Into her life 
enters a simple heart, but a heart which is pure in love” (519; emphasis mine). Lytle 
undercuts his own argument when he negates the initial positive connotation of the 
simple heart with “but.” Instead of continuity, the “but” juxtaposes the simple heart with 
the heart pure in love; thus the implication that the heart pure in love, which is 
necessarily positive, is opposite the simple heart, which must then necessarily be of 
negative connotation. Lytle argues that between Mme Aubain and Félicité “the selfish 
ego and the loving heart, extreme opposites, are thus brought together and must have 
presented Flaubert the hardest demands on his skill” (519). Here Lytle underscores the 
“genius” I describe initially—that the characters, even the simple ones, are dynamic and 
complex—and they demand an analysis that is conceptually similar to peeling back layers 
                                                 
22 Less Proof, More Truth (2007); qtd. in The Math Book: From Pythagoras to the 57th Dimension, 250 Milestones in 
the History of Mathematics, Clifford A. Pickover. 
23 Published posthumously. 
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of an onion, with each new layer being unique and individuated. Arguably, Lytle’s most 
relevant contribution in his analysis of Félicité is in raising awareness for the quandary 
faced by Flaubert: “The question must have been—how could any human being in the 
hard-bitten materialism of the day have remained untouched by it?” (519). Lytle’s 
question is particularly relevant to my argument concerning possible worlds and the voids 
or deficits they fill, so let us return to this momentarily to elaborate further on an issue 
that speaks so truly to the dynamic of Félicité’s “simple” heart. 
Frederic J. Shepler, who discusses the Trois contes concerning the presence or 
absence of God between the three tales as a whole, argues in favour of Félicité’s 
simplicity, and the absence of agency and intentionality to choose the path by which her 
life travels. Shepler argues that: 
L’amour trouve son symbole finalement dans Loulou, le perroquet. 
Félicité finit même par la confondre avec Dieu. En cherchant à 
comprendre les doctrines de l’église elle découvre que le Saint-Esprit a 
‘quelque chose du perroquet.’ Elle prie à genoux parfois devant l’oiseau 
empaillé. Alors que l’atmosphère d’Hérodias [le deuxième conte] est 
remplie d’espoir divin, que les événements de La légende [le troisième 
conte] révélent la main de Dieu, Dieu est mourant dans Un cœur simple. 
La seule force extraordinaire semble être l’amour, qui est finalement sans 
grande influence et légèrement ridicule. (414) 
Shepler’s analysis approaches the sheer mockery of a dynamic character, which 
problematizes the quality of what should be an objective and detached literary analysis. 
Félicité learns the doctrines of the church but confuses the Holy Spirit with a parrot; Saint 
Julian sees the hand of God revealed, but Félicité’s belief in God is empty, because he is 
dying; and what is more, a heart full of love, as Lytle describes Félicité, is very much 
present throughout the story, yet slightly ridiculous: in her stupidity (bêtises) she 
becomes a stupid object (la bêtise). Shepler’s analysis of Félicité can be formulated as a 
series of subjective deductions, which are superficial and indicative of a reader who 
accepts the veneer of simplicity presented to readers via Félicité. À faire la bêtise or à 
dire la bêtise is, according to Shepler, the deductive conclusion that elle est la bêtise; said 
otherwise, Félicité does stupid things and says stupid things, and is therefore herself the 
product of her own stupidity: she is the reflexive object who commits acts of stupidity 
upon herself, only to make herself more of a fool each time she inflicts stupidity on 
herself. This analysis is en pointe if we are to accept Félicité for the simple or stupid 
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object who lacks the agency to choose how to live a life which is one of passionate 
concern for all whom she loves. I want to take a closer look at Félicité, described as 
“simple” by Flaubert, upon which Lytle comments that “simple is an adjective to a noun 
which is mysterious. He [Flaubert] does this by naming her Felicity” (520). To be 
felicitous is to be fitting, true, good, and pleasing; and “felicity” also carries similar 
positive connotations, such as “simple joy” and a “cause of happiness.” What is thus 
mysterious is whether “simple” is positive or negative, and on this there is much to 
consider, and I will revisit this point shortly.  
 The name “Félicité” seems to anticipate the Speech Act Theory of J.L. Austin, 
who discusses felicitous and infelicitous acts.24 Austin explains that felicitous speech acts 
speak to the parallelism between what is said and the ensuing result based on the felicity 
conditions; whereas infelicitous speech acts encompass an act lacking in cohesiveness 
between what was uttered and what occurred. Both felicitous and infelicitous speech acts 
hold a positive correlation with their basic definition as words in the structure of the 
sentence—where felicitous is “fitting” and infelicitous is “unsuitable.” If we were to 
consider Flaubert’s construction of Félicité’s character through the terms “felicitous” and 
“infelicitous,” both derived from “felicity,” it seems that Austin’s theory of felicity 
conditions, specifically the conditions of a request, are a perfect example of Flaubert’s 
authorial presence in-text: he is suggesting that readers inquire into the verity of the label 
“simple.”  
 What is more, a closer analysis of the Flaubert’s Félicité as presented in the 
French source text requires an even deeper inquiry into what “Félicité” or “felicity” 
means in the context of the short story. In the translation from French into English the 
term “felicitous” used to characterize Félicité means “happy” (heureux) and “fortunate,” 
also defined as “heureux” (Collins French).  Thus we see that in spite of the fact that the 
English equivalent of “felicity” is “fitting,” which appears to bear no etymological ties to 
the French equivalent of happiness, that Flaubertian critics cannot justly define Félicité as 
simple, “driven as if by clockwork,” because her happiness (bonheur) is in fact fitting to 
her situation. Throughout the narrative, Félicité crafts a world within her mind, one 
whose existence ensures her happiness, and thus her persistent happiness in the face of 
                                                 
24 How to Do Things with Words. 
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hardship is fitting; Félicité has reframed a life of poverty and servitude with the power of 
a self-created possible world, and this most certainly is far from simple. 
 Moreover, the narrative voice underscores Félicité’s clocklike quotidian life, but I 
would argue that the initial assumption that an unwavering routine is superficial. Faire 
une bêtise need not apply to Félicité; she is not a “stupid thing”; however, the question of 
whether Félicité behaves as a stupid thing or speaks like a stupid thing (Dire une bêtise) 
is a riddle—one that can arguably be settled via the true Flaubertian bêtise: La 
dictionnaire des idées reçues.25 Félicité’s devotion to Madame Aubain presents a woman 
who adores her mistress, almost as if Félicité is the blindly faithful dog-like companion 
of a woman whose garbage is Félicité’s treasure. “If there was anything that Madame 
Aubain wanted to get rid of, she would find a place for it in her room” (34),26 and shortly 
to follow the sudden death of her Mistress, Félicité found that she, too, had pneumonia 
(37). What is more, Félicité answered: “Ah! Comme Madame,’ trouvant naturel de suivre 
sa maîtresse”; ‘ ‘‘Ah! Like Madame,’ finding it quite natural that she should follow in her 
mistress’s footsteps’ (32; 37). Such avid devotion is often viewed as childlike or self-
derogating, but the critics to whom I refer to above are modern critics who impose 
contemporary values upon a servant, whose devotion would have been prized and 
celebrated in the late nineteenth century. In La dictionnaire, Flaubert notes that devotion 
is something that humans “Complain of the lack of it in others. ‘We are quite inferior to 
dogs, in this regard’” (26). And later, Flaubert claims that a dog is “Specially created to 
save the lie of its master. A dog is a man’s best friend” (29), which necessarily implies 
that the human being void of devotion is inferior to his own dog, yet this dog still saves 
its inferior master as an act of devotion; therefore, the dog—or, in this case, the 
devotedness of Félicité—is always superior to its master or mistress so long as its loyal 
devotion rules its daily actions.  
 Such a comparison between two of Flaubert’s mature works is humorous, but 
more importantly, the juxtaposition adds a new layer that should justly become part of the 
hermeneutics of definition and self-definition. What is more, as Félicité lies upon her 
deathbed with the parrot hovering above, we find in the act of juxtaposition Flaubert’s 
                                                 
25 Published posthumously in 1913. 
26 There is no corresponding translation of this sentence. Félicité is described as collecting the possessions of the family 
in general as her own treasures, but this specific English translation elaborates on the French source text. 
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love for birds: “Wish to be one, and say with a sigh: ‘Wings! Wings!’ Sign of a poetic 
soul” (11). The Flaubertian definition of a bird suggests that the bird, and thus the parrot 
as a sub-category, is a creature one should envy, and this envy speaks to the verity of the 
soul of a true poet. This labyrinth of definitions leads us, finally, to a common ground 
concerning the English definition “felicitous” compared to its French equivalent 
“heureux,” which bestows upon Flaubert’s simple maid the beauty of having everything 
she needs to be happy (elle a toute pour être heureuse). In a direct translation of her very 
nom propre, “Félicité” is the equivalent to the English word “bliss,” which, when 
described in English, is “perfect happiness” or “serene joy” (Collins French). Thus it 
appears that if a reader wishes to devote him or herself to the reaching the centre of 
Flaubert’s labyrinth, then the ultimate conclusion concerning this simple soul is anything 
but simplistic.  
 Lytle points out that Félicité’s unyielding love for the children is: “[t]he 
submersion of the self into another, unconsciously, it is the selflessness of love. So 
stimulated, ‘her simple heart’ quickened in the imagination rich and unblemished” (522). 
Just as Félicité tries to understand the world through the eyes of those she loves, let us 
move to and fro between the roles of objective reader and the submersed reader, who 
wishes to understand Félicité for her true nature. As readers, we may be tempted to 
compare Félicité’s understanding of reality and the actual world with what we determine 
is in fact the actual world based on the omniscient narrator’s description; but I think it 
would be far more profitable to see Félicité as she sees herself; or rather, it would benefit 
our inquiry to live vicariously through Félicité and the eyes through which she perceives 
the events of the world, thus internalizing it and making it her own, which consequently 
becomes the source of the reader’s knowledge. 
 I have discussed the oil-painting-like possible world of Lawrence in “Zero,” and I 
argue that there is a void—a space in the continuum of internal duration that hosts the 
mind’s motion between possible and actual world (and vice versa), and in this shift, or 
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movement from sub-Euclidean point to sub-Euclidean point,27 28 the mind is actively 
deliberating, sorting, and integrating new information between two spaces. Leibniz 
argues that motion, which I apply to the transition between possible and actual spaces, is: 
“The transition from place to place, and therefore is in both places at once, since it cannot 
be in neither, i.e. nowhere” (qtd. in Arthur xli)29. The continuum of external, or universal, 
duration is the totality of all durations of all individuals, and this totality includes all 
possible-world realities from past and present. Leibniz’s continuum30 has no fixed 
beginning or end, and it is the seventeenth-century version of what Bergson develops into 
the concept of pure duration. Bergson explains further that individuals have both internal 
and external durations: 
The intuition we refer to then bears above all upon internal duration. It 
grasps a succession which is not juxtaposition, a growth from within, the 
uninterrupted prolongation of the past into the present which is already 
blending into the future. It is the direction vision of the mind by the mind. 
(Creative 20) 
I argue that possible worlds constitute internal durations which unite with external 
duration by way of the actor—the conscious being in universal space, who is a building 
block of the homogeneous continuum, which is external duration. The harmonious flow 
of data between possible and actual worlds, and vice versa, is a dialogue between an 
extended self (i.e. the individual’s connection to the actual world of universal space), and 
the subjective self (i.e. the self-identified “I” that constitutes an internal duration). This 
                                                 
27 Euclidean points are used in mathematics, as well as logic. Used in relation to metaphysics, (which we see shares 
boundaries with physics and necessarily mathematics), these points are unique and individuated points in space, which 
are without dimension, (no length, width, height). In terms of Leibniz’s continuum, these are considered infinitesimals 
that are parts of what was once whole in the universe (i.e. everything is of one, which in the seventeenth century, one 
was equivalent to God, the first mover), and though each point is “of one,” it is unique and allows for the continuation 
of the motion that Bergson recognizes as the nature of pure duration. See Richard T. W. Arthur, The Yale Leibniz: The 
Labyrinth of the Continuum: Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686, (xxiii-xliii). 
28 I have explained Euclidean points in terms of the one homogeneous continuum of universal space—the space in 
which all matter inhabits; but within this space, I describe micro continuums as the internal duration of an individual, 
that is, one’s movement between states of consciousness in various possible worlds and the actual world. Therefore, 
this micro continuum is within the mind of the individual, who also registers in the totality of all durations, the 
continuum described by Leibniz. Thus, what I call a “sub-Euclidean point” is meant to describe the points in 
consciousness of one individual and the corresponding internal duration, which Leibniz would describe as “worlds 
within worlds”; that is, infinitesimals on Leibniz’s continuum divide infinitely to and towards infinity, and the 
processes continues ad infinitum. 
29 Leibniz, On the Cohesiveness of Bodies, (1672-73). Much akin to Schrödinger’s cat experiment (1935). 
30 The continuum of infinitesimals was a hot debate in the early modern period and through the Scientific Revolution, 
only to be dropped in the nineteenth century, and later picked up in the twentieth century. There were various 
mathematicians who either supported or rejected infinitesimals, some of whom rejected this theory due to the belief that 
it contradicted God’s power, though this mentality was later subdued, so as to satisfy in part both Protestants and 
Catholics (although not much of a success). Other major contributors include Hobbes, Descartes, and Galileo, to name 
a few. I refer to the continuum as being of Leibniz simply to reduce redundancy or confusion. 
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“I” is the perceived, the self-identified autonomous being, whose brain and body are of 
and in the world, but whose mind—though influenced by external sensations—exists 
relative to nothing; it is the free-thinking and imaginative faculty that considers not “what 
is,” but rather “what if…?” Of course, one cannot deny that the mind engages with the 
external world, but it is not pre-destined nor is it at each moment determined by this 
world; in fact, I would argue that as a response to the actual world’s inability to complete 
the self, the mind takes charge of crafting a reality which fills a deficit of the particular 
substance the mind believes it lacks as a complete continuum of internal duration. It is the 
faculty of perception, enabled by the brain of the body in the actual world, but drawn to 
action by the consciousness of the mind-space that navigates both the possible and actual 
worlds.  
 To perceive is a dual-act of noting the presence of something and consecutively 
sorting this data via the judgment of its nature or purpose. This judgment chooses either 
to store the data pertinent to one’s existence, or to jettison the experiential data of the 
actual world, so as to remove all of which interrupts the harmony of one’s own duration. 
Leibniz scholar Richard T.W. Arthur discusses Leibniz’s continuum, noting that “the 
principle of cohesion is harmonizing motion (motus conspirans) . . . [e]ven in particular 
disturbances there is a general harmony (conspiratio) in certain laws of the system of the 
universe” (xliii). The perceptiveness which necessitates the harmony between internal 
and external durations—or possible and actual worlds—acts to order experiential data of 
the actual world, which exists in x-fashioned reality to supplement the internal duration 
with new data for the possible world. Thus we can see that which logically follows 
perception: potentiality—a harmonious “dialogue” between internal and external 
durations. Flaubert scholars have described Félicité as having a limited scope through 
which she understands the world, which articulates her seeming naivety and lack of 
education; and her faith in God is deemed unsubstantiated and ridiculous, because she 
does not understand the formal doctrines of the church. Superficially, this seems rather 
accurate given that Félicité confuses the parrot with the Holy Ghost, but I want to 
endeavour to explore the superficial narrative implications and overcome them, so as to 
see the world, in part, through Félicité’s eyes while maintaining a more detached 
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objectivity that permits a clear understanding of the cohesiveness I argue exists between 
Félicité’s possible and actual worlds. 
 I posit that Leibniz’s continuum of universal space, which Bergson calls duration, 
has subset realities, (i.e. sub-Euclidean points), that exist concurrently within the motion 
that sweeps from point to point, or from conscious individual to conscious individual. If 
we consider each point of the continuum as a “whole” being—that is, one who exists as a 
conscious being with internally and externally directed psychical processes, as a unit in 
itself, but also a unit of another whole—then this necessarily implies that each being 
composed of many parts and various durations has subset durations, or micro-spaces of 
possible-world realities as their individual composition.31 Thus we have universal or 
external space, which is the continuum, or the homogeneous duration of constant energy 
due to unending motion, composed of an uncountable amount of points, or beings in 
consciousness; and likewise, each point is constructed in a similar fashion, with each 
being in consciousness as a whole composed of subset, or internal durations.32 
Furthermore, this continuum as described by Leibniz is infinite; there is no marked 
beginning or end, and it is this universal space (i.e. the shared external duration) 
illuminated by individuals in consciousness, who compose the continuum, which allows 
motion and energy, and which validates the existence of non-tangible spaces, like the 
mind. Therefore, if the continuum is infinite, then the mind is not assigned the same 
finitude of the corporeal body; so, while each individual is finite in terms of the volume 
of ideas or realities actualized in the process of entelechy in actual-world existence, (i.e. 
naissance to death), the mind is not limited in what it can think or imagine; the mind is 
infinite in potentiality to do or think x.33 
                                                 
31 When I say “subset durations” or “micro-spaces,” these are variants of sub-Euclidean points, and I do this to keep 
closer to Bergsonian metaphysics. 
32 Leibniz would argue that there are no wholes possible in the continuum, because infinitesimals are only fractions. 
For the purpose of this argument, I suggest we consider each life (each Euclidean point) as original, and as having 
micro-worlds, which together create the composite point. This composite point is an infinitesimal with the potentiality 
for infinitely many parts, so it is a point of beginning from whole into parts of one part of infinitely many wholes. 
33 One might argue that there is no empirical data to prove this infinite potentiality, but it is crucial to note that 
physicists cannot see the end of the universe, and thus know not its genesis or its ontology. Rather, infinite space is 
accepted as infinite, because it is beyond the scope of scientists in terms of how we might classify the infinite. 
Therefore, we face a situation that in our ignorance, we assume space is infinite, and we base this conclusion on the 
best empirical data that would support this supposition, although it is not verifiable, and thus not certain. Infinite 
potentiality cannot be measured or quantified, and in its non-tangible state, one cannot accurately gauge its existence or 
potential, because there is no empirical data to validate or negate this argument. 
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 Infinite potentiality is present within all conscious individuals, but whether or not 
this potentiality is uncovered and exercised depends entirely on the thinker. When this 
potentiality is immanent yet hidden, this is often a case of divisiveness in the thinker. In 
other words, it is one’s understanding of the world according to “what should and should 
not be,” rather than “what could be.” Such divisions are institutionally imposed on 
individuals, and the mind operates in systems of binary thought without necessarily being 
conscious of such a damaging approach to the nature of the world and its beings. 
Geoffrey Wall, who introduced an English translation of Trois contes, writes explicitly in 
his commentary that “the protagonists all go mad” and that “each tale draws us towards 
the dark and fearful places of the mind” (xiv), and this is precisely the binary system of 
thinking to which I refer. Wall assumes madness plagues the end-days of Félicité’s life, 
and he goes so far as to say that the three tales (Trois contes) take readers to an internal 
place—the mind—and its frightening maze of unrecognizable data that spurs a negative 
response in the mind, which would imply that the “I” faces the source of its madness in 
these “dark places.”34 Such a comment seems more indicative of Wall’s personal 
meditations on the text, and his evidently closed subjectivity weakens the persuasiveness 
necessary to capture the attention of a larger readership. Just as all human beings bring 
into the text their own understanding of the self in the world, Wall seems inadvertently to 
ascribe his own understanding of madness to each protagonist. That Wall describes 
madness as each protagonist’s demise is indicative only of his understanding of madness, 
and it is a binary understanding which juxtaposes “what is” in terms of the reader’s 
perception of the textual affairs, and “what should be,” which exemplifies the actual-
world situation of the reader’s mind, which in its subjectivity is applied to the world of 
the narrative as if it were empirical and verifiable truth. Critical to this debate on the 
subjective universal claims of narrative fiction, specifically interpretations of Flaubert’s 
Félicité, Wall explains that Flaubert’s own fear of madness explains his “persistent 
interest in other worlds of experience” (xvii), a precise and valid conclusion on states of 
being, such as madness. If we were to consider, for the sake of constructing a clear 
pattern of reason, that madness is in many ways a social construct, we might conclude 
that madness does not exist; but then this would refute serious and valid cases of mental 
                                                 
34 Wall refers to all three tales and their protagonists: Félicité, Hérodias, and Saint Julien.  
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illness. At the same time, however, if we were to consider that madness in many cases 
becomes an anomaly as it manifests differently in each human being, then this would 
validate the need to reconsider madness and its function. Said otherwise, mental illness is 
a verifiable truth, but it is a truth so large and with so many facets that no amount of 
research can account for x-assigned diagnosis combined with a given personality.35 
Michel Foucault explains that: 
Madness and non-madness, reason and non-reason are inextricably 
involved: inseparable at the moment when they do not yet exist, and 
existing for each other, in relation to each other, in the exchange which 
separates them. (x) 
Each individual displays manifestations of the illness differently, therefore deviating 
from the diagnostic manual. Here, I suggest that madness in its vast significations is often 
expected to fit into a mold of “what should be,” and all that fails to fit in this 
organizational heuristic is upsetting to objective bystanders. Foucault continues to argue 
that: 
As for a common language, there is no such thing; or rather, there is no 
such thing any longer; the constitution of madness as a mental illness, at 
the end of the eighteenth century, affords the evidence of a broken 
dialogue, posits the separation as already effected, and thrusts into 
oblivion all those stammered, imperfect words without fixed syntax in 
which the exchange between madness and reason were made. (x) 
As a result of the opposing discourses of “what should be” and “what is,” the individual 
like Félicité, is ruled out as one in the mode of being which constitutes the “normative” 
according to the institutional expectations inserted both into the actual world, and the 
fictional world of literary texts. I would argue that to focus on “what is” relative to 
Félicité’s perceived state of mind is a challenge worth accepting, because to see through 
the eyes of a fictional character—or even a being in the actual world—is a new world in 
itself, full of new possibilities. Relativity ensures infinitely many possibilities to do x in 
the world. For Félicité, “what is” is leagues apart from the “what should be” brought into 
                                                 
35 This issue of linguistic accuracy relative to the medical phenomenon is a problem derived from the fact the all 
linguistic systems are manmade, and that these systems use symbols to communicate an observed phenomenon, but 
cannot accurately speak to the nature or essence of the direct object of interest. As such, language-users try to convey 
the most accurate comprehensive data via language, but then with each added detail in the attempt to clarify the issue, 
the issue at hand deviates from a standard definition. Standard definitions of mental illness are too broad, yet specific 
definitions are too exclusive; thus we are left to observe mental phenomena with which we are ill-equipped to 
understand. This inability to understand wholly the nature of the phenomenon can lead observers to create binaries of 
normal-abnormal, thus painting numerous variants of individuated illnesses with one broad stroke. This is to say, when 
perceived mental illness is an enigma, how can we define someone as “mad,” or in contemporary terms, “mentally ill”? 
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the text by readers, who accept that deviance from “what should be” according to 
customary standards is madness, or other exclusive terms that create unnecessary 
binaries. 
 Félicité’s self—the autonomous “I”—is that which experiences her variant of 
“what is,” better labelled “the subjective self”; and if we are to understand the world 
through Félicité’s eyes, then we must abandon the mentality of “what should be,” and 
remove ourselves temporarily from our personal understanding of the narrative’s “what 
is,” so as to adopt Félicité’s version of reality. At the same time, as critical thinkers we 
would find it most profitable to maintain a dualistic approach to the narrative, which 
includes necessarily Félicité’s “what is,” while concurrently being conscious of “what 
could be.” This “what could be” is the infinite potentiality which I have addressed earlier, 
and to embark on an inquiry into Félicité’s “what is” we must overcome the 
institutionally imposed binaries of mad-sane, real-imaginary, and most importantly, 
possible-actual. What becomes apparent in relaxing such boundaries is that Félicité has a 
cohesive continuum, or duration of self, between possible and actual worlds; she can 
move between these worlds with the ease of one who is bilingual, and who code switches 
with such a seamless transition that it is unnoticeable to listeners—and to readers—which 
I argue is the case for readers of the Flaubertian approach to alternative worlds enabled 
by the “play of energy” between “body and soul” (Wall xv).36 Therefore, my analysis 
isolates binary systems throughout the narrative that also appear seamless in that two 
implicitly divisive terms go hand-in-hand, as if they were a dualism.37 
 The narrative begins with a lengthy description of Félicité, Mme Aubain, and the 
house in which they dwell. But an important detail to note is the syntax: Félicité is not a 
servant or a housemaid; she is “Madame Aubain’s housemaid” and the “envy of all the 
good ladies of Pont-l’Évêque” (Flaubert 3; emphasis mine). Readers are introduced to 
Félicité as a possessed noun, and all that readers learn in this initial description is that the 
“good” ladies of Pont-l’Évêque envy her. First, we see the divisiveness of the word 
“good”: only the good—a subtle cue which implies the wealthy women, and not those of 
                                                 
36 From Gustave Flaubert’s Correspondence, volume 1, ed. J. Bruneau, (1973). 
37 For the sake of argument, one might say that dualisms require their opposite to ensure their own existence; but the 
point I wish to convey is that the seamless dualism has two cohesive parts that forge one homogeneous whole. This 
whole dualism concept is pertinent to our discussion, because it will allow us to isolate terms that are either dualistic in 
nature or truly divisive.  
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Félicité’s station; therefore, we have already established that Félicité is possessed, which 
erects the binary of owner-object or superior-inferior. We also see that there are good 
ladies and implicitly we learn there are “bad” ladies, those of unfortunate circumstances, 
which is the case for Félicité, herself. What is more, these good ladies who “envy” 
Félicité do not envy Félicité-the-servant, whose daily tasks they themselves would not 
like to do, but rather they envy the domestic results achieved by Félicité and enjoyed by 
Mme Aubain. Félicité is the humanized grammatical subject acting upon nouns—the 
objects that compose the duties of her life. She cleans the kitchen, she ensures a spotless 
house; and of course, Félicité acts upon herself—the unfortunate, thrifty help: “Économe, 
elle mangeait avec lenteur, et recueillait du doight sur la table les miettes de son pain,—
un pain de douze livres, cuit exprès pour elle, et qui durait vingt jours”; ‘wasted nothing . 
. . gathering every crumb of her loaf from the table with her fingers, a twelve-pound loaf 
baked especially for her and which lasted her twenty days’ (21; 4). It appears, at least by 
modern standards, and assumedly by contemporaneous standards, that Félicité is not 
envied by the “good women,” nor is she envied by those of her so-called station either. 
Félicité was “so well liked by her employers, her friends were jealous of her” (5), but 
which friends are these? Aside from Théodore, the unfaithful lover bound loosely to 
Félicité in an ephemeral relationship, and who values money over love in his choice to 
elope with a “good” lady of fortune (7), Félicité has no friends, not one; neither the 
financially fortunate nor the impoverished maids and servicemen take interest in Félicité 
for what she offers as an autonomous, self-possessed being.  
 Félicité is the woman who cares for all who enter her life, and it is because of her 
constant role as the “helper” or “caretaker” of the wellbeing of others that she is isolated; 
she is not one to whom one would wishes to draw close, or to engage in lively 
conversation. Felicitie is the faithful servant whom no one cares much to acknowledge, 
yet who is praised in her own absence for her prudence. Félicité is a fixture that is 
imperative to daily life, yet one that must remain out of sight, anonymous, seemingly 
non-existent. Each Monday two farmers, one “a tall man with a hooked nose” and the 
other “short, fat and red in the face” (8), would adorn Félicité with, “Tous deux offraient 
à leur propriétaire des poules ou des fromages. Félicité invariablement déjouait leurs 
astuces; et ils s’en allaient pleins de consideration pour elle”; ‘chickens or cheeses which 
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they hoped they might persuade their landlady to buy. But Félicité was more than a match 
for their banter and they always respected her for this’ (28; 9). Respected she was for her 
prudence and her steadfastness, and these male farmers revere her for executing to a tee 
her role as housemaid, whose faithfulness to “Madame” manifests in her rejection of 
unnecessary goods that her mistress truly cannot afford. Furthermore, readers are 
presented two farmers of the working lower class, who are described by terms otherwise 
offensive to any human being with personal dignity; and like Félicité, they are all fixtures 
whose existences are desired not for their essence, but for their trace—to complete the 
chore with the desired result present and the cause of this result absent. Though these 
men were not Félicité’s friends, they could see in this woman the unbridled kindness of 
which they would not take advantage. In a similar situation, Félicité is reunited with her 
sister, separated in childhood, and readers see that, “Félicité se prit d’affection pour eux. 
Elle leur acheta une couverture, des chemises, un fourneau; évidemment ils 
l’exploitaient”; ‘Félicité became very attached to them. She bought them a blanket, some 
shirts and a cooking stove. They were obviously out to take advantage of her. Madame 
Aubain was annoyed that Félicité was not more firm with them’ (37; 14). Mme Aubain 
appears to care for Félicité to a degree, but it seems more likely that she is disappointed 
that Félicité falls into the traps of false pretense of her opportunistic sister. Though to 
follow, “Cette faiblesse agaçait Mme Aubain, qui d’ailleurs n’aimait pas les familiarités 
du neveu,—car il tutoyait son fils”;  ‘[Mme Aubain] also took objection to the familiar 
way in which the nephew spoke to Paul’ (14). Readers are left to wonder whether Mme 
Aubain cares, on some level, for Félicité as a human being, or if she is just disappointed 
that Félicité, who seems to operate so methodically “as if by clockwork,” could fall prey 
to her own humanity (5). I make the distinction between Mme Aubain’s attitude in these 
contrasting situations, because the sentence immediately to follow the description of 
Félicité’s sister is Mme Aubain’s objection that Félicité’s nephew does not address her 
own son appropriately, thus underscoring the social hierarchy present even in the 
discourses of children. Félicité is individuated from her sister only because she is the 
possession of Mme Aubain, and this class distinction reinforces the social hierarchy, 
reminding readers that in spite of Félicité’s love for the children and for “Madame,” she 
is still the housemaid, not the friend, and not family. 
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 Félicité faces numerous binary social situations throughout her life—she is a 
niece, yet a farm worker; she loves, but is separated from the object of her love by the 
hubris attached to monetary gain; and she is afforded the utmost respect by Mme Aubain 
and others throughout Pont-l’Évêque, yet is not their equal. Félicité plays the role of 
“servant” rather than “equal,” but even when she serves her mistress and the children in 
excessive faithfulness—like when she saves the mistress and her children from the bull—
she can only be acted upon as an object of the will of others; the villagers adore Félicité’s 
courage while facing the bull, yet still she is an object, not an actor (31, 10). Nonetheless, 
Félicité is either unaware of her so-called otherness, or she ignores such divisions, so as 
to derive joy in the most trivial of events—the simple joys. The joy that Félicité derives 
from the simple moments of servitude are more endearing when the omniscient narrator 
describes events according to Félicité’s emotional response. These events are intrinsically 
human, and there appears to be hope that Félicité might finally enjoy a reciprocal 
relationship, one of love both given and received—the maid whose loving kindness is 
received and responded to in equal fortitude. But when readers are privy to Mme 
Aubain’s feelings, the tone of the narrative becomes almost harsh, or at the very least 
condescending; one example is Mme Aubain’s dismissal of Félicité’s long lost sister, 
who, after “a quarter of an hour,” is dismissed by Félicité’s proprietor (14). Thus we find 
another binary erected in the narrative—one that is central to our understanding of 
Félicité’s world through her own eyes, and one that is pertinent to the revelation we seek 
as readers, the revelation that regardless of actual-world circumstances, possible-world 
realities offer a plethora of gleeful enthusiasm for actual-world existence, derived from 
the kindness bestowed on the self by the self in the possible world. 
 Though one’s devotion to God is hierarchical, and individual submission of the 
self to God is a choice one is wholly free to make, for Félicité this choice becomes not a 
separation from the Almighty from Félicité, but rather, via the Holy Ghost, a unification 
of the Almighty and the servant, the Creator and the created. When Félicité is assigned 
the duty of taking Virginie to catechism, a new knowledge develops within Félicité’s 
simple heart: 
Puis, elle pleura en écoutant la Passion. Pourquoi l’araient-ils crucifié, lui 
qui chérissait les enfants, nourrissait les foules, guérissait les aveugles, et 
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avait voulu, par douceur, naître au milieu des pauvres, sur le fumier d’une 
étable ? (40) 
 
The dazzling recital of events instilled in her a wholesome respect for the 
Almighty and a profound fear of his wrath. She wept at the story of 
Christ’s passion. Why had they crucified a man who was so kind to 
children, fed the hungry, gave sight to the blind, and who had chosen, out 
of his own gentle nature, to be born amongst the poor on the rough straw 
of a stable? (15) 
The narrator’s description of how Félicité perceives the Almighty in His splendor and 
kindness is much akin to Félicité’s own actions in daily life; she is a servant to those in 
need, just as Christ serves the people of God; and what is more, Félicité leads people 
along the path of righteousness by modeling what it means to love God. Félicité feeds the 
children; Félicité feeds the soldiers passing through town; and she devotes her spare time 
to the care of Comiche, an elderly man in a dismal state of health, who was rumoured to 
have committed “terrible atrocities” in la Terreur led by Robespierre at the height of the 
French Revolution in 1793 (28). Still Félicité refrains from judgment, and her selflessness 
mirrors the biblical parable of the good Samaritan in the New Testament Gospel of 
Luke.38 Through the passage of time, “La bonté de son coeur se développa . . . Elle 
soigna des cholériques”; ‘Félicité’s natural kind-heartedness increased’ (58; 28), and she 
“helped to nurse cholera victims and to look after the refugees from Poland” (28). Truly, 
Félicité is impartial when it comes to giving unconditional love. While she comes to the 
aid of Polish refugees, she also nurses Comiche, whose violations against God’s people 
did not exclude him from Félicité’s care. “Les gamins le regardaient par les fentes du 
mur, et lui jetaient des cailloux qui tombaient sur son grabat, où il gisait”; ‘The boys in 
the town used to spy on [Comiche] through the cracks in the wall and throw stones at him 
as he lay coughing and choking on his straw bed’ (58-9; 28), and though many would 
find this ill-treatment the consequence of his own heinous crimes, Félicité tends to his 
needs as if his atrocities had never come to pass. 
 Félicité’s growing kindness is a result of her growing love for God, and with this 
reciprocal love, Félicité infuses others with the same kindness that puts her in a state of 
“rapture” while sitting in church (15). Concerning the foundation of a new knowledge—
which for Félicité is the knowledge that she is loved by the Almighty—Bergson explains 
                                                 
38 Luke 10:27: “Love your neighbor as yourself.” 
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that “No matter how abstract a conception may be it always has its starting point in a 
perception . . . It must have a matter, and this matter can only reach [the conception] 
through the senses or the consciousness” (Creative 110). Félicité does not appear to 
recognize the source of her constant joy and unyielding kindness, because the love that 
flourishes in her heart is kindled by the abstract concept of God. Readers of the Bible can 
come to a worldly and finite understanding of God’s nature, but Félicité cannot read; but 
it is not the mechanistic dogma of the church that is at the core of one’s faith, rather it is 
one’s will to accept life as a gift from God. Félicité identifies with Christ in many ways, 
and we find that “Les semailles, les moissons, les pressoirs, toutes ces choses familières 
dont parle l’Évangile, se trouvaient dans sa vie”; ‘Seed-time and harvest, the fruits of the 
vine, all those familiar things mentioned in the gospels had their place in her life too’ (40; 
15). With God as the giver of life, and Christ as the Saviour of God’s people, the third 
part of the Trinity—that of the Holy Spirit—becomes central to Félicité’s abstract 
knowledge of the Divine. Félicité “Elle avait peine à imaginer sa personne; car il n’était 
pas seulement oiseau, mais encore un feu, et d’autres fois un soufflé”; ‘found it difficult 
to imagine what the Holy Spirit actually looked like because he was not only a bird but 
sometimes a fire and sometimes a breath’ (40; 15), but this is precisely the knowledge of 
the senses—of intuition—that Bergson describes. Félicité’s faith is grounded in ceaseless 
devotion to God; that she cannot read the Scripture, or understand the “religious 
observances,” such as fasting and confession, is of no importance when it concerns the 
purity of her heart (15). In fact, I would argue that it is her simple heart that sanctifies her 
soul in preparation for the union with God in Heaven. Félicité need not concern herself 
with the monotonous actions so often repeated in mass, which can be habitual and 
mechanistic, rather than conscious acts of humility and awe for the greatness of God. As 
a result, Félicité’s simplicity allows her to act on her faith; finally, Félicité is the actor, 
rather than the object, and in her declaration of faith where she, “aima plus tendrement 
les agneaux par amour de l’Agneau, les Colombes à cause du Saint-Esprit”; ‘loved lambs 
all the more because of her love for the Lamb of God’ (40; 15), simplicity is the gift that 
allows her to give of herself continually. 
 When Virginie leaves her mother to attend a boarding school for girls, Mme 
Aubain becomes distraught when, for four days, she has not received word from her 
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daughter. But Félicité, too, bears this burden of helpless concern and anxiety, because her 
nephew Victor has not sent word from the Americas, which is uncharacteristic of him. 
Félicité: 
le voyait battu par cette même tempête, au sommet d’un mât francassé, 
tout le corps en arrière, sous une nappe d’écume ; ou bien,—souvenirs de 
la géographie en estampes,—il était mangé par les sauvages, pris dans un 
bois par des signes, se mourait le long d’une plage déserte. Et jamais elle 
ne parlait de ses inquiétudes. (47)  
 
pictured [Victor] buffeted by [a] storm, clinging to the top of a broken 
mast and being flung backwards into a sheet of foam . . . she imagined him 
being eaten by savages, captured by monkeys in a forest or dying on some 
deserted beach. But she never spoke about these worries to anyone. (20) 
Mme Aubain, however, does not reserve her feelings and anxieties for the internal space 
of her mind; instead, when Félicité, in an attempt to console her mistress, explains that 
she has not heard from Victor for six months, Mme Aubain shrugs her shoulders as if she 
“Je n’y pensais plus!”; ‘‘hadn’t given him a thought!’’ (48; 20). In the eyes of Mme 
Aubain, Victor is “‘Au surplus, je m’en moque! Un mousse, un gueux, belle affaire! . . . 
tandis que ma fille . . . songez donc!’”; ‘A mere ship’s boy, a scrounger; he’s not worth 
bothering about’ (48; 20), and though Félicité considered this attitude a travesty, she 
“soon got over it” (20). But now, after Paul and Virginie reside abroad, and word arrives 
that Victor has died of the fever, this binary of mistress-servant becomes more defined. 
When the “Negro” servant of the mistress next door presents Mme Aubain with a parrot, 
a new spark of life ignites Félicité’s soul (29). The parrot, Loulou, “occupait depuis 
longtemps l’imagination de Félicité, car il venait d’Amérique; et ce mot lui rappelait 
Victor”; ‘had been a constant source of wonder to Félicité for a long time, for it came 
from America, a word which always reminder her of Victor’ (59-60; 28-9). A parrot 
passed from one mistress—the neighbour—to her servant, and to another mistress—Mme 
Aubain—by this servant, only to be bestowed quickly upon Félicité in her devoted 
servitude. Loulou soon consumes Félicité’s consciousness—he is the pinnacle of her 
internal dialogue, which Bergson explains well: 
As we are not accustomed to observe ourselves directly, but perceive 
ourselves through the forms borrowed from the external world, we are led 
to believe that real duration, the duration lived by consciousness, is the 
same as the duration which glides over the inert atoms without penetrating 
and altering them. (Time 154) 
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Félicité sees in Loulou a version of herself, although readers are not privy to whether or 
not she makes such a connection; and we see later the relation between Félicité and 
Christ, so to affiliate the parrot with the Holy Ghost of a tripartite God seems nearly 
appropriate, and though it remains nonsensical, readers can see the epistemic evolution of 
psychical association and projection. Never will Loulou be absent from her mind; in life 
just as in death, Loulou becomes the symbol of the epistemic evolution that occurs within 
the internal duration of Félicité’s mind: it becomes part of her identity; it furnishes a 
mind of internal, personal durations. 
 The mind and the soul—two non-tangible entities observable through one’s 
external actions and reactions alone—are not only internal to the individual, but intrinsic 
and self-aware. Though the individual is self-aware of his or her internal workings, this 
does not necessarily imply that this self-awareness is cohesive with the objective-external 
actual world. One who is harmed by the world, attacked and stripped of individual 
identity, responds to these provocations, and whether in the spirit of positivity or 
negativity, the potential for a new internal duration—as possible world within the mind—
makes itself apparent to the individual in question. Bergson explains that “invention gives 
being to what did not exist” (Creative 37), and we thus see that the internal act of creation 
flourishes within the human mind. This mind—a space of unlimited potentiality to do x—
limited only by itself, comes to fruition with each possible world; and as a result, one 
being can have numerous possible worlds, all of which are infinite in potentiality. If we 
consider each Euclidean point on Leibniz’s continuum as an individual—whose life is an 
event—then it becomes apparent that each point-cum-being is wholly unique, and that 
each individual can expand his or her own mental horizon to infinity with the creative 
powers of actualizing the phenomenon of being. This is not to say that infinity is 
something that can be reached—not at all; but it is a concept that is described as having 
qualities, though it is understood as the totality of numbers in constant flux and 
expanding with no limit: the infinite is unbounded.39 The infinite signifies the totality of 
everything: every particle or atom, every thought or belief, every creation or action; and 
while the infinite space continues to expand, there are no clear demarcations as to the 
                                                 
39 Leibniz via Arthur explains that “infinity” is not a number, nor is it the end or final point of a series of numbers. 
Rather, it signifies a number that is uncountable, and one that in constant motion fends off all attempts to claim a 
knowledge of its unending nature. 
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borders of infinity, simply because it has not such. Infinity is non-transcendental, and this 
is the only means of explaining infinite potentiality, because there need be no borders to 
limit the creativity taking place in the mind—the new ideas and individuated realities 
made possible by the evolution of the mind in the creation of possible worlds. It should 
be apparent, then, that the mind is relative to no-thing, but infinite space—Bergsonian 
duration, or universal space—sweeps up the events of the mind-space, which exists as a 
conceptual Euclidean point in space, but in its pure subjectivity its nature cannot be 
quantified, which is exactly the case with the infinite. We cannot measure the nature of 
the infinite, and we cannot assign value to the nature of another’s mind, because it is a 
portion of space that is unique, individuated, and subjective; it has its own system of 
logic, and it responds to the external world in ways that best suit its internal needs.  
 I argue that on a smaller scale, the conceptual continuum of non-repeating 
points—the infinite infinitesimals—exists on a micro level within the mind. Each event 
that occurs and is recorded by one’s internal duration constitutes a point on this micro 
continuum. If we bring this unique infinitesimal with meta durations back to the 
continuum of the universe as a whole, it becomes apparent that the continuum is infinite 
in all directions; therefore, if each micro continuum has a meta duration that is 
heterogeneous in nature, but this micro continuum is united with all other micro 
continuums (i.e. all other infinitesimals), we see that these points contain the cycles of 
infinite progress and infinitesimal regress, which I discuss in the chapter to follow.40 
Moreover, the potential for the existence of infinitely many Euclidean points is 
unbounded, and it must logically follow that if a Euclidean point is infinite in potentiality, 
then the micro continuums are, too, infinite in potentiality to create or imagine x as the 
internal spaces of possible worlds. In order for a mind to have infinite potentiality, it must 
therefore be in constant evolution; it must be conscious, not necessarily of the 
specificities of the actual world, but in the basic function of responding to stimuli in the 
actual world. The mind of infinite potentiality is constantly approaching the infinite, 
which is due to what Bergson calls the “mind-energy”: the psychical data that have the 
potential to be actualized, and to make energy that manifests in one’s engagement with 
                                                 
40 Leibniz would call the processes of infinite progress and infinitesimal regress “worlds within worlds,” meaning that 
each infinitesimal can divide to infinity, which supports my claim that the mind has infinite potentiality, because so 
long as the mind is conscious, new truths and new “worlds” develop in response to other worlds of the same self. 
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the actual world. Bergson poses the question that “if molecular movement can create 
sensation out of a zero of consciousness, why should not consciousness in its turn create 
movement either out of a zero kinetic and potential energy, or by making use of this 
energy in its own way?” (Time 152). If the molecules of matter can raise sensation in the 
conscious being, then what Bergson suggests is that in having consciousness and 
extensity as a cohesive body of matter, the potential to create “movement” is great. 
Furthermore, it is movement that characterizes homogeneous duration, so I would argue 
that what logically follows Bergson’s argument is that a conscious being has the potential 
to create internal durations which record the psychical events in the mind, and if we must 
consider molecules in this discussion, then psychical events are the engagement of 
molecules and neurological pathways in the corporeal brain, which constitutes the 
presence of energy in consciousness. But when the mind is no longer conscious, it ceases 
to have infinite potentiality, because in becomes stagnant and there are no cycles of 
progress and regress within the mind.41 
 On Félicité’s deathbed, the few who surround her insist that she is not conscious 
of her physical state of being, and that she is not lucid: her discourse is nonsensical and 
she appears senile. I will return to this point shortly, but I want to point out that 
consciousness does not have to be the participation of the self in shared reality, or the 
actual world of institutional and brute facts. Instead, I suggest that consciousness is 
simply an awareness of the “I” in-the-world; whether this “I” is within the mind, or in 
sync with the actual world, the “I” exists, and thus consciousness is established. It is 
Félicité’s consciousness of the actual world that sparks within her soul the need for a 
possible world, and though this is not an intentional creation, it is one necessitated by that 
which the actual world cannot provide: the uncompromising love she bestows upon 
others. 
 Though Leibniz and René Descartes were not necessarily in theoretical 
harmony—in fact, in many ways Leibniz fought the Cartesian mind-body dualism—there 
is a point of agreement that is worth pointing out, that of the “I”-subject and the 
originality of each Euclidean point, or infinitesimal—each individual. The awareness of 
                                                 
41 One example that suggests that infinite potentiality is possible only with the non-tangible mind is that one can be 
considered alive but unconscious, so the mind is presumably not active while the brain continues to live. It is the mind 
which is unconscious—not the being. 
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the world which Félicité possesses is difficult for readers to define, but let us imagine that 
we can synthesize her consciousness with ours, and the “I” identified by readers can 
become the “we” as thinkers and perceivers. Descartes explains that “‘I am’ precisely 
taken refers only to a conscious being; that is a mind, a soul (animus), an intellect, a 
reason—words whose meaning I did not previously know. I am a real being, and really 
exist; but what sort of being? As I said, a conscious being (cogitans)” (69). Certainly 
Félicité possesses an “I,” a first person singularity that constitutes the originality of her 
being, which is filled with her mind, or spirit. What is more, as readers, when we imagine 
the “I” that is hiding behind the omniscient narrative voice, the text becomes real in the 
sense that “we” becomes “I,” and thus our amalgamation of consciousness is 
homogeneous, because we see and understand the world through the eyes of Félicité. 
This is the challenge: to surrender the objective “I” which renders judgment on the 
“she”—Félicité—and consider to the best of our abilities how the events of the narrative 
alone, free of any implicit judgment or perceived narrative tone, would appear to 
Félicité—that would appear to “me.” We see, then, that “I am a real being, and I really 
exist,” but as the “I,” the question Descartes tries to answer—what sort of being—cannot 
occur to the subjective “I.” Of course, each individual in the actual world can attempt to 
perceive themselves from the outside looking in, but this process of self-ideation is 
tainted naturally by the fact that our understanding of the external world from the inside 
will permeate any attempt at an objective analysis of what makes the “I” unique because 
in the duration of life and daily events, we do not question what sort of being we are. If, 
when walking through a shopping center, one is stopped and in a flash of a second asked: 
“What sort of being are you?” I would imagine this would render most speechless, and I 
invite readers to consider what they might answer as an immediate response. If I were 
asked this question, my external answer would be “a human being,” and my internal 
dialogue would answer, “what a ridiculous question!” and this would manifest in the 
actual world in the rolling of my eyes. The question is not ridiculous, but we perceive it 
as such precisely because we do not ask this of ourselves. We assume that our being is 
defined as “human,” and the point I wish to make here is that Félicité conceives of her 
own world—possible and actual—and its events as entirely quotidian and not even 
remotely senile or simplistic. In terms of an individuated human being, again we face the 
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problem of the subjective influence on the objective. Where readers like Shepler see 
Félicité as simple, Félicité likely sees herself as entirely ordinary, because one’s reality is 
accepted internally as real, just as Bergson explains that one understands the self via 
forms in the external world. It is through her actions that readers become aware of 
Félicité’s nature: she is kind, loyal, and selfless; but unfortunately readers cannot 
determine how Félicité imagines herself as unique in some way or another, because her 
actions do not necessarily speak to her self-definition, though they do speak to the nature 
of her own reality.  
 “[Le perroquet] s’appelait Loulou. Son corps était vert, le bout de ses ailes rose, 
son front bleu, et sa gorge dorée”; ‘The parrot was called Loulou. His body was green, 
the tips of his wings were pink, the top of his head was blue and his breast was gold-
coloured’ (Flaubert 61; 20). Here, Flaubert introduces readers to the parrot: “Mme 
Aubain, qu’il ennuyait, le donna pour toujours à Félicité”; ‘[he] thoroughly irritated 
Madame Aubain [ ] so she gave him to Félicité to look after’ (62; 29). An immediate 
attachment between Loulou and Félicité is noticeable from the genesis of their time 
together in the actual world, and this relationship is what allows for the longevity of 
Félicité’s possible world, even after Loulou dies. Like Félicité, who is cast aside to an 
uncaring neighbour following the death of her parents, Loulou is also brushed off by his 
owner, who “could not take [Loulou] away with her” (29; emphasis mine).  
 Loulou becomes a faithful companion to Félicité, whereas the parrot is simply an 
aggravating and unnecessary pet tended to by the help. Félicité, “entreprit de l’instrure; 
bientôt il répeta: ‘Charmant garcon! Serviteur, monsieur! Je vous salue, Marie!”; 
‘decided she would teach him to speak and he was very soon able to say, ‘Pretty boy!,’ 
‘Your servant, sir!,’ and ‘Hail Mary!’’ (62; 29). What is so striking about this passage is 
that in the action of teaching Loulou—just as Monsieur Bourais shares his geographical 
knowledge with Mme Aubain’s children, and subsequently Paul teaches Félicité points 
on the map—Félicité bestows upon a bird the gift of knowledge, which she is thrilled to 
have received when the children were still at home (9). But there is much more to be said 
behind this act of kindness. The phrases that Félicité teaches Loulou are wholly resonant 
of Félicité’s nature. “Pretty boy” corresponds to Félicité’s immediate and unconditional 
love for Loulou, as well as the praise that she lavishes upon others; “Your servant, sir!” 
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resounds her daily life in a service position, where her sole purpose is to ensure the 
wellbeing of others; and “Hail Mary!” draws our attention, again, to Félicité’s newfound 
love for the Holy Trinity, specifically the dove.  
 Francis A. Grabowski argues that “knowledge is similar to sensory perception in 
the sense that it involves the knowing subject becoming directly acquainted with its 
objects, namely, the Forms” (101). Félicité comes to know Loulou—not as an inanimate 
object, but rather as the object of her consciousness, which expands and continues to 
focus more and more upon Loulou—by way of the knowledge of sensory perception. One 
afternoon, Félicité: 
pose sur l’herbe pour le rafraîchir, s’absenta une minute ; et, quand elle 
revint, plus du perroquet ! D’abord elle le chercha dans les buissons, au 
bord de l’eau et sur les toits. 
 Enfin, elle rentra épuisée, les savates en lambeaux, la mort dans 
l’âme ; et, assise au milieu du banc, près de Madame, elle racontait toutes 
ses démarches, quand un poids léger lui tomba sur l’épaule, Loulou ! 
 Elle eut du mal à s’en remettre, ou plutôt ne s’en remit jamais. 
 Par suite d’un refroidissement, il lui vint une angine ; peu de temps 
après, un mal d’oreilles. Trois ans plus tard, elle était sourde ; et elle 
parlait très haut, même à l’église. (64-5) 
 
put [Loulou] out on the grass to get some fresh air. She went indoors for a 
minute and, when she came back, the parrot had disappeared. She 
searched for him in the bushes, by the river and even on the rooftops, . . . 
[finally] [s]he sat down on the middle of the garden bench, next to 
Madame, . . . when suddenly she felt something drop gently on to her 
shoulder. It was Loulou! 
 It took Félicité quite a while to recover from this shock. If the truth 
were known, she never really recovered from it completely. 
 She caught tonsillitis, as a result of getting thoroughly chilled, and 
shortly afterwards developed pain in her ears. Within three years she was 
completely deaf and spoke in a very loud voice, even in church. (Flaubert 
31) 
Félicité’s state of terror brings her to search desperately for Loulou, and we see the pure 
love Félicité has for her little companion. When she feels something drop lightly upon 
her shoulder only to find that it is Loulou, she is beyond relief. The contact between 
Loulou and Félicité is not solely the sensorial response to touch, but a signification of the 
unbreakable bond between them, and when Loulou’s feet touch upon Félicité’s shoulder, 
all is well. But such a shock to her system exposes Félicité to illness, and in her 
movement from the world of sound to the world of silence, her ties to the actual world—
61 
 
 
 
those of sound—loosen, and she indulges more in a world where Loulou is the pinnacle 
of her consciousness. 
 What doubles as both comic relief and the assertion of Félicité’s purity of heart is 
the narrative description of Félicité and the projection of her voice—she speaks loudly, 
even in church; and those who have attended church, and many who have not, will likely 
find this somewhat humorous: it hints at Félicité’s senility or detachment from the shared 
reality of the actual world. But the sentence to follow explains that:  
Bien que ses péchés auraient pu sans déshonneur pour elle, ni 
inconvénient pour le monde, se répandre à tous les coins du diocèse, M. le 
Curé jugea convenable de ne plus recevoir sa confession que dans la 
sacristie. (65) 
 
Even though her sins could have been proclaimed in every corner of the 
diocese without bringing any discredit to her or causing offence to others, 
the cure decided that it would now be best to hear her confession in the 
sacristy. (31) 
While somewhat laughable based on the common understanding of institutionally defined 
etiquette in x-given situation, in this case, church and the privacy of confession, we see 
Félicité’s seeming simplicity—that she confesses her sins, ignorant of her elevated pitch. 
However, to call her simplistic because in her deafness she cannot control the volume of 
her voice would be counter-intuitive. If one is deaf, one cannot hear; and if one who is 
deaf raises one’s voice, one cannot be deemed simplistic due to the inability to hear the 
volume of one’s own voice. This in itself is quite simple. At the same time, Félicité’s 
purity of heart is rearticulated in the comment that her sins were so minor that it would 
matter not if others were to hear them. That Félicité confesses these self-identified sins 
speaks to her ability to reflect retrospectively, and therefore she must be considered 
conscious, because memory is the first signifier of consciousness. Bergson elucidates this 
point, noting: “I characterize consciousness by its most obvious feature: it means, before 
everything else, memory” (Mind 3). What is more, Félicité’s approach to life is not to 
forget painful memories from the past, but to acknowledge them and use them to make 
her stronger. Bergson explains further that “Our memories, at a given moment, form one 
solidary whole, a pyramid whose point coincides with our present—with a present 
moving ceaselessly and plunging into the future” (69). Félicité mourns the deaths of 
Virginie and Victor, and she does the same for Loulou, but for each blow sustained to her 
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psyche, she becomes stronger, and she does so by investing more energy into the 
construction of her internal realm, the possible world within. 
 To most others, Félicité’s minor transgressions are not sins, but rather minor 
trespasses; but to Félicité, to trespass is to sin, and no sin, no matter how small, can be 
dismissed in the eyes of God. It therefore seems more appropriate to observe complexity 
in the nature of Félicité; she could be perceived as child-like or immature to confess 
something so minor, yet at the same time, Félicité grounds her faith in God and in 
Christian integrity and ethics, which means that a small sin is still a sin, and thus must be 
confessed in order to be forgiven. To be forgiven is to be free of the burden of sin—it is 
to enjoy the felicities of life. Félicité is, at some level, conscious of the need to purge the 
negative events of life from her consciousness by surrendering them in confession, and in 
doing this she is free to enjoy life, which includes her possible world. Félicité’s 
confession eliminates the discomfort of the guilt that opposes one’s own values; 
naturally, then, Félicité’s internal harmony ensures that her stream of consciousness is not 
impeded by the shadows of her past. 
 To return to Grabowski’s explanation of knowledge as the conscious being 
coming to realize surrounding objects in the context of becoming, the notion of the Forms 
surfaces. I do not wish to digress too far, but I would suggest that as Félicité comes to 
know the Holy Ghost via Loulou, she comes to know the ultimate Platonic Form—that of 
the infinite God. This infinite God has crafted all human life in the reflection of his own 
image;42 these lives can be considered the allegorical Euclidean points on Leibniz’s 
continuum, because each point moves towards infinity—towards God—and not to 
mention, each point or life is of God, who is the One, while concurrently occupying the 
numeric position “1”: the whole, the entirety, the genesis of all matter according to 
Abrahamic faiths. Grabowski argues that: 
Plato posits the Forms as eternal, simple, and changeless entities. Unlike 
the objects of everyday experience, Forms are entirely free of sensible 
imagery of the physical sort and always present themselves without hint of 
obscurity or ambiguity. And owing to their unwavering appearance and 
character, they alone qualify as the objects of knowledge. (28) 
                                                 
42 Genesis 1:27: “So God created mankind in his own image, in the image of God he created them.” Also, see James 
Miller’s “Three Mirrors of Dante’s Paradiso” (1977). 
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My contention is this: if we are to see the world through the eyes of Félicité, then it 
seems quite apparent that Félicité understands the eternal God to have presented himself 
unambiguously to her by way of the parrot, which she likens to the Holy Ghost; and 
furthermore, this parrot—both in life and in death—fuels a desire to learn of this Form, to 
learn of God, who, like Félicité, is simple in nature. Félicité, like the Christian 
understanding of the nature of God, is in many ways changeless; she is simple and 
straightforward through the course of her life; assaults do not embitter her; and loss does 
not poison her loving heart. But most important is that in spite of Félicité’s rather solitary 
life, relative to others who enjoy a bounty of personal relationships, she tends to the 
needs of others, and this act of giving of herself fulfills her spirit and her sense of being-
in-the-world. The essence of Félicité is her loving spirit, which shows unwavering 
kindness to those badly in need of love—those who are the social outcasts, like the Polish 
man, and like Loulou—the latter taken from his natural habitat only to become an 
ephemeral interest to Mme Larsonierre, who discards him when the exotic excitement is 
no longer convenient, thus leaving her no reason to care any further for the parrot. If we 
were to accept Félicité’s character as complex, but with a simplistic approach to life, then 
this is much akin to the notion of God: “Does He speak and then not act? Does He 
promise and not fulfill?” (Num. 23.19). We see, then, the true simplicity of two complex 
beings: Félicité and the God to whom she devotes her life. 
 Mme Larsonierre rejects the parrot, but Félicité, on the other hand, is thrilled to 
receive Loulou, whom she comes to know as a companion, rather than a romanticized 
figure of a world vast and unknown to those who wish to behold its treasures. This is 
camaraderie between two simple souls: Félicité, whose “la taille droite et les gestes 
mesurés, semblait une femme en bois, fonctionnant d’une manière automatique”; ‘upright 
stance and deliberate movements gave her the appearance of a woman made out of wood, 
driven as if by clockwork’ (22; 5); and Loulou, who, “on le comparait à une dinde, à une 
bûche”; ‘[s]ome people said he looked more like a turkey or called him a blockhead” (62; 
29). What is more, the immediacy of the love bestowed upon Loulou by Félicité is 
apparent when she finds “these jibes very hurtful’ (29). But this is not simplicity in the 
context of the ignorance and dumbfounded servant as defined by Shepler and Lytle; this 
is the bonding of equals, defined as such by Félicité herself. Earlier in the story, Théodore 
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attempts to seduce Félicité against her will, but sometimes to trust is to be naïve, because 
the alternative is cynicism or the excessive suspicion of anyone—of everyone, and the 
disturbance of one’s internal harmony. In allowing Théodore another chance to prove his 
love for Félicité. But readers observe that she is not completely naïve to the world: 
Ils se rencontraient au fond des cours, derrière un mur, sous un arbre isolé. 
Elle n’était pas innocente à la manière des demoiselles,—les animaux 
l’avaient instruite ; mais la raison et l’instinct de l’honneur l’empêchèrent 
de faillir. Cette résistance exaspéra l’amour de Théodore. (25)  
 
They would meet in a corner of some farmyard, behind a wall or beneath a 
solitary tree. Félicité was not naïve like other young girls of her age; 
working with the farm animals had taught her a great deal. However, her 
natural discretion and an intuitive sense of honour prevented her from 
giving in to Théodore’s demands. (6) 
The innuendo concerning the habits of farm animals is a good jest, but Flaubert’s design 
is to mobilize humour in order to illuminate the obvious facts of life which Félicité has 
transferred from the context of primacy to her own personal life; she is aware of 
Théodore’s desire, but she has the agency to deny him that for which he wishes. What is 
more, Théodore is annoyed by Félicité’s desire to remain pure, but so early in the text 
Flaubert foreshadows one of the many things held in common between Félicité and 
Loulou; in this case, it is her “resistance” that informs her initial judgment of the parrot, 
that being his “Étrange obstination de Loulou, ne parlant plus du moment qu’on le 
regardait”; ‘stubborn streak . . . which never ceased to amaze Félicité; he would refuse to 
talk the minute anyone looked at him!’ (62; 29). Akin to an impertinent child, Loulou 
talks only to his adopted mother, who “doted upon him” as if he were of Félicité’s 
généologie—Loulou becomes a reflection of his “mother” just as Félicité is a reflection 
of God, her own Creator. To be stubborn or to resist is not the behaviour characteristic of 
Félicité, but to persevere when life is most challenging is Félicité’s claim to 
stubbornness. To resist is the mark of one who has considered the issue at hand, and 
subsequently chooses consciously to oppose x or y, whereas the definition of simplicity 
so defined by Shepler is one that suits a passive being, who allows life to pass by without 
engaging it. On the contrary, Félicité’s simple heart is one that I characterize as free of 
the vanity, conceit, and pretense, which surrounds Félicité in her actual world, a place 
where her worth is founded in her servitude, and her person is valued only in filling the 
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demands of others. Félicité’s simplicity, therefore, is an active approach to life: she is 
unafraid to love endlessly those with whom she crosses paths, and though many of these 
flâneurs of-the-world do not care for her in return, she does in fact internalize every 
ounce of love and courtesy bestowed upon her in a world whose inhabitants live 
unnecessarily complex—non-simplistic lives—that they forget the joy found in those 
who are simple in their approach to people and to life. Most important is the distinction  
inherent in this malleable and relative understanding of the narrative, that is, the flâneurs 
of the world exist passively, thus failing to engage the life bestowed upon the wanderer; 
and I place emphasis on the preposition “of,” because to be of the world means that one is 
a materialized being of a material world, whereas to be in the world implies an active 
engagement with life thus given, and regardless of the events and hardships one must 
face, the life in the world is the process of maturation and self-amelioration. Félicité is in 
the world, and though her responses to daily struggles seem somewhat shallow, it is not 
she who is simplistic; and though her love is rarely reciprocated, Félicité’s own 
stubbornness—her insistence to love—defines one who is conscious both of herself and 
of others.  
 It is Mme Aubain’s life that is monotonous: once her role as “mother” changes 
shape, she loses her identity. At the age of seventy-two, Mme Aubain dies from an illness 
prompted by the jarring revelation that the man she had employed to see to her finances 
had swindled her. We see the fragility which defines Mme Aubain when those who have 
tended to the quotidian and monotonous tasks complicate her life by dying: “Ces 
turpitudes l’affligèrent beaucoup. Au moins de mars 1853, elle fut prise d’une douleur 
dans la poitrine; . . . et le neuvième soir elle expira, ayant juste soixante-douze ans”; ‘This 
sordid business [caring for her own finances] was a source of great distress to Madame 
Aubain. In March 1853, she began to feel pains in her chest. . . . On the ninth evening of 
her illness, she died, aged just seventy-two’ (71-2; 36). What I wish to point out is the 
sheer irony of the word “simple,” because we see now that Félicité’s life is significantly 
more eventful and consequently complex, whereas Mme Aubain enjoys the solitude of 
the country, caring for very little other than herself; Mme Aubain enjoys the simple life. 
What complicates the adjective “simple” even more is Félicité’s response to Mme 
Aubain’s death: 
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Félicité la pleura, comme on ne pleure pas les maîtres. Que Madame 
mourût avant elle, cela troublait ses idées, lui semblait contraire à l’ordre 
des choses, inadmissible et monstrueux. (72) 
 
Félicité wept for her in a way that servants rarely weep for their masters. 
That Madame should die before her disturbed her whole way of thinking; 
it seemed to go against the natural order of things; it was something 
unacceptable and unreal. (36) 
Again we see Félicité’s natural tendency to love those who surround her, and though it is 
quite unfortunate that Félicité believes that her superior, or “master,” should die after her, 
so as to respect the natural order of hierarchy, it is Félicité’s simple approach to life that 
inspires her unyielding love and passion for service. Félicité chooses to love simply, 
rather than be subordinate for her simplicity; her love is a love that is indiscriminately 
kind—the love for human life, much akin to the New Testament declaration that: “God so 
loved the world that he gave his one and only Son” (John 3.16). Likewise, Félicité so 
loves the world that in her role of service, she loves Madame not out of necessity, but out 
of the overwhelming passion for God’s creatures; she sees people not for their faults, but 
simply receives them as themselves. Most importantly, one’s simplistic approach to life 
does not then define one as simple—this would be post hoc logic; rather, it suggests that 
this is a dynamic being who is conscious of and in touch with the world, but sees no need 
to complicate the act of giving of herself and loving—actions that serve as the guiding 
principle of her actions and the source of her happiness. 
 The plot takes a drastic turn from the pitiful “real” and the intriguing “(un)real.” 
Félicité accepts all of God’s creatures as they are, which poses a problem: if Félicité takes 
God’s creatures for their true essence, what is it that allows her to equate the Holy Ghost 
in the form of the dove with the parrot, now stuffed and perched in her room? 
 Following the traumatic missing bird situation, for Félicité “tous les êtres 
fonctionnaient avec le silence des fantômes. Un seul bruit arrivait maintenant à ses 
oreilles, la voix du perroquet”; ‘became enclosed in an ever-diminishing world of her 
own’ and that “[o]nly one sound now reached her ears, and that was the voice of the 
parrot” (65; 31). I would argue that if one were to consider the numerous hardships in 
which Félicité is abused, mocked, and slandered, one would determine that in finding a 
constant companion—Loulou—that the short period in which he goes missing would jar 
Félicité to such an extent that the overwhelming burdens of life begin to weigh upon her, 
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and a possible world develops in order to lighten that load. Félicité loves Loulou for 
himself, and Loulou senses in Félicité her natural kindness that is affective; it is not a 
façade, and it is free from hierarchic order, which is why Loulou lands upon her shoulder, 
rather than that of Madame. Of course, we are not privy to the mind of the parrot, but it is 
reasonable to consider that Félicité’s genuine self is apparent to Loulou, simply because 
as a conscious being—though a bird, not a person—he prefers Félicité over all others. 
Loulou is unable to identify a hierarchic relationship, and therefore there is no 
corresponding notion that he must live amidst such a condescending order of existence.43 
Nonetheless, Félicité “simply doted on him” (31), and within her mind the vulnerable and 
maternal self appears in the absence of the social norms and roles by according to which 
she lives her life daily. The possible world within Félicité’s mind is not one of retreat or 
safe harbour, but rather a space in which she is free to be herself, and she is understood 
and valued for this self, in spite of how she may appear to those who observe her from 
the actual world. Félicité exists in both the actual and possible worlds, but it is almost as 
if the mind is separated from the body, and the body functions via physiological patterns 
and automatic responses facilitated by the brain. The imaginative and self-subsisting 
faculties of Félicité’s mind are not out of sync with the actual world—the place in which 
she is “Ne communiquant avec personne, elle vivait dans une torpeur de Somnambule”; 
‘unable to hold a conversation with anyone, [therefore] she lived her life as if in a 
sleepwalker’s trance’ (70; 34). Félicité no longer grounds her identity in the actual, 
material world; but instead, she holds conversations with Loulou, “Ils avaient des 
dialogues, lui, débitant à satiété les trois phrases de son repertoire, et elle, y répondant par 
des mots sans plus de suite, mais où son coeur s’épanchait”; ‘the parrot endlessly 
repeating the three stock phrases from his repertory and Félicité replying with words that 
made very little sense but which all came straight from the heart’ (66; 31). For something 
to “make sense” to an individual in the actual world, the thinker must be in accordance 
with the societal “norms,” or institutionally-created “realities,” but in the possible world, 
one need not worry, because such rules do not and cannot exist within this space, because 
                                                 
43 It is worth pointing out that the colloquial term “bird brain,” which refers to one who is as stupid as a bird, is 
overturned in Loulou. For the parrot, his understanding of life is quite simple: he likes those who care for him, and this 
preference is simple, but it is also most logical. Thus it seems that man—who crafted the concept of Occam’s razor, the 
theory of the simplistic method being best—is the only species who complicates life unnecessarily, thus imposing on 
the self so-called realities, like politics and hierarchy, that exist only in the human mind. 
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they would be self-defeating: if the possible world is a platform upon which the mind has 
infinite potentiality to act upon experiential psychical data and create x reality, it must be 
free from the shackles of mediocrity, that being the generally arbitrary social “rules” in 
the actual world. Such rules are defined by a given society, certainly, and social etiquette 
and perceived faux pas behaviour varies from society to society; but nonetheless, even if 
these rules are ingrained in one’s daily thinking, they are self-imposed binaries between 
what could be and what must be. But this is precisely the problem with the actual world: 
it is the epistemological faux pas, where one knowingly submits oneself to the power of 
social niceties, simply because these niceties allow one to be perceived as “normal” or 
sane; these are tactics of social in-grouping. If one cares about one’s reputation in the 
actual world, then these rules are an unfair negotiation of choice, and such restrictions are 
often in place to ensure the superficial comfort of others; but what if we were to forget 
the divisiveness of niceties and simply exist in the harmony between mind and body, 
relative to no one except our own perception of the actual or possible world? What “must 
be” is the self-imposed false consciousness that is not the nature of the world, but rather 
the nature of life, so crafted by cognitive human beings. 
 Discussing the early Christian church, philosopher Christian Moevs addresses the 
historical debate on the soul, whose presence is apparent in historical burial practices 
dating back to Ancient Egypt, and Ancient Greek philosophy, as we see in Plato’s 
dialogues, like the Phaedo. Moevs argues that: 
Humans are the horizon between the immaterial and the material, the 
infinite and the finite, the timeless and the temporal. In humans the 
ultimate ontological principle becomes aware of itself [ ] this is human 
consciousness or self-awareness, the divine and immortal element of the 
human being, manifest in space-time through the human form.” (6) 
I claim that the human mind has infinite potentiality to do or create x, and it seems quite 
clear in Moevs’s argument that the human form, which is the vehicle of the mind or soul, 
is at the brink between the finite and the infinite, and I extend this claim to posit the idea 
that the human form is the placeholder between the actual-finite world and the possible-
infinite world. Félicité’s actual world—in the now dilapidated French country home of 
the late Mme Aubain—is finite, because this world limits her; she is bound by the laws of 
causality—that a conclusion must logically follow a set of deductions, and that for every 
conclusion—an effect—there is a logical cause that precedes it. But this is the linear 
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nature of the finite actual world. Once “we allow ourselves to live” (Time 100) and know 
the world intuitively for what it can offer, rather that what it presents to us, then we know 
the freedom of the possible-infinite world in pure duration. This world does not conform 
to the logic of linearity and cause and effect, but rather it operates as a relational system 
of the thinker relative to this thinker’s own mind; it is the internal duration—the pure 
duration—that sheds the weighty burden of conformity, so as to embrace all that can be 
in the space of the mind, the space developed and shaped by its possessor, and the space 
in which the possessor is the deity-like creator of existence, of experience and the internal 
harmony of the self vis-à-vis the self. It is in such a space that Félicité enjoys the 
company of her winged companion, and the reader who fails to understand the intricacies 
of Félicité’s mind is the one who views her through the actual-world lens—the 
standardized system of conforming to social norms and behaviours: it is the standardized 
system of implosion, where with each step inside the smothering realm of mediocrity, 
one eliminates in each movement and each thought the potential to do or be x, and one 
accepts in its place the limited y-reality as all that one can be and experience. This 
finitude is the equivalent of existing in the void of missing substance, and settling oneself 
in the empty atmosphere of what could be. 
 On her deathbed, Félicité thinks only of the parrot’s well-being, his body buried 
well beneath wreaths of roses and figures of the Virgin Mary on an Alter of the Corpus 
Christi parade. She asks: “‘Est-il bien?’ tourmentée du perroquet” (33). Having, in a 
sense, sacrificed Loulou’s finite-worldly body in contribution to the Corpus Christi 
celebrations, Félicité releases her worldly possessions, which are but a few, and draws 
closer to her own death. Most importantly, we see the mimicry of Jesus Christ by the 
parrot; Loulou’s finite-worldly body is left behind, but his divine connection with the 
Trinity ensures his place in Heaven. Naturally, it would be a religious faux pas to rise a 
common bird to the place of the Trinitarian dove, but we have considered Félicité’s 
world, and thus have considered her beliefs through her own eyes, and she believes that 
Loulou is the metonymic Holy Spirit, which in truth no one could possibly verify or 
deny. To anthropomorphize that which we cannot know is normal, not simple; it is the 
human quest for comprehension—it is to satisfy the craving for substance to fill the void. 
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Félicité no longer seeks truth, because believes she has found it in the parrot, and in her 
final breaths: 
Les mouvements de son coeur se ralentirent un à un, plus vagues chaque 
fois, plus doux, comme une fontaine s’épuise, comme un écho disparaît ; 
et, quand elle exhala son dernier souffle, elle crut voir, dans les cieux 
entrouverts, un perroquet gigantesque, planant au-dessus de sa tête. (34) 
 
One by one her heartbeats became slower, growing successively weaker 
and fainter like a fountain running dry, an echo fading away. With her 
dying breath she imagined she saw a huge parrot hovering above her head 
as the heavens parted to receive her. (40) 
Loulou is Félicité’s final earthly concern, but within her mind—or in this context, her 
esprit, the parrot hovers above according to the common spatial rationalization of Heaven 
being above the earth. Loulou waits for her, and he is there to welcome her into the one 
place that gives her eternal hope in the finite world: the Kingdom of God. 
 In her devotion to the Holy Spirit, Felicité dissolves into the divine realm, thereby 
transcending her seeming simplicity by merging with the infinitely complex.  The result 
is the undoing of all assumptions made by her social environment regarding Felicité’s 
alleged simple heart. This complexity through simplicity — divinely mediated or brought 
about through the accretion of semantic strata — is at the crux of Flaubert’s subtle 
paradox.  It is the paradox inherent in Jesus’s pronouncements in the Sermon on the 
Mount: 
Blessed are the poor in spirit, 
    for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. 
 Blessed are those who mourn, 
    for they will be comforted. 
Blessed are the meek, 
    for they will inherit the earth. 
Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, 
    for they will be filled. 
Blessed are the merciful, 
    for they will be shown mercy. 
Blessed are the pure in heart, 
    for they will see God. 
Blessed are the peacemakers, 
    for they will be called children of God. 
Blessed are those who are persecuted because of righteousness, 
    for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.  
Blessed are you when people insult you, persecute you and falsely say all 
kinds of evil against you because of me. 
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Rejoice and be glad, because great is your reward in heaven, for in the 
same way they persecuted the prophets who were before you. (Matt. 5.3-
12; emphasis mine) 
In each of these Beatitudes we see exemplified to a tee Félicité, and as we attempt to see 
the world through her own eyes, we find that her Christian faith—which is a selfless 
devotion to those whom she serves, and the praise she pours upon a common parrot-cum-
Holy Spirit—is real simply due to her devotion to God the actual world; it matters not 
whether the Holy Ghost is a dove or a parrot; what makes Félicité’s faith true is her 
unwavering belief and commitment to living life according to biblical principles. Flaubert 
presents Félicité as if she were a sort of “wild card,” where she seems to fit whichever 
judgment is bestowed upon her. Though she is not Christ, Flaubert draws significant 
parallels between Félicité and the Christian figure of the personified God, the Son. 
Félicité does not achieve the fame akin to the name proper of Christ, but the Sermon on 
the Mount, spoken by the biblical Jesus, seems to capture the essence of each of Félicité’s 
characteristics and behaviours—it seems that Félicité’s nature within Flaubert’s narrative 
mirrors the Beatitudes of the Sermon, with each proclamation encapsulating a portion of 
the history of Félicité’s own life, her own torments, trials, and moments of jubilance. 
Flaubert paints Félicité as if she were a micro-Christ, the saviour of the poor and 
wretched, who loves rather than judges, and who gives while rarely receiving. Félicité’s 
gift is simply that she finds the sustenance she needs to live happily and freely in her 
faith—a faith founded in the Holy Trinity, and epitomized in the parrot.  
 Félicité triumphs upon her deathbed: within her simplicity is her perceived 
Salvation, and that for which she wishes—a union with the Trinity—is bestowed upon 
her in death as Loulou hovers above the finite body of the simple housemaid of Pont-
l’Évêque. Félicité finds that to complete her internal duration, or continuum, she must 
situate herself where the space of her mind finds the harmony of peace and freedom to 
be. Therefore, we see that Loulou operates as a connective vehicle through which Félicité 
believes herself to enter the presence and sanctity of God. As the spirit of the parrot—her 
own hallucination, thus her own reality—hovers above, so below Félicité perishes, not as 
a life wasted in simplicity, but life whose inherent value is founded not in those who 
surround her deathbed and condemn her to senility and simplicity. Félicité cherishes her 
relationship with God, and this is explicit in her devout prayers and her raptures in 
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church; it does not matter that her devout prayers are to the stuffed and rotting corpse of a 
parrot, nor does it matter that her raptures in church are a response to her likening the 
Holy Dove to the Amazonian parrot. Indeed, Flaubert’s narrative is all but simple, 
because in order for one to understand Félicité’s reality, one must first see through her 
eyes God’s simple message of Salvation. The need to appear anything other than simple-
at-heart is unnecessary, because Félicité deigns for Salvation, and readers are left only 
with the sound assumption that it is Salvation which she receives. Félicité’s simple mind 
and simple heart seem therefore the most direct means of her understanding the simple 
message of God, for whom and akin to whom she lives her external life daily, her internal 
life—her own reality—as the guiding principle for her worldly actions. The deified parrot 
becomes Félicité’s “inner life,” as we encounter in Chaitin’s account of unbounded 
human potentiality; Félicité achieves all that she wishes, and as a result her potentiality to 
do or be x is exhausted in full, spanning from her beginning to her end. 
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Chapter 4. 
A Theory of Infinite Flux: Wonderland and the Ever-Evolving Alice  
“No continuous thing is divisible into things without parts.” –Aristotle.44 
  
 Lewis Carroll’s45 Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865) is a product of the 
Victorian period, but this fact, albeit wholly obvious to most readers, is problematic. 
Nowhere in the novel are readers informed of the time, place, or social customs, but it 
seems too often these biographical and contextual ideas are brought into the text by 
readers.46 Thus we are left with a girl, Alice, who falls asleep while sitting alongside her 
sister at a stream, and we follow Alice into the depths of her dream formed on a different 
level of consciousness. This variant level of consciousness-this dream-state—is a 
possible world, and consequently so, it has its own duration, one of numerous durations 
we would assume to exist if Alice were a real human being as opposed to a fictional 
character.  
 For each human being there is, at the very least, an internal and an external 
duration; said otherwise, there is a duration that is wholly personal and subjective—it is 
of the mind, whereas the external duration is of the actual world, wherein all bodies 
which house the brains that facilitate the mind exist and engage. Until this point I define 
possible worlds as entelechial47 spaces of potentiality to do or create x within the mind; 
and the psychical data that ensues due to the energetic presence of consciousness creates 
matter, albeit matter without the necessary form to be considered actual. On matter and 
substance, Kurt Smith explains via Leibniz that “a body or material substance emerges as 
the result of a soul (mind) acting through the metaphysical medium of matter. A material 
substance, in other words, is a mind-matter unity” (156). Smith makes current 
                                                 
44 The Physics (22). 
45 Penname for Charles Dodgson. 
46 Interestingly, we see that Carroll is a penname, which may appear odd considering its proximity to the Belle Époque 
in continental Europe, a time of curiosity and artistic innovation. But we know from Carroll’s biographical information 
that he chose the penname so as to maintain his status as a leader at Christ’s Church at Oxford University; he was a 
renowned mathematics scholar, and if we were to consider the biographic subtext, then the reason for a penname 
becomes clearer: a mathematician and logician at Oxford is writing a child’s book about talking rabbits and 
anthropomorphic decks of cards. 
47 Aristotle’s usage of the term “entelechy” applies to matter that has become actualized, or has thus gained Form; 
Leibniz considers entelechy to be a process of amelioration, or self-reflexive realization of a process of perfection, 
which exists due to consciousness. I err towards Leibniz’s usage, that is, that there is immanent data derived from 
possible worlds within the mind that await the conscious realization of the potential to be or do x, rather than accept the 
present reality of y. 
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seventeenth-century metaphysics by equating the soul with the mind, which is the shift 
from the religious—present throughout early church theology—to the secular; and in this 
context, the mind-matter unity is the individual consciousness or realization of substance-
to-be, which must pass through the processes of entelechy. This version of possible 
worlds assumes the infinite potentiality of the mind to create new realities and new 
durations, and just as Bergson notes that each individual has an internal duration, I extend 
this to say that each possible world exists amidst a multiplicity of durations, all of which 
await the entelechial process of actualization within the mind-space. I use the term 
“mind-space” to describe the amalgamation of, or connection between, the individual 
mind and general, or universal space. This term thereby illustrates a space occupied by 
that mind alone, and in turn, this mind makes an impression on the actual-world of 
universal space, which will always maintain the trace of this mind’s presence.48 Mind-
space is akin to the natural sciences term, space-time, which describes space and time as 
interconnected to compose one concept representative of length, width, height, and time; 
mind-space, therefore, is the combination of the continuum of matter, energy, time, 
duration, and consciousness. Space-time is a conceptual unity borrowed from applied 
mathematics, and likewise, mind-space is a concept that defines the unity between the 
thinking-individual and the space in which he or she exists, as well as the space which 
their mind occupies. I raise awareness of mind-space as a concept, because it is 
imperative to one’s understanding of the potentiality of the mind to create new durations, 
which are infinite in potentiality. 
 Infinite potentiality relies upon perception—one’s state of mind or attitude—in 
order to enter the process of entelechy. Bergson argues that “action [ ] isolates that part of 
reality as a whole that interests us; it shows us less the things themselves than the use we 
can make of them . . . we scarcely look at the object, it is enough for us to know to which 
category it belongs” (Creative 114). Every so often one will “look at a thing, they see it 
for itself, and not for themselves” (114), or in other words, they see the superficial, but 
fail to see the potential for it to become x: “[t]hey do not perceive it simply with a view to 
action; they perceive it in order to perceive” (114). If we were to consider every possible 
world as a whole of many parts, we would have both infinite progress and infinitesimal 
                                                 
48 One example would be Charles Dodgson’s creation of Wonderland, which we continue to read today. 
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regress. If a possible world represents the totality of events of one internal duration of one 
individual being, it acts as a sort of building block in the larger duration—the compilation 
of all durations both possible and actual: universal space. This process of expansion by 
way of adding one whole to create a larger whole is what I call “infinite progress,” 
because so long as there is human consciousness, there are infinitely many durations, thus 
forcing the totality of durations as the whole of existence to grow in infinite progress.49 50 
But we also see infinitesimal regress coincide with infinite progress. By “infinitesimal 
regress” I mean to say just what Bergson implies: instead of accepting an object as a 
whole, one should be the individual who perceives the object for itself, for its essence, 
which necessarily implies that one observes the many parts that form this whole. If we 
were to begin with Alice as a human being, in spite of the fact we know her only through 
fiction, Alice’s self is an amalgamation of every event in her consciousness and its 
subsequent processing within the mind-space; Alice is a whole of many parts, or an 
aggregate. We also see Alice as a building block for the totality of durations which 
expands in infinite progress. The former statement that Alice is a compilation of every 
event in her consciousness, possible and actual world events, and imagined or real events, 
reveals a process less explicit. I propose that we consider Alice as a being of many parts, 
as well as a part of a larger whole. Alice is a building block in Carroll’s narrative, just as 
a student is a part of a department; and the department is an aggregate of students, staff, 
and faculty, but each student or staff is a complete unit in itself.51 Therefore, infinite 
progress, (a therefore b therefore c →∞), is—let us begin this example with one 
student—the expansion of a larger body by way of the amalgamation of its parts: students 
are to departments, departments are to faculties, and faculties to universities, etcetera. 
Though a series of expansion may appear to end, it is important to remember that the 
process of expansion encompasses many parts, and each part, or building block, of the 
                                                 
49 This is a mathematical construct that works just as well linguistically. “Infinite progress” (→∞) is 1 therefore 2 
therefore 3, ad infinitum. 
50 Unfortunately, the language necessary to describe these ideas is self-defeating, but we cannot simply remove 
language of quantity from our semiotic systems of communication. Let us consider that “totality” is not a whole—
because the infinite is everything (n + 1 → ∞)—so the totality will mean all which exists, with the understanding that 
“everything” (matter, energy, consciousness) expands infinitely to infinity. Synonymous terms will include 
“continuum,” “continuity,” “compilation,” and “aggregate.” 
51 “Infinitesimal regress (→ - ∞) is the counterpart to infinite progress, and the linguistic formula akin to its 
mathematical counterpart would be a if b if c → ∞. Simply stated, a does not occur or take form if b does not ensure its 
necessity, and b is necessitated by c. This is the mathematical system of regress, rather than that of formal logic. 
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“departmental” expansion has also its own composition, and each part of this building 
block begins in series of expansion in and of themselves. For example, the student of a 
department could be composed of many life events, and though the student is part of the 
department, the student’s experience in the department causes an expansion within its 
self; therefore, the student’s experience in the department comprises the evolving student 
in itself, and this student may become a teacher or a lawyer, who is composed of many 
parts, one of which is the departmental-educational system. Thus we see the series is 
unending, because the interconnectivity between building blocks and their parts is 
unavoidable. These processes of expansion are akin to the continuum of infinitesimals 
described by Leibniz, (and later formulated as 
1
∞
 by Georg Cantor), but for a conceptual 
understanding, let us hold that the student who is of the department, which is of a faculty, 
is infinite progress; whereas the student who is composed of experiences and memories, 
(𝑥1 + 𝑥2 . . . 𝑥𝑛), which includes departmental relations, is the equivalent of infinitesimal 
regress. Simply stated, both progress and regress are systems of expansions, the former 
via addition, and the latter via division; but the idea is that both illuminate or create 
substance that was not apparent prior to the realization of the series. The difference 
between progress and regress is simply conceptual: it is to understand a whole and its role 
as a part, and to understand a whole as defined by its many parts. But regardless of our 
approach, both processes are mobilized to understand more completely the nature of the 
infinite, which is the aggregate of all matter and consciousness in its unending realm, 
expanding infinitely to infinity. 
 To divide Alice-the-whole into her many parts is to illuminate the building blocks 
of Alice’s self; but we do not stop here. If we divide continually the parts of parts, where 
each smaller part is also a whole of the larger part, Alice, is a product of infinite progress, 
so understood via infinitesimal regress: one can divide wholes into their corresponding 
parts in order to understand the nature of a whole which is also part of a larger, or 
different whole, which is the continuum of durations, or infinitesimals. That which we 
should seek is the nature of the continuum, the compilation of all durations expanding to 
infinity. Of course, we cannot know the entire nature of the universe, because it is 
infinite; but I argue that we can in fact understand our own place in the scheme of 
infinity—a universe illuminated by the consciousness of those who wish to become 
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enlightened through an understanding of the world surrounding each and every conscious 
being. 
 My ambition, here, is to consider Carroll’s Alice as a whole comprised of many 
parts, or building blocks as I will call them; but I also want to discuss Alice as a part of a 
larger universal whole, which I will argue is the indefinite, or uncountable totality of all 
durations of all levels of consciousness expanding to infinity, thus with no end. That 
which I present suggests that my definition of possible worlds, which I apply to a work of 
fiction as a prototypical example of human potentiality beyond the literary text, is an 
effective way to consider the epistemological processes of human beings. Such processes 
have the potential to lead each individual to the center of the personal labyrinth—the 
mind-space—where the enigmatic infinite reveals a truth in itself relative to that given 
being. Possible worlds constitute a large part of individual epistemic evolution—the 
evolution of the mind through space—and what the fictional dream-world of Wonderland 
offers readers is more than a fantastical escape from reality: it realizes the necessity of 
multiple durations in every being. Duration necessarily implies continuity, yet we see that 
actual-world qualifications of possible-world “illogic” and “nonsensicality” are products 
of various internal durations, but are too often perceived as illogical or nonsensical 
strictly because they appear not to correspond with one’s actual world understanding of 
the phenomena of life; to bond “possible” with “illogical” is the denial of potentiality, 
because what could be is dismissed as impossible. Following this logic, I argue that such 
socially-imposed binaries on the self can, in many cases, be eliminated, or at very least 
relaxed, so as to allow individuals to profit from the data of their consciousness, albeit 
consciousness of an internal duration at a different level of consciousness.52 Binaries are, 
in many cases, a display of ignorance—bias that leads to divisiveness, as well as common 
logic which stipulates that one must follow a pre-determined institutionally-created 
system of logic, or else appear mad or out of touch. But what we see in Wonderland is a 
                                                 
52 I say “levels of consciousness” to describe the connection between perception and actual-world “logic.” For 
example, in a dream-state, which is a possible world, Alice joins the Mad Hatter for tea, though it is a subversion of the 
tea service she would join in the actual world. Although this experience constitutes both consciousness and duration, 
the connection between the logic she would use in the actual world and her perceptions within Wonderland have a 
weaker correspondence than the logic she would use to contemplate whether she would take her tea with lemon or 
milk, which is, by standard philosophical and theoretical definition, a possible world. 
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variant duration unified in one body: Alice, who is of many parts, and who will become 
part of a whole, that is, the continuum.  
 British anarchist Herbert Read explains that “what we apprehend of the nature of 
things is subject to constant change, and the change is not so much inherent in the thing 
itself—in matter—as in our consciousness or apprehension of these essences” (146). 
Thus we see that our understanding of the world in which we live—the actual world—is 
in constant flux as our perception is shaped by the various internal durations. As a 
consequence, when one embraces such fluctuation it becomes very difficult to adhere to 
the socially or self-imposed binaries that lead to a sort of black and white model of 
thought. Read continues to argue that “essences do not change, nor do they subsist in 
space or time. They are merely there when we perceive them. They belong to the object, 
but can exist without its material presence, like the grin of the Cheshire cat in Alice in 
Wonderland” (146). Read’s description of unchanging essences supports my claim that 
possible worlds of internal durations of one being do in fact exist with or without the 
prerogative of other beings; and what is more, they are independent of socially-
constructed binaries that demarcate one idea from another, thus making “right” and 
“wrong” the sole judge of all individual experience. Binaries attempt to bar the synthesis 
of durations within the individual, not to mention the cohesiveness of the individual with 
the continuum of durations. As such, we find no whole, but instead many directionless 
parts. Read’s argument also points out that the core of x-being does not change, because 
an essence or core is not an aggregate, but is organic and essential to the nature of the 
aggregate. I would extend Read’s logic concerning unchanging and eternal essences to 
argue that the only unity or homogeneous whole of unchanging essence is universal 
space—whose core is the very particle that brought it into existence. It is everything 
within space that changes, but all matter does have at its core a portion of space, because 
matter is of space, and thus the essence of space is extended to all matter upon the 
continuum. 
 In our considerations of wholes of many parts, alongside wholes of the whole, 
(i.e. the endlessly expanding infinite), I want to take this opportunity to contemplate 
whether it is in fact true that the whole is the unbounded and evolving aggregate of all 
durations—fictional or actual—with each part of the whole owning the potential of 
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experiencing the sweetness of infinity in various states of consciousness, because each 
part is a fragment of the infinite.53 This “sweetness” in Italian is dolcezza, and I borrow 
Moevs’s definition, which is, “the sweetness of infinity and unity tasted in the finite” (9). 
This fraction of infinity is quite similar to Leibniz’s statement that: 
It can indeed be said that every substance bears in some sort the character 
of God’s infinite wisdom and omnipotence, and imitates him as much as it 
is able to do; for it expresses, although confusedly, all that happens in the 
universe, past, present and future, deriving thus a certain resemblance to 
an infinite perception or power of knowing. (Metaphysics 10) 
In a secular context, God can be replaced with “total consciousness,” which signifies 
individual durations that I equate to the infinitesimals of the continuum of universal 
space, which I argue is infinite.54. Each finite individual has the potential to experience 
dolcezza within one or each of their own internal durations, simply because the totality of 
durations includes individual thinker a, and therefore a is a fraction of the composite 
substance of the universe, or total consciousness affiliated with universal homogeneous 
universal duration. Dolcezza is to realize one’s place in the world, and to act out this part 
in such a way that the mind matures and the self is in constant self-amelioration. At this 
moment the mind becomes a powerful tool of potentiality to do or create x-reality, and 
while immersed in new realities—new possible worlds and durations—one will, each in 
one’s own way, experience the sweetness of infinity due to the infinite potentiality of the 
mind-space, which is facilitated by the brain belonging to one’s actual-world 
corporeality, though the latter is itself limited by temporal finitude.55 Dolcezza exists 
                                                 
53 One could use this to argue in favour of Leibniz’s continuum, because the infinite is not a whole, but it expands 
infinitely to infinity, yet it can never be considered complete, because its unbounded nature as space frees it from the 
finitude of matter; and this is due to the fact that all matter is originally of one particle, therefore designating all matter 
and substance as infinitesimals. Matter began in one particle (1), and thus divides infinitely without limitation, thus 
never reaching zero, necessarily implying that everything that is of the continuum has substance, as signified by the 
cardinal number 1 and its infinitely many parts. 
54 The term “infinite” can be defined in various ways. I use the term to describe all of existence, which is all 
consciousness and all durations—past and present (and eventually the future as an event passes through present into the 
past). Although I do not go so deep as to define the existence of atoms and particles unseen by the human eye, we know 
that they exist, and we know that we do not understand every working component, or building block, of the universe. In 
this knowledge of our own deficit we signify its potentiality to advance, and that means that the object a has the 
potentiality to be actualized by a mind, given the circumstances that consciousness alone allows us to acknowledge the 
presence of environmental objects whether they exist as a projection of consciousness, or as a priori to consciousness. 
55 When I say that the mind is infinite in potentiality and that the body is finite, it appears contradictory; but what I 
want to underscore is that potentiality is not limited so long as there is consciousness, which implies a responsive brain 
in an actively live body. One cannot have infinite potentiality forever, then; but one’s potentiality is limited by nothing 
except itself while the body is live in the actual world. 
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already within the individual—it is immanent—and it is discovered in the persistent 
exploration of the labyrinth of the mind. 
 Immediately upon reading the poem preceding the actual story of Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland, we see an instance of events moving through duration. 
Carroll crafts a poem that tells the vague history of Wonderland’s creation, but although 
the poem is placed first, it is written retrospectively. “All in the golden afternoon / Full 
leisurely we glide: / For both our oars, with little skill, / By little arms are plied” (Carroll 
i). These little arms are those of “three tongues” (i), or the three girls rowing down the 
river with Wonderland’s creator, who writes of the “dream-child moving through a land / 
Of wonders wild and new, / In friendly chat with bird or beast— / And half believe it 
true” (i). Alice is introduced to the tale of Wonderland in the rowboat, half believing the 
fantasies to be true, and the poem is more akin to a sad lament for the loss of childhood. 
In fact, Alice’s journey through Wonderland comes to a close as she awakens to find 
herself still upon the bank of the river with her older sister, who responds to Alice’s 
account of her dream about Wonderland, saying “It was a curious dream, dear, certainly; 
but now run in to your tea: it’s getting late” (102). Her sister displays a vague pretense 
that an older sibling develops as they mature, but “she too began dreaming after a fashion 
. . . the whole placed around her became alive with the strange creatures of her little 
sister’s dream” (103), as “she sat on, with closed eyes, and half believed herself in 
Wonderland, though she knew she had but to open them again, and all would change to 
dull reality” (104; emphasis mine). Before I address the duration which flows from the 
riverboat ride and into Alice’s dream with the solemn poem to follow, I want to point out 
a parallel between the narrator’s account of the sister’s thought processes and the joy 
which Alice’s sister finds when engaging with what could be: the Wonderland of the 
mind-space. The poem speaks of “wonders new” that the adventurer “half believe it true” 
(i), just as the sister “half believed herself in Wonderland” (104), knowing only that in 
opening her eyes, it would be gone, much akin to the poetic reminiscence on Wonderland 
as a “childish” story that should “with a gentle hand, / Lay it where Childhood’s dreams 
are twined / In memory’s mystic band” (ii). We see the sister come close to returning to 
the story of Wonderland, for which she pleaded to hear as a child, but she reverts—
almost as conscious choice to forget fairy tales—back to the “dull reality” of the actual-
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world logic expected of a maturing child. Meanwhile we read that Wonderland is “Like 
pilgrim’s wither’d wreath of flowers / Pluck’d in a far-off land” (ii). The poem charts 
Wonderland’s very beginning, but a tone of sadness prevails. The wreath of flowers, 
much like the one Alice considers crafting as she lays beside the river (1), has been 
woven in Wonderland by a wandering pilgrim—also resembling Alice—but has faded 
and withered as time has progressed and the memory of Wonderland fades into the 
oblivion of the maturing mind, where actual-world logic is the only acceptable currency 
of thought. 
 We see the apparent flow of time as it progresses from a fantastical story from the 
girls’ childhood to Alice’s “curious” dream, and to the poet’s admission of Wonderland’s 
fading relevance—events that are indeed situated in socially-constructed time, though it 
is duration which reveals the large-scale or universal irrelevance of time. In fact, as far as 
the motions of the universe are concerned, time does not exist—there is just no need 
beyond human consciousness. We cannot conceive of time’s movement through space 
without the assistance of temporal markers; it is the use of qualifiers like “after lunch” or 
“before dusk” that give rise to the illusion of time as relevant outside of institutionally-
created spaces. Duration, on the other hand, often goes unnoticed in our states of 
consciousness, but it is the sole register of all events experienced in the individual mind-
space, as well all events experienced by all beings in the actual, physical world of reality. 
By “space,” I mean simply the fabric of life—the stage upon which we enact the data of 
consciousness as an event—and with every event there is a trace of its presence, past or 
present; duration is the universal and homogeneous continuum of memory, a compilation 
of subjective durations, and is therefore immeasurable by a system of numbers. 
 On the topic of subjectivity, I want to expand on my earlier definition of mind-
space. In addition to this conceptual notion of a mind occupying a certain realm in total 
space, the mind-space is also the subjective synthesis of all durations of that particular 
being. I have argued that we understand space through temporal markers that manifest in 
the form of events, and we understand that space is necessary in order for time to exist, 
but if there is nothing in space, then how do we, as visually oriented thinkers, conceive of 
space? Of course, we have the realities of buildings and trees, but this does not account 
for the fabric of the mind-space, a purely subjective zone. The mind possesses an 
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imagination, whereas the world—universal space—is a prop for the continuum of 
durations, including imagined or possible worlds. Therefore, we see instances of 
imagination in particular durations, because imagination is simply another variant of 
perception via a different level of consciousness. Consciousness is another defining 
quality of the mind-space in the cognitive and perceiving being-in-the-world; and 
universal space is, again, the fabric onto which human consciousness maps its individual 
events and realities in internal durations. Space is homogeneous and it serves to unite 
heterogeneous matter as an aggregate, and this homogeneous space both influences the 
individual and is influenced or acted upon by the individual. Said otherwise, 
homogeneous space, in a sense, “holds” various other durations that impact the being; 
and likewise, this single being impacts the durations surrounding it in homogeneous 
space. 
 Bergson describes durations as “the form which the succession of our conscious 
states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present 
state from its former states” (Time 100). What we see, here, is that duration is in its most 
perfect form when it moves through the mind unconsciously, and Bergson likens it to 
notes of a tune “melting, so to speak, into one another” (103). One lives within the 
continuum of durations—every possible internal duration projected into universal 
space—and a certain form of duration exists within one’s own mind. Bergson explains 
that “we are led to believe that real duration, the duration lived by [our] consciousness, is 
the same as the duration which glides over the inert atoms without penetrating them and 
altering them” (154). Thus we see a pattern: the internal-external battle; we note that 
mind-space is subjective and individuated, whereas universal space is objective, yet 
impersonal; and now we observe that duration, too, exists within this battle between 
interiority and exteriority. Duration that shapes one’s character—one’s mind—is internal 
duration; it is subjective, but also affective, because it both perceives the events in 
relation to the self, and records the affective response of the self in memory as a process 
of learning, or epistemic evolution. External duration is passive and impersonal, but it 
exists of necessity, because without external duration there can be no internal duration. 
The words “duration” and “space” are synonymous because universal space is the 
continuum of durations due to the fact that duration is homogeneous space, which is why 
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duration cannot be quantified, and often operates unknown to the human mind (162). 
When Alice enters Wonderland as she falls asleep on the bank of the river, she does so by 
falling into a well, and this is the first noted experience of the relativity or subjectivity of 
duration. The narrator informs readers that: 
[e]ither the well was very deep, or she fell very slowly, for she had plenty 
of time as she went down to look about her, and to wonder what was going 
to happen next. First, she tried to look down and make out what she was 
coming to, but it was too dark to see anything: then she looked at the sides 
of the well, and noticed that they were filled with cupboards and 
bookshelves: here and there she saw maps and pictures hung upon pegs. 
She took down a jar from one of the shelves as she passed: it was labelled 
‘ORANGE MARMELADE’ but to her great disappointment it was empty: she 
did not like to drop the jar, for fear of killing somebody underneath, so 
managed to put it into one of the cupboards as she fell past it. (Carroll 2) 
At first glance we observe that Alice does not fall at a rate that acknowledges actual-
world laws of gravity, because in falling so far the first response would likely be terror, as 
the fight or flight response takes over the mind; but Alice has time to look at maps and 
pictures, as well as open a jar of marmalade, only to find it empty and return it to another 
shelf, because in this possible world, actual-world time—whose nature is fundamental to 
the concept of gravity56—has no bearing on such events. Bergson argues that: 
For though we reach a sum by taking into account a succession of 
different terms, yet it is necessary that each of these terms should remain 
when we pass to the following and should wait . . . to be added to the 
others: how could it wait, if it were nothing but an instant in duration? 
And where could it wait if we did not localize it in space? (“Time” 78-9) 
Duration is the “fabric” that unites instances in both internal events in consciousness, as 
well as all events that occur in all durations within universal duration. We see and 
conceive of space based on the events woven into its body; without events, space would 
be invisible to the eye, and arguably if there is nothing to validate space, then we must 
ask logically whether duration exists. But of course, this is a circular line of reasoning, 
because we could not question the existence of duration if there were none, as there 
would be no consciousness and the experiential data which accompanies it; duration 
exists, so this question would be ridiculed, because there is life and consciousness, and 
necessarily, then, duration. We understand impersonal, or homogeneous duration, via the 
juxtaposition of visible matter and identifiable phenomena relative to other matter and 
                                                 
56 So measured by the rate at which an object falls. 
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phenomena, and we understand that the changing nature of these substances is due to 
motion. As motion is energy that moves matter, it must have space in which to move. 
Without space there could exist no matter—space is the fabric of existence of any and all 
kinds of matter and substance. To question the validity of duration would be the 
equivalent of asking whether there is such a thing as death, because I have not died, and 
therefore I experience death from a detached view, and may wonder if this, too, will be 
my fate, though yet it has not been such. But these sorts of questions are the ones that 
must be asked, because when we focus on what is viewed as apparent or obvious, we are 
more likely to encounter ideas and realities that have been overlooked in the zealotry of 
the enlightened being, who pursues only empirical data to construct his or her 
understanding of the world. In the actual world in which we exist, a common mechanism 
of self-preservation is the autonomous being who attempts to establish a well-grounded 
understanding of the world, which in the existentialistic discourses that render human 
will and self-direction arbitrary amidst socio-political institutions bring to the individual a 
sense of security. We craft this security in our minds—this security is an aspiration, a 
dream, a goal—it is a potentiality; one can choose either to ignore the possible world 
bliss as non-pragmatic, or one can act on this sense of security by rejecting the empirical 
argument that matter is tangible alone, and all that is non-tangible is impossible. 
 On a superficial level, Wonderland is diametrically opposed to empiricism, but if 
empiricism is based on deductive facts with verifiable data, then it seems as if we can 
describe Alice’s first encounter in Wonderland based on this model, however ridiculous 
this may seem. Alice finally reaches the floor of the well, and discovers a bottle and “tied 
around the neck of the bottle was a paper label, with the words “DRINK ME” beautifully 
printed on it in large letters (Carroll 5). Naturally, Alice wonders if it is poison, but 
determines that “the bottle was not marked ‘poison,” so [she] ventured to taste it, and 
finding it very nice (it had, in fact, a sort of mixed flavour of cherry-tart, custard, 
pineapple, roast turkey . . . [and] very soon finished it off” (6). Though Alice is rather 
pleased to find that the mixture was not poisonous, she is equally satisfied with her new 
height of ten inches (6). As is the case of Alice’s extended fall down the well, a being in 
the actual world would be both mortified and terrified to become a mere ten inches tall, 
but this is because a being in the actual world is aware of the actual-world ramifications 
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for a person who is but ten inches tall. This height would be a tremendous handicap, but 
equally shocking is that it negates all empirical data that would validate the total 
impossibility of such circumstances. Alice’s reasoning is deductive, but her motive for 
such reasoning is informed by possible-world logic, and as such when Alice finds herself 
a ten-inch tall girl she is thrilled now to be “the right size for going through the little door 
into the lovely garden” (6). The crushing force of defeat in actual-world events is a 
rational triumph in the possible world. Alice’s defiance of Newtonian physics exists in 
the dream because it is possible; though I must emphasize that “actual” does not 
necessarily follow “possible,” though what would appear empirically impossible can 
manifest in the actual world in a different form. Therefore, the possible-world deductive 
reasoning becomes the data of consciousness, and individual consciousness is the entirety 
of that being, necessarily implicating possible worlds as data of consciousness, which 
finds its ontological bearings in the actual world of the corporeal being. Possible world 
data are in fact experience, but though it may be possible, it may not be plausible in the 
same form which it takes in the possible world, but I will return to this point shortly. 
 It would appear that Alice is not conscious of her situation, because we do not see 
any correspondence between actual-world logic and possible-world events. But needing 
to change size again, Alice eats a portion of the cake: 
And said anxiously to herself “Which way? Which way?” holding her 
hand on the top of her head to feel which way it was growing; and she was 
quite surprised to find that she remained the same size. To be sure, this is 
what generally happens when one eats cake; but Alice had got so much 
into the way of expecting nothing but out-of-the-way things to happen, 
that it seemed quite dull and stupid for life to go on in the common way. 
(Carroll 7) 
It is quite apparent that Alice is in fact conscious of her situation: she attempts to measure 
the size that she expects to become, which necessarily implies that she relies on her 
memory of the early shrinking incident to anticipate what might occur in a similar 
situation to follow, which implies memory. According to Bergson, consciousness is 
apparent “by its most obvious feature: it means, before anything else, memory” (Mind 3). 
Alice’s fall through the well, followed be the non-poisonous potion, and the incident of 
the cake signifies not only durations within her mind-space, but the importance of 
memory as the primary feature of consciousness. Memory is pertinent to consciousness, 
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because it affirms one’s own internal duration; this internal duration is the flow of events 
through Alice’s mind-space and her engagement with the actual world, which furnishes 
the mind-space with the content on which it dwells. These events constitute psychical 
matter, as Bergson explains in Time and Free Will, but in order for them to take form, 
they must be swept up by consciousness (152); thus we find that it is the experiential data 
of consciousness in the flow of duration, recalled by memory that verifies one’s existence 
and one’s self. To be conscious indicates the active presence of pure duration, which 
means that events and their subsequent experiential data flow through the mind as a 
homogeneous whole, and not a juxtaposed awareness of events, formulated as such:  
𝑛1 + 𝑛2 . . .→ ∞ . 
 Prior to describing Alice’s own internal set of durations, I want to explore both 
one building block lower and one higher by way of the divisive and unifying power of 
language. As Alice wanders through the woods, she comes across the Cheshire Cat, of 
whom she asks the direction in which she should go; he responds: “That depends a good 
deal on where you want to get to” (49). The Cheshire Cat’s comments seem 
confrontational and unhelpful, but this is a game of logic that Carroll creates throughout 
the text, and this logic breaks concepts into parts in infinitesimal regress. Alice responds, 
“I don’t much care where—” to which the Cat replies, “Then it doesn’t matter which way 
you go” (49). Alice then counters the Cat to qualify the vagueness of her former comment 
in saying: “so long as I get somewhere” (49), thinking that she has solidified her logic via 
specificity—so long as perceived by Alice as a means of receiving a finite and definitive 
answer—but her logic is shattered again by the Cat’s ability to work towards the lowest 
common logical denominator: “Oh, you’re sure to do that . . . if you only walk long 
enough” (50). Here, we can identify the divisive power of language, which in this 
particular case, finds its form in deductive logic. Alice asks a question expecting one 
answer, only to find that with each new qualification she becomes increasingly confused, 
as opposed to her initial hope of finding the right path. But this path is in no way defined, 
which thus allows the Cat to reduce each question and qualifier to sub-questions and 
qualifiers, and through this reading of Wonderland we find that infinitesimal regress is an 
expansion of the apparent into its many parts, which are then treated as separate wholes. 
Therefore, infinitesimal regress—if mapped on paper—would appear as ∆, an equilateral 
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triangle signifying what is truly inductive logic, which counters the model of deductive 
reasoning often described as narrowing possibilities akin to the image of an overturned 
equilateral triangle. In the end, the divisiveness of the cat’s logic actually exacerbates 
Alice’s confusion, and she becomes frustrated by the various possibilities that expand the 
potential outcomes, when truly that which she desires is to narrow down the possibilities, 
so as to find an answer to her seemingly simplistic question. If we consider the equilateral 
triangle as a symbol for inductive reasoning, we see that the cat has expanded the 
possible outcomes via infinitesimal regress, because he begins with one datum and 
expands outwards, much akin to inductivity. This process of regression has the possibility 
to divide without end, but in terms of individual consciousness, the subject of division 
does not notice the process; they cannot notice the process, because the fluidity of our 
internal duration does not allow us to recall each instance of cause and effect that leads to 
the created whole by which we view ourselves in the present. In terms of space and mind-
space, we cannot view ourselves objectively from beyond our mind-space, because that is 
the limit of our consciousness; and likewise, no human being can think beyond the 
infinite body of space, because beyond the infinite there is neither nothing nor something; 
there is only the infinite,57 and it has no Other by which we can juxtapose and compare 
their natures. Thus we find that the mind-space functions by similar principles as 
universal space, and I would argue that this similarity is due to the continuum of 
infinitesimals. 
 If we recall the chapter concerning Lawrence Durrell and the void, we can see 
that the protagonist has many identities, each akin to a fragment of a shattered mirror; as 
a consequence, the shards of mirror reflect the shards surrounding it, so each shard is a 
reflection of another, therefore, each shard is influenced by those which surround it. 
Then, if we were to consider the infinite as an entire mirror—a mirror that is free of 
cracks, because it represents the homogeneity of universal space—then we would find 
only that the infinite reflects nothing, because no matter or substance exists outside of the 
                                                 
57 One possible objection to saying that there is only the infinite is that, in terms of natural science, space is believed to 
be infinite, yet it continues to expand at such a rate that we cannot conceive of following its movement. But in order to 
expand, it seems that there must be something into which the infinite can that we describe expand, which necessarily 
implies that there is something outside and beyond the infinite. In order to settle this matter, my suggestion is simply 
space as infinite, because our technology cannot follow the expansion of space at the speed of light, so we must settle 
with the term “infinite” which seems to be synonymous with the unimaginable, or inconceivable.  
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infinite, which is the aggregate of all matter, substance, and energy; it is the incomplete 
and ever-evolving aggregate of the totality of all that exists in duration. Let us consider 
this analogy in terms of the continuum, which can be equated to Bergsonian pure 
duration—the complete mirror is space, and all that occurs within space does so relative 
to its position on the continuum. Moreover, this is a continuum of infinitesimals, and 
therefore it is unending—it is the incomplete aggregate. As such, each point on the 
continuum that represents matter in motion, (which demands human consciousness in 
order for it to self-realize that it exists, simply because the point is a human being, and it 
is events in duration that surround the being), is the equivalent of an Euclidian point, 
which I have discussed in the Flaubert chapter. Thus every point is a being, and each 
being is unique, but at its core it still contains a portion of its beginning—its ontological 
roots are of the first particle and the motion, (energy), that ensues. Stated otherwise, 
according to the mirror analogy, each point, or possible world, can be considered a shard 
of mirror that reflects those which surround it; and as a shard, its necessary beginning 
was of the unbroken mirror, and is therefore a shard that has at its core a fragment of the 
whole mirror, which is akin to the notion of dolcezza: the individual fragment of infinity. 
We find, then, that each being is autonomous and free-thinking, and as a result a life 
begins to create the “worlds within worlds” as described by Leibniz. Said otherwise, each 
being extends outwards, and in each instance of energetic movement—objectively 
physical or subjectively psychical—new durations develop in the mind-space; and each 
duration is projected upon the fabric of universal space—the continuum—by way of the 
trace of human presence in space. Just as these sub-durations or micro-worlds reflect their 
creator, their ontologies coinciding with their own first mover, so too do the Euclidian 
points upon the continuum, or instances of new and individuated consciousness, reflect 
that original particle of the universe. That which is of the mind-space extends itself into 
space, but reflects the initial (the Alpha, the first) Euclidean point; and likewise, that 
which originates as a unique and individuated vessel of consciousness in space reflects—
like a fragmented mirror—the essence of its ontological origin.58 
                                                 
58 Essentially, this is quite similar to the logic of Xenophanes, who said “If cows and horses had hands and could draw, 
cows would draw gods that looked like cows and horses would draw gods that looked like horses.” The original particle 
would thus be the anthropomorphized (except we would change this term to describe an animal envisioning a god in its 
likeness) cow or horse, and it would be created by the corresponding cow or horse, which in this analogy would be the 
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As Alice continues her possible-world conversation with the Cheshire Cat, 
readers see a shift in the discourse: The Cat stops using divisive qualifiers that expose the 
composition of each of Alice’s thoughts, and he begins to build a first-person plural 
foundation for unity: “we” + “all.” It seems glaringly obvious, but in Wonderland there is 
an important distinction we must consider in terms of personal pronouns, and Alice does 
this well. In her vexing conversation with the Cat, Alice asks “What sort of people live 
about here?” (50), and the Cat kindly informs her that both the Hatter and the March Hare 
live to his left and to his right; they are “mad” (50). Alice counters this comment that she 
“[doesn’t] want to go among mad people,” but in her own belief that she is sane, the Cat 
draws her into the “we,” thus making Alice a building block of Wonderland itself. The 
Cat, perfectly complacent, informs Alice: “we’re all mad here. I’m mad. You’re mad,” 
and when Alice demands that the Cat substantiate his claim, he offers additional 
deductive reason: “You must be [mad] . . . or you wouldn’t be here” (50). Alice becomes 
a collective “we” in Wonderland, and resists this collective for only a marginal period of 
time before refusing to reject this logic; or more straightforward, she realizes the logic of 
Wonderland-logic and embraces it. In essence, Alice code-switches: though the language 
in terms of diction and words is identical to her own actual world (and to speakers of 
English), Wonderland logic uses the same diction, but its syntactical-semantic 
correspondence is different based on the association of words in a cause-effect formula. 
Alice demands of the Cat which “sort” of people live in Wonderland, and he responds 
that it is the mad who live here; but as a direct consequence of Alice’s assumption that 
her state of being exemplifies what it means to be sane, she sees herself as other to those 
who are mad. Nonetheless, the Wonderland rhetoric envelops Alice, and she becomes a 
part of Wonderland—a building block of her own dream in Wonderland. Alice is the 
protagonist of her dream, which is a possible world within her mind-space, and this 
inclusive and unifying label of “we” makes Alice a building block for Wonderland in her 
own possible world; and, to follow, Wonderland is a building block in the composition of 
Alice’s actual-world self.59 This logic seems circuitous, but it is not in the least. Echoing 
                                                 
Euclidean points: each point is of the first particle, and thus they resemble the first particle and identify its presence in 
them, even if they are so far removed from this particle that there is no corresponding image. 
59 For clarification purposes, Alice’s actual world is, to Carroll’s readers, a possible world whereas Alice’s possible 
world is a sub-reality in Alice’s life. When I refer to Alice’s actual world, this is a fictional actual world, but for the 
sake of understanding the dynamic nature of possible worlds in our own actual world—we, the readers—I avoid the 
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the logic of Lawrence Durrell, that “nonsense is good sense with all sense removed” 
(“Heraldic” 72), we see that due to the internal duration flowing between Alice’s actual 
world and possible world, she is able to project experiential data from the actual world—
the childhood story of Wonderland—onto the space of her mind in the form of a dream. 
The level of consciousness that crafts Alice’s dream as a possible world is derived from 
the events of the actual world—the childhood story of Wonderland—and she places her 
own “self” as the protagonist of a possible-world adventure through Wonderland. 
Therefore, readers see that Alice shapes the events of her dream; yet upon waking, 
Wonderland’s existence, as both a story and a dream, becomes an undeniable part of her 
self—it is a building block that informs the “whole” Alice, the combination of all internal 
durations in one body, which is yet another duration within the continuum of durations, 
that is, the universal duration or infinite space. However, as Alice departs from the dream 
to begin to transition back into the actual world, the Queen’s soldiers, who resemble 
playing cards with feet and hands, revert to their “whole” form as a deck of cards, and:  
rose up into the air, and came flying down upon her; she gave a little 
scream . . . and tried to beat them off, and found herself . . . with her head 
in the lap of her sister, who was gently brushing away some dead leaves 
that had fluttered down from the trees upon her face. (Carroll 102) 
On dreams, Bergson states that “To hear sounds in a dream, it is generally necessary that 
real sounds should be perceived. Out of nothing the dream can make nothing” (Mind 67), 
and that “it is out of real sensation that we fabricate the dream” (69). It makes sense, then, 
that Alice awakens to find her sister brushing leaves off of her face, because inside the 
dream Alice frantically attempts to swat away the deck of cards falling upon her as the 
dream-world collapses. 
 Describing her dream as “curious,” Alice runs off to take her afternoon tea, 
“thinking while she ran, as well she might, what a wonderful dream it had been” (Carroll 
102). Such a smooth transition signifies the continuous flow of data between actual and 
possible worlds. Alice has heard the story of Wonderland many times as she grew up, and 
her fondness for the story furnishes her possible world, which enters her mind-space as a 
dream that seems like reality; and it appears like reality because the shifting of her 
                                                 
redundant designation whenever possible, granted that readers understand that the actual world I describe is still 
fictional, albeit an exemplary prototype for my argument concerning possible worlds. 
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conscious states from waking to sleeping, and then to dreaming, are synthesized upon 
awakening as an “event” in consciousness that registers as a separate duration, though 
one that belongs to her self. Alice is the aggregate of her many durations, but in 
conferring upon herself the pronoun “I,” it is simple to see that in spite of various 
durations within Alice’s mind-space, she views herself as singular—she views herself as 
one; 1; a whole. Alice is a self, and such a reality is likewise in the actual world of 
Carroll’s readers.60 
In Alice’s conversation with the Cheshire Cat, we find that Alice’s sentences can 
be broken down by infinitesimal regression, which appears to exclude her from 
Wonderland logic; at the same time, however, the Cat’s shift in reasoning leads to his 
adoption of the inclusive “we,” and readers find that Alice becomes part of the building 
block of Wonderland, which illuminates the fact that building blocks of many parts can 
increase in infinite progress at a swift pace, as well. Thus we see through the course of 
the novel the explicit heterogeneous wholes: Alice of many parts to Alice as part of a 
whole; and Alice of many parts, whose parts have individual parts, and each part has its 
own heterogeneous composition, ad infinitum. These wholes of many parts are the 
continuum to which I refer—Leibniz explains it as the continuum of infinitesimals, with 
each infinitesimal as a point that divides to infinity, therefore there are infinitely many 
infinities, or “worlds within worlds.” Richard Arthur explains that: 
The doctrine of ‘worlds within worlds’ to infinity is held to be a 
consequence of continuity. Because of the infinite divisibility of the 
continuum, [Leibniz] says . . . that it is certainly possible that smaller 
things will have proportionately the same qualities as larger ones, and so 
on to infinity. (Arthur xxxii) 
Thus we see that each unique point, (an infinitesimal to which I refer earlier as a 
Euclidean point), divides infinitely, so there must be infinitely many parts, and 
necessarily infinitely many components to each point; hence the infinite potentiality of 
                                                 
60 I want to acknowledge that regardless of Leibniz’s insistence that there are no wholes which are composites, and in 
spite of my revision to Leibniz, where I argue that a composite can be an aggregate that constitutes a complete whole 
(although ever-evolving) upon the infinite continuum, I would still contend that a finite being as a composite can be a 
whole simply because it is finite: when it expires, it has been completed. Space is infinite and thus never complete; 
matter cannot follow this rule. 
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the mind, whose composition is of infinitely many substances—actual or potential—
which expand to infinity. 
The processes of infinite progress and infinitesimal regress as the building blocks 
of individuals and their durations imply consistent motion of various parts through the 
flow of universal space, because consciousness relies on the existence of duration (i.e. 
space), and duration requires the energy of motion through which matter evolves and 
leaves its trace upon the canvas of space. It seems logical to conclude, then, that all 
durations—which are the totality of durations in human consciousness—are in constant 
flux. The constant flux of universal duration is a result of its heterogeneous parts united 
as a homogeneous whole. Each of these parts are distinguished as human durations, 
which Bergson describes as the growth of the self as it: 
expands and changes as it passes through the two contrary states [a state of 
consciousness that is aware of two actions, but only one possibility]: if 
not, how would it ever come to a decision? Hence there are not exactly 
two contrary states, but a large number of successive and different states 
within which I distinguish, by an effort of imagination, two opposite 
directions . . . in reality there are not two tendencies, or even two 
directions, but a self which lives and develops by means of its very 
hesitations. (Time 175) 
These hesitations highlight the existence of traditional Possible Worlds theory from the 
realms of philosophy and literary theory, yet at the same time we see that in the self’s 
“hesitations” there are the brief moment of consideration, which I have discussed earlier 
in relation to the void in Durrell’s “Zero.” The void between actual and possible worlds is 
a flash of the mind’s energy and the data it relies upon to make choice a rather than b. 
Nonetheless, substance—though not yet actualized into a more definitive form—rises 
from such a choice, because for each thought process in the void, which beckons the 
fruition of substances, the energy involved in this process creates substance out of the 
“kinetic energy,” so called by Bergson. But substance cannot come of nothing, which 
necessarily implies the existence of some substance that was, until that moment of 
realization, immanent: present, yet not realized. This immanent data is that which fuels 
the process of entelechy, where the conscious mind-space realizes the presence of 
substance, and works to actualize it; and in its actualization, the entelechial process 
produces the substance that allows the cycle of entelechy to repeat as each new instance 
or realization of immanent substance rises in one’s consciousness. What I want to 
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consider more carefully is the pure potentiality of the mind-space of both internal and 
external durations to do or actualize x by way of bringing the data of consciousness into 
the actual world, in one way or another. 
 Alice’s croquet mallet—the flamingo—which she uses when the Red Queen 
invites her to play, is in a slightly foul mood, and the Duchess, now appearing before 
Alice, is “doubtful about the temper of [her] flamingo” (Carroll 74). Alice responds that 
“He might bite,” though we find that Alice did not feel “at all anxious to have the 
experiment tried” (74). But as they continue to exchange words, the Duchess and Alice 
become increasingly distant from each other, in a figural sense, as the Duchess 
contemplates the moral of mustard: “‘The more there is of mine, the less there is of 
yours,’” whereas Alice, who exists within a completely different duration, exclaims that 
mustard is “a vegetable. It doesn’t look like one, but it is’” (74). Clearly this is no mutual 
exchange of thoughts, but rather two streams of consciousness spatially located in close 
semantic proximity each to the other. But soon their monologues converge at the dialogic 
intersection of durations, and the Duchess responds to Alice’s argument that mustard is a 
vegetable with the comment she finds most appropriate, which, we can see, is mildly 
related to the discussion of mustard: 
“I quite agree with you,” said the Duchess; “and the moral of that is—“Be 
what you would seem to be”—or, if you’d like it put more simply—
“Never imagine yourself not to be otherwise that what it might appear to 
others that what you were or might have been was not otherwise than what 
you had been would have appeared to them to be otherwise.” (74) 
More a riddle than a moral, the Duchess adds to the growing confusion of Wonderland as 
Alice’s dream comes to a close; but Alice does not seem confused—in fact, she seems 
completely comfortable with the riddle, if only the Duchess would write it down (74). 
But if we deconstruct the riddle, it could be reformulated as: “I am otherwise than I 
appear to others in relation to their understanding of how I could have been, which they 
want to see as congruous with what I truly have been, because—if not—I would appear 
otherwise to their conception of who I am.” To simplify the formula further and place it 
in the context of the internal durations of others that, in one way or another, permeate our 
own internal duration, one could say: “I should imagine myself as wholly different in any 
potential or actual state of being than how others see me in my current state of being 
(which I likely see differently than they). Others wish to see congruity between what I 
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could have been if x and what I currently am as: y, because without this continuity I 
would be viewed as ‘otherwise,’ but not the type of ‘otherwise’ by which I define myself. 
(Others desire to see me as x, in any past or present duration, even if I define myself as y: 
x = y but y ≠ x).” The Duchess assures Alice that this riddle is a present, and, to Alice’s 
disgust, the Duchess rests her “sharp little chin” on Alice’s shoulders (74). “Alice did not 
much like [the Duchess] keeping so close to her: first because the Duchess was very ugly; 
and secondly, because she was exactly the height to rest her chin on Alice’s shoulder, and 
it was an uncomfortably sharp chin” (73), but though Alice’s external reaction is one of 
general patience, her internal consciousness is plagued with the feeling of an invasion of 
her personal space. Given that this possible world belongs to Alice’s dream-state plane of 
consciousness, it is no surprise when the Duchess must face the Red Queen, who hisses: 
“either you or your head must be off, and that in about half no time! Take your choice!” 
(75). How fortunate for Alice that this bothersome projection of her own consciousness is 
eliminated from the scene by the threat of corporeal elimination—her impending 
execution in the dream world, if she refuses to vanish within the half second. Ironically, 
the Duchess “jabs” her chin into Alice’s shoulder, so for her to face the threat of 
decapitation does serve Alice’s possible-world self-interest best; but more importantly, 
what would enrage one in the actual world can manifest in the possible world in a 
hypothetical context that bears no consequences. Cutting off the Duchess’s head, which 
includes the chin which “jabs” Alice, is both humorous and eerie in the sense that the 
unconscious portion of the mind is free to act in the possible world, thus revealing that 
which lies beneath rational consciousness, and the self-censorship of internal dialogues 
that determine when one must act according to the binary of “right” and “wrong.” 
 As readers approach the final result of the entelechial cycle of Alice’s levels of 
consciousness, (i.e. dreaming, waking, imagining, etcetera), they come to recognize 
Alice’s moment of dolcezza. It is the moment of epiphany of Alice’s own consciousness 
of herself—her presence—in the world; it is Bergsonian intuition—the “direct vision of 
the mind by the mind—nothing intervening, no refraction through the prism”—that 
propels Alice towards the sweetness of infinity (Creative 20). To actualize the data of the 
mind-space, giving matter its form in the actual world, is the active consciousness that 
speaks to the harmony between internal durations and the universal space in which we 
95 
 
 
 
function daily. It appears that Alice becomes increasingly aware of her surroundings and 
her ability to exercise power over the matter surrounding her, and she possesses a 
heightened consciousness in the dream-state. Moving through the mad tea party and the 
trial at the end of the dream, Alice begins to impress upon the space of Wonderland—her 
mind-space—the authority that she holds as this world’s very creator. This epistemic 
maturation is a result of this particular duration in the possible world of Wonderland, 
Alice’s consciousness evokes her faculty of memory, which allows her to create in this 
possible world a narrative of self. What is more, the narrative of self is an act of self-
definition relative to the Others in her own possible world, and this act is completed via 
Alice’s expanded consciousness and awareness of the trace she leaves upon this space. It 
is a space that is of Alice, and in reciprocation, a space upon which Alice impresses her 
existence, hence the act of self-definition. The events of Wonderland have impressed 
themselves upon the fabric of Alice’s mind-space as psychical data—events which leave 
a trace in Alice’s consciousness, resulting in epistemic maturation or evolution sustained 
by her memory of where she began, and her anticipation of where she might end. The 
journey through Wonderland is thus a cycle of infinitesimal regress, where Alice’s 
consciousness expands via the possible world, and evolves due to her newfound 
experiential data. This data is crafted in one duration of the mind-space—for Alice, this is 
her subconscious—and transferred to the possible-world dream-state. The beauty of 
possible worlds, then, is that an individual can craft his or her own spaces, in which he or 
she engages in possible-world experiences that become the data of consciousness in an 
internal duration, and can therefore manifest in some form in the actual world.  
 Alice finds her voice in Wonderland; she realizes that it is she who has power 
over the events, although in her dream-state consciousness she does not recognize that 
her power stems from her mind, the ontological beginning of this possible world. 
Wandering through the Queen’s garden, Alice sees a deck of playing cards—each card an 
individual subject of the queen—and they are painting the roses red. As the Queen 
approaches, the cards fall upon their faces in her procession; and if we consider these 
playing cards for their actual-world value, a game of cards consists of hiding the faces of 
the cards, and when the faces are hidden each card appears identical to the others as a 
homogeneous deck—a deck, or the deck of cards. It is interesting to note, then, that when 
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various durations of one whole being—in this case, the deck of cards—face another 
duration—in this case, the Red Queen—each duration is viewed objectively as a whole. 
The Queen sees the deck of cards with their faces down; and the cards lower their faces 
as they realize the presence of the Queen. Thus we see Bergson’s notion of pure duration, 
which is indiscriminate and impersonal. Pure duration is the force which unites all 
heterogeneous aggregates as a network of durations in constant flux and expansion to 
infinity. 
 When the Queen comes to a halt before Alice, there is a brief yet volatile dialogue 
between the two aggregate beings: 
“What’s your name, child?” 
“My name is Alice, so please your Majesty,” said Alice very 
politely; but she added, to herself, “Why they’re only a pack of cards after 
all. I needn’t be afraid of them!” 
“And who are these?” [referring to the cards with the paint] said 
the Queen . . . 
 “How should I know?” said Alice, surprised at her own courage. 
“It’s no business of mine.” . . .  
The Queen turned crimson with fury, and after glaring at her for a moment 
like a wild beast, began screaming “Off with her head! Off with—” 
 “Nonsense!” said Alice, very loudly and decidedly, and the Queen 
was silent. (Carroll 65) 
Alice is shocked by her own bravery in the shouting match with the Queen, and the 
processes of her epistemic evolution and self-realization continue, and while playing 
croquet with the Queen, she “was looking for some way of escape” (68). The ensuing 
result is a sort of hilarious rendition of the Sublime: with no hint of his physical presence, 
the Cheshire Cat appears floating through the air—but it is simply his head, which spans 
across the entire green upon which they are playing croquet. Alice’s initial experience 
with the Cat is already part of her collected data of consciousness from Wonderland, and 
the image of the Cat’s floating head—which, as it fades, leaves only its smile—can be 
considered a visual example of the trace that one leaves in space. In a dream-state this 
sort of vision is not abnormal, especially given the contextual atmosphere of 
nonsensicality in Wonderland; and this game of croquet, composed of players of Alice’s 
complex internal duration, renders various responses to the enormous Cat head hovering 
ominously above them. In a strikingly similar situation, Flaubert’s Félicité perceives the 
gargantuan parrot, Loulou, hovering over her as she is about to die, but the nurses 
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surrounding her do not see that which Félicité believes to be true. But this incongruity 
speaks to the truth that reality is always subjective. This is not to say that the experiential 
data of everyday life is necessarily disputable or interpretive; the difference I wish to 
underscore is that one’s perception of reality is subjective. It is the possible world as an 
internal and subjective duration that processes all that we perceive in the actual world, 
because it is in the possible that one decides that which is, that which could be, and that 
which should be. And our expectation of the world around us—the model that we impose 
on existence—shapes what we perceive as reality. Our attitude towards the actual world 
is determined by the internal processes of the mind-space, and thus possible worlds are 
both places of potentiality, and spaces of self-definition. 
 The sublime moment frees Alice while concurrently defusing the situation she 
wishes to escape, but though the thought of a cat’s head hovering over the garden is 
comical for readers, especially for children, it signifies a synthesis of Alice’s internal 
duration with the external universal duration. It is this very continuity that allows Alice to 
see herself as a whole, while viewing the experiential data of possible and actual worlds 
as a unified self—a whole self united in one duration of the self, and positioned relative 
to the universal duration, or the continuum. The synthesis is one’s possible worlds united 
with one’s comprehension of actual-world reality—it is the “impersonal” homogeneous 
duration of all that is, what can be, and what could be. 
 In order for the conscious being to experience dolcezza, there must be internal 
harmony. Moevs uses this term in reference to Dante Alighieri’s pilgrimage through 
Inferno, Purgatorio, and Paradiso, so as to become illuminated by the Divine—the unity 
of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Of course, Alice is not on a spiritual journey 
of enlightenment, but the parallel I want to draw is one of unity. For Dante, he began his 
journey in Hell, and as he moved through its various rings, followed by the upward hike 
of Purgatory, finally gazing upon Beatrice and the rings of Paradise, the Pilgrim 
Dante’s61 illumination is a result of a chain of events in consciousness: he must first learn 
about sin, retribution, penance, forgiveness, and wisdom, and it is through his own 
epistemic “evolution” to a larger understanding of God’s nature and purpose that he 
                                                 
61 In the Divine Comedy, Dante Alighieri characterizes himself as the Pilgrim who makes a spiritual journey, which 
he—Dante himself—later “recounts” for the betterment of those in the finite actual world of life. 
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becomes worthy of his encounter with the Divine. The unity which I describe is the 
synthesis of the interiority of the self with the exteriority of the world, which means that 
the being feels unity of mind and body in the actual world. For Alice, we see, too, that as 
she moves through Wonderland and its various events, she learns tactics to orient herself 
in a world so foreign to her actual-world system of logic and reason. In the specific 
duration of her internal Wonderland Alice gains control of her own creation, and her final 
comment to the Queen reveals Alice’s piqued consciousness in the possible world: 
“‘Who cares for you? Said Alice (she had grown to her full size by this time). ‘You’re 
nothing but a pack of cards!’” (102). Alice’s recognition is one that recalls all of which 
she once feared, now easily conquered as she reframes the situation, putting herself in 
control of her own destiny. “At this the whole pack rose up into the air, and came flying 
down upon her” and as Alice begins her gradual return to the actual world, she swats 
away the cards falling upon her head, only to awake in the lap of her sister who brushes 
leaves off of Alice’s hair (102). This moment—when Alice reaches the pinnacle of 
consciousness necessary to navigate this specific duration—is the climax of the dream; it 
is the moment of dolcezza, where Alice’s consciousness finds harmony in her mind-
space, and for a flash of a moment in duration Alice witnesses the unity of the Infinite 
from her finite position between possible and actual worlds. The unity that Alice 
witnesses in the infinite is that which Dante faces vis-à-vis the Divine; by either term it is 
the ever-changing infinity in constant flux; it is everything that has existed and exists at 
present; it is everything potential, possible, actual, imagined, perceived, externalized, and 
internalized, and it will continue to expand rapidly without any imaginable termination. 
This is a flash moment of self-realization akin to lucid dreaming, where Alice recognizes 
the power she has to shape both actual and possible worlds, while still remaining free 
from the shackles of actual-world obligations; it is the stage between sleeping and 
waking, the shift in consciousness. Alice, as a building block for this totality, sees but for 
a moment her place in the infinite, and this pleasure is a result of the harmony of 
durations within Alice—the parts of the whole that she does not detect as parts, but 
simply as experience, as pure duration, just as Bergson describes. But most importantly, 
this moment of dolcezza is Alice’s revelation—that is, within her mind-space she has 
infinite potentiality to do or create x, simply because she is of the infinite, the first particle 
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that allows all other Euclidean points, or lives upon the continuum, to come into 
existence. 
 To be between possible and actual worlds is a momentary lapse in Alice’s full 
consciousness, where intuition guides her as she transitions back into the actual world 
where the possible-world data of experience is unified in one entire self. Dolcezza is 
intuitive, something that is experienced internally without penetration by the actual-world 
realities, but this unique experience will bear its affective nature in the mind-space of the 
thinker, not necessarily as a memory, but as a moment of uninterrupted harmony—the 
dance of durations within the self, each moving around the other as an intricate whole in 
constant motion akin to the celestial spheres. Bergson’s description of this moment as one 
akin of dolcezza: 
The intuition we refer to then bears above all upon internal duration. It 
grasps a succession which is not juxtaposition . . . It is the direction vision 
of the mind by the mind—nothing intervening, no refraction through the 
prism . . . Instead of states contiguous to states . . . we have the indivisible 
and therefore substantial continuity of the flow of the inner life. Intuition, 
then, signifies first of all consciousness. (Creative 20) 
Bergson’s description of intuition positions the thinker vis-à-vis the self, and in order to 
see the whole self, one must live in the free flow of pure duration. This uninterrupted 
state of internal harmony gives birth to a consciousness that sees things external to the 
self as objects of many parts, but one cannot conceive of each event in one’s life as 
separate, because in the use of the pronoun “I,” all events unite in the self-realization of 
the self, or, as Bergson would say, the mind vis-à-vis itself. All events experienced by the 
self unite within the mind-space as a life, or in one’s internal dialogue “my life.” One can 
see durations external to the self as dynamic and consisting of many parts in constant flux 
in an individual, as well as the place that this individual and exterior “building block” 
takes in the larger structure of universal duration. Bergson was well-versed in the history 
of philosophy, and was both an exceptional mathematician and metaphysician, and he 
calls upon Leibniz, who uses a garden as analogy to underscore the truism that matter is 
of many parts. Leibniz writes: 
Every portion of matter may be conceived as like a garden full of plants 
and like a pond full of fish. But every branch of a plant, every member of 
an animal, and every drop of the fluids within it, is also such a garden or 
such a pond. (59) 
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Akin to Bergson’s suggestion that parts of wholes should be described as parts in their 
own nature, Leibniz crafts a sort of ecosystem, whose building blocks have nature in their 
parts and wholes in both infinitesimal regress and infinite progress. Another example 
would be to look at a classroom of students. There are twenty students, but we call this a 
class; we call this a mass noun, but the problem, then, is that we can still count twenty 
students. It is not that the class is uncountable, but rather that the human scope of 
understanding is designed to simplify concepts for the faculty of perception and 
corresponding sorting of data; it is much like learning multiplication, where 3x3 takes the 
place of 3+3+3, yielding the same result with less effort. Nonetheless, countable or not, 
there are twenty apparent parts of the whole we call a class, and we cannot forget that 
each of these twenty students is a whole composed of many parts. At the same time, if we 
count this one class as one of thirty classes in the school, we see that these twenty 
students form one building block, (i.e. the class), of the school—the whole. Naturally it 
would follow that this school is a part of a district, but we need not go this far to see the 
cycles of infinite progress at work concurrently with the cycles of infinitesimal regress. 
In terms of Alice’s dream, the aggregate of the experiences of that specific duration could 
be quantified by the addition of each separate experience, simplified by a mass-noun; but 
instead we qualify it as an experience, rather than a sequence and finite number of events. 
To assign a number is to assign finitude, thereby extinguishing one’s infinite potentiality. 
 Moreover, it is impossible to assign quantity to Alice’s dream, because there is an 
uncountable amount of data that exists and contributes to her experience: it is not 
mentioned or realized, but rather taken for granted.62 For example, Alice walks through 
forests and upon lawns and through gardens, but the narrator does not describe the grass; 
it is a component of background matter that becomes part of the fabric of that specific 
space, and though we do not consider the role of the grass, if it were not present, we 
would likely find this somewhat jarring based on our understanding of gardens and 
forests. 
                                                 
62 An important item to consider is that I each internal duration, like Alice’s dream and various other internal spaces, 
there exists possible worlds that are in themselves finite; they are self-contained and have a beginning and an end. 
However, infinite potentiality still applies, because we can consider each possible world, or internal duration, as an 
evolution and maturation of the mind-space, whose experiential data enters the process of entelechy in order to 
actualize the possible. By creating data in the possible world and bringing it into the process of entelechy, one has 
infinite potentiality to do or create x, because one’s consciousness is in constant flux in response to every new datum.  
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 Thus we see that even the grass is one of the many parts of the space of 
Wonderland, which becomes a building block of Alice’s self in her actual world, though 
necessarily unnoticed, because the mind is crafted to give attention to the most relevant 
or prominent data that can directly affect the self. But the grass remains a building block, 
without which Wonderland would not be Wonderland, although what it would be without 
the grass is indeterminable. The data of Alice’s dream possible world is in constant flux 
as it enters Alice’s consciousness and so too is the whole of the self in flux relative to the 
other building blocks of the infinite continuum. Leibniz concludes that in: 
a plenum or filled space every movement has an effect upon bodies in 
proportion to this distance, so that not only is every body affected by those 
which are in contact with it and respond in some way to whatever happens 
to them, but also by means of them, the body responds to those bodies 
adjoining them, and their intercommunication reaches to any distance 
whatsoever. (57) 
If, in space, one body—one duration of one being as whole—has an “effect” on those in 
its vicinity, and a dialogue of some sort becomes a reciprocal “intercommunication” 
between relative durations, then the universal space—the totality of all durations, plus 
one to infinity—is that of many evolving parts, and as a result, the aggregate evolves 
constantly in its homogeneous self. The whole expands, the whole changes shape and 
substance, and its nature changes with each reconfiguration. The most appropriate 
conclusion, therefore, is that if in macro-analysis we see the nature of the whole in flux, 
then it logically follows that in a micro-analysis we see each heterogeneous part of each 
homogeneous whole change its nature based on internal events, like dreams and possible 
world experiences. It is essentially the ripple effect. 
 The flux we see in the durations external to our own is what I would call the 
“dance of duration.” Imagine that you have an eagle’s eye view of a nineteenth-century 
dancefloor; there is a ball, and as you observe the entirety of movement within each 
waltz, you see the carefully coordinated movements of each couple dancing in complete 
unity with the other couples. Each ordered system functions in relation to those external 
to it, and each movement advances the waltz and adds to the sweetness—or in the basic 
definition of the word—dolcezza of the harmony of couples, (i.e., durations), as they 
move amidst others in space. Leibinz argues that each body permeates and affects those 
surrounding it, and in turn, the affected body continues the chain of 
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“intercommunication” in its affecting of another body or duration. What I want to address 
is the simple notion that, in many cases, binaries that separate a from b are unnecessarily 
self-imposed structures that limit the mind’s potentiality; and in the context of the dance, 
a binary between couples, or between those who form a couple, would destroy the 
harmony of the waltz. In order for this analogy to describe accurately the dance of 
duration, it must therefore consider each couple as a working part of a whole—the 
waltz—and that together these couples are an aggregate, but if they are alone the social 
decorum of dinner parties is disturbed. Likewise with duration: it is composed of the 
many heterogeneous parts—the infinitesimals, or the Euclidean points—but universal 
duration is homogeneous, because it is simply the blank canvas of space awaiting the 
matter that characterizes its nature at that given point on the continuum. What is more, 
based on Leibniz’s argument, we have no choice but to be affected by the matter and 
form surrounding us in space, so it seems only logical that self-imposed binaries crafted 
by finite beings are maintained only through the stubborn opposition that we are wholly 
self-subsistent and individuated beings. I do not mean to suggest that we are in no way 
individuated, because we have already discussed what it means to be a whole of many 
parts; each being in consciousness is akin to a Euclidean point on the continuum; what I 
do wish to suggest, though, is that each individual is something beyond itself: it is a 
portion of dolcezza, but in order to experience such a phenomenon one must tear down 
the binaries that separate possible from actual. The entelechial process cannot proceed in 
the being who sees the world in juxtaposed states, as if life is a simple act of sorting black 
from white, so as to construct a controlled environment. If there is only black and only 
white, the environment can be only finite, because there is no potential for anything to be 
other than black or white; there can be no grey. This analogy is fundamental to my 
argument concerning human potentiality, because if we were to consider all of which we 
experience in consciousness as either one or the other, and thus to follow, only one or the 
other, then the continuity of each being’s internal duration would be destroyed: if there is 
no grey—no transition between actual and possible, and therefore no penetration each of 
the other—then one’s potentiality to do or create x cannot exist. Such a possibility 
requires the existence of both actual and possible worlds; there must be an actual in 
which the possible comes to fruition, and there must be a possible in order for that which 
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is actual to enter the process of entelechy, or actualization. The possible worlds validate 
the actual world, because it allows the being to develop a stronger sense of objectivity of 
the actual viewed from the possible. 
 Wonderland logic undercuts the foundation of one-dimensional black-and-white 
logic: it challenges the actual-world logic which Alice imposes upon the dream world; 
yet at the same time, Wonderland logic confuses Alice due to the incongruity between 
“how things should be” and “how things are.” Eventually, readers find that actual-world 
logic is jettisoned from their minds, because what once was foreign has become the 
common currency of the fictional discourse. The nonsensical word-games or the sort of 
mad tea party logic illustrate the malleable nature of language; they force readers in their 
attempt to understand the intellectual processes of Wonderland to consider that for every 
common phrase of colloquialism there can be various interpretations. Such a variety of 
interpretations is humorous, but serves the larger purpose of illuminating the necessity of 
context and spatiotemporal position in the world. It calls into question the influence of 
language on individual reality—it demands that readers consider the history of one’s 
society and the building blocks that determine what is proper, or improper—what is 
logical, and what is not; and thus we are left with proof derived from a story written for 
three young girls that although we are all part of the continuum, or universal duration, the 
micro-worlds or sub-durations that develop from each point on the continuum will differ 
in their relation to other micro-worlds, or “worlds within worlds,” whose ontology begins 
in the initial Euclidean point. Here, we are faced with the undeniable presence of the 
theory of building blocks: all that informs Canadian culture, for example, is an aggregate 
of all that has been and currently is, and it will continue to exist in flux so long as there 
are people who identify as Canadian. The building blocks of our environment shape us; 
and likewise, as beings of consciousness in space, we, too, shape the building blocks of 
the present that will eventually inform the present-to-be.  
 What is entertaining and humorous to Carroll’s readers is simply the subversion 
of the British social niceties—the standards to which children and adults are expected to 
conform. When the Hatter comments that Alice’s hair “needs cutting” (53), Alice 
reproaches him: “‘You should learn not to make personal remarks,’ Alice said with some 
severity: ‘It’s very rude’” (Carroll 54). The Hatter’s response seems an appropriate 
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response to Alice’s objection, but only for the first half of the sentence. “The Hatter 
opened his eyes very wide on hearing this; but all he said was ‘Why is a raven like a 
writing-desk?’” (54). Carroll emphasizes two components of this sentence: first, he 
places a semi-colon after the main clause, as if he means deliberately to overturn the logic 
behind the Hatter’s appropriate response in the main clause; and second, Carroll 
emphasizes the words “all” and “said,” so as to underscore that “all” the Hatter offered 
was a riddle, rather than an apology. A bit of a disconnect, surely, but it does not end 
here. The Hatter glances at his watch: “‘Two days wrong!’ sighed the Hatter. ‘I told you 
butter wouldn’t suit the works!’ he added, looking angrily at the March Hare’” (55). The 
apparent disconnect, here, is one that juxtaposes actual-world logic—where one refrains 
from putting butter in one’s watch—and possible-world logic, where the March Hare 
insists “It was the best butter” (55). But the complete overthrow of actual-world logic is 
when the Hatter and the Hare agree that the problem was not the butter, but rather that the 
Hare installed it with a bread-knife, hence the crumbs in the butter, which, according to 
Wonderland logic, explains the faulty clockwork (55). Alice comments: “‘What a funny 
watch! . . . It tells the day of the month, and doesn’t tell what o’clock it is!’” to which the 
Hatter responds “‘Why should it?’ . . . Does your watch tell you what year it is?’” And 
Alice responds with the actual-world logic affiliated with conventional, man-made time: 
“‘Of course not . . . but that’s because it stays the same year for such a long time 
together’” (55). The Hatter responds “‘Which is just the case with mine’” (55). The 
conversation seems counterintuitive, but after discussing the faulty watch, the 
conversation progresses to discuss time and Time, the latter being the name of the 
dormouse. Alice, disheartened by such a seemingly ridiculous conversation, sighs wearily 
and asserts “‘I think you might do something better with the time . . . than wasting it in 
asking riddles that have no answers’” (56; emphasis mine). The measurable time of 
which Alice speaks is the lower-case time, preceded by a definite article which implies 
the generic, universal time. But we find shortly to follow that since the dormouse, Time, 
is constantly napping, drifting in and out of conversation, that the universal time of which 
Alice speaks does not exist in Wonderland. 
 The Hatter mourns the loss of Time’s constant presence, and laments that “‘It’s 
always six o’clock now’” (57). Readers find that six o’clock is tea time, and it is always 
105 
 
 
 
tea time, because Time no longer cooperates, which is likely the cause of the broken 
watch, if we were to base our conclusion on Wonderland logic; if there is no time, there 
is no day, no month, no year; yet there are tea parties, and boat rides on the river, as well 
as meetings with the Red Queen, and new friends, like the Cheshire Cat. The Hatter 
explains the twelve places are set, because “‘It’s always tea-time, and we’ve no time to 
wash the things between whiles’” (57). But all the while they continue their tea party, 
Time sleeps at the table; the Hatter asks questions to which he already knows the answer; 
and the Hare attacks Alice’s dimensionless reasoning. These are events in duration, and 
they exist in space. In this connection, Bergson argues that duration is space, which 
necessarily implies that space records all times and holds all durations, because matter 
can only take form in space, and potentiality can become actualized only in space; 
whether it be universal space or the mind-space, both exist in harmony. Time is the 
actual-world currency with which humans can conceive of the events that take place; it 
allows them to remember events and conversations in relation to other events and 
conversations; it signifies events by way of temporal markers, which are notable events in 
consciousness with which one situates oneself in the continuity and progression of one’s 
own life. As beings actively engaged in and with space, we are events impressed upon the 
fabric of space; we have moments of illumination—connections between ideas and 
various durations external to us that have not been discovered—and this is the slice of 
individuated infinity—dolcezza, via the possible world. 
 Carroll manipulates the qualities of language to undermine the concept of time, 
the general understanding of which is numerical.63 Time, in the context of Wonderland, is 
an empty signifier—it is an illusion, or a conceptual knowledge of something that exists 
elsewhere, though never experienced by any in Wonderland. The idea of a singular 
chronology that tacks all life events of all individuals onto a line moving forward—often 
imagined as rightward linearity—is archaic and it retards the potentiality that exists 
already within each individual mind. This linear time makes the world seem one-
                                                 
63 I say “generally” simply because we have linguistic qualifiers that are in no way numerical, such as “when,” “how 
long,” “it took x amount of time,” “minutes,” “hours,” “seconds.” At the same time, this is somewhat of an illusion, 
because quantifiers (15h00, etc.) are a branch of qualifiers that are presented with numerals, which we receive and 
convert this into language that is meaningful and relevant to the given context. Numbers are a means of quickening 
conversation; for example, I would not say there is a monkey, and a monkey, and a monkey, and a monkey; I would 
say: “there are four monkeys.” Numbers are also symbols, just as rhetorician Kenneth Burke says “man is a symbol-
using animal.” See On Symbols and Society. 
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dimensional and uneventful, when in fact we see in Lawrence Durrell’s short stories 
“Zero” and “Asylum in the Snow” that the protagonist’s friend thinks “in many clever 
dimensions,”64 therefore dismissing the relevance of such one-dimensional thinking 
(Durrell, “Asylum” 45). Carroll crafts Alice as thinking in a different dimension than the 
four-dimensional actual world; this alternative dimension—this possible world—is 
another plane of consciousness,65 another duration. These alternate durations are possible 
worlds within the mind-space that allow the thinker infinite potentiality to do x, and the 
information that informs these possible worlds is immanent within the mind of the 
individual, but requires a means of becoming apparent. In its essence, this knowledge is 
the “potentiality” underlying entelechy; and as we see in Wonderland, the story is not one 
of nonsense, and it is not a mere fictional possible world. Wonderland has complexities 
that inform actual-world readers of Carroll’s novel of “the many clever dimensions” of 
consciousness, and the opportunity to bring the data of consciousness into the actual 
world via entelechy. Possible worlds within the minds of all thinkers can create substance 
or give psychical matter form in the actual world, because our own internal durations 
inform our understanding of the actual world, though the possible-world data is context-
dependent. By “context-dependent,”66 I mean knowledge that is immanent in every 
reader who engages a possible world, and it is tailor-made based on what particulars and 
subjective themes arise in the individual mind according to one’s spatiotemporal position. 
In a sense, it fills a need in the particular thinker. 
 Just as is the case with Alice, whose whole self is comprised of the totality of 
experiential data from possible and actual worlds, and whose whole self becomes a 
building block in her actual world of Victorian England; so, too, is the case for Carroll’s 
readers. Each thought, each moment of internal discourse alongside moments where we 
ponder what the text “means” to us, is part of an event in our lives that contributes to our 
                                                 
64 There are ten dimensions which we can prove now, and there are in theory at least twenty-six. See Gubser, The Little 
Book of String Theory. 
65 I borrow this phraseology from Herbert Read, an English Surrealist and leader in the anarchist movement in 1930s 
and 40s England and continental Europe. Read describes the evolving thinker as rising to “new planes of existence” 
(156), Anarchy and Order. Interestingly, Durrell and Read had a common connection—Henry Miller—with whom 
Read corresponded, the letters of this epistolary relationship later passed from Miller to Durrell. Durrell writes much 
later than Read, describing the “spiritual self of man” which extends its self into the world as “a continuous self-
subsisting plane of reality” that aims to “strike the Universe” to find its symbolic truths (“Heraldic” 72). 
66 Here, I allude to Deborah Cameron’s claim that language is context-dependent, which she discusses in her book 
Verbal Hygiene.  
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existence as a whole, homogeneous individual; but with the dynamic planes of 
consciousness, and the potential vis-à-vis with infinity by the self—the part and the 
whole—figure into universal space and therefore the totality of all durations that move 
from present to past. Seeing as the universe is composed of building blocks—the pond 
and the garden as described by Leibniz, or the internal durations of every individual 
described by Bergson—necessarily implies unity amidst all parts. Every part is of 
another, either in infinite progress or infinitesimal regress. If we take one building block, 
like a given individual and place this person in the larger scale of the world, we have 
infinite progress: this person is one part of a larger whole, which in its superlative form is 
universal duration. Likewise, if we take the same individual and examine him or her 
objectively with the knowledge of every life event in this whole, we see that this 
individual is a whole of many parts; each part is also a whole of many parts, and we can 
do this ad infinitum. Between progress and regress we have the body of the infinite in 
consistent flux, reflecting each and every change of each and every duration, or building 
block. Incidentally, infinite progress is matter expanding in space: it is multiplicity by 
way of addition; yet at the same time, infinitesimal regress is also a multiplicity of matter 
in space by way of division. Therefore, I would argue that if both processes produce 
multiplicities to infinity—worlds within worlds—then this is indicative of the presence of 
the continuum of infinitesimals. All matter that is possible or actual, and even that which 
is in the process of entelechy, is bonded to the continuum by one or many extensions of 
matter in space—the open place of potentiality, the unbounded fabric of what could be. 
 In determining this spatial unity, I would say that the next reasonable step is to 
question what it means to be “possible” and what it means to be “actual”; in fact, I 
propose that we consider possible worlds as real experience, because the mind is of the 
brain, and the brain of the body;—it is a whole working in harmony amidst an infinite 
symphony of uncountable musicians and vocalists, each with a specific role, and each 
executing their role in the sweetness of perfect harmony. It is, as Bergson describes so 
gracefully, the pure duration that is heterogeneous in ontology, yet homogeneous by 
nature—the notes of a tune, each melting into the next. 
 If something is possible, it may be plausible, and if swept up by the right 
consciousness of the right individual, it can become actual in its own form. This “right 
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individual” is any being who acknowledges his or her own mind-space as a possible 
world, and who recognizes that the experiences upon which one partakes in the mind can 
become actual-world realities via self-propelled entelechy, though such realities will most 
likely manifest in a different form than that of the possible world. When matter is 
transmitted from the possible world to the actual world, its form need not be that of 
which it was in the possible; instead, it can transpire in the actual world of the creator of 
its being, and it will do so in such a way as to fill a deficit or void in the life of the person 
who brought it into being. Potentiality is, then, the equivalent of plausibility, because if 
the possible-world reality enters the process of entelechy, which recognizes the 
applicability of the possible-world data in the actual world, then in the case of 
Wonderland, the Hatter need not be the Hatter in Alice’s England, but instead a 
newfound understanding by Alice of the limitations that are institutionally imposed on 
the individual through the medium of language, which consequently limits human 
potentiality. 
 The process of entelechy is, therefore, the recognition of potentiality to do x by 
creating new data within the framework of parts and wholes: that which they are 
comprised of and that which they comprise. Each individual unit—as part and/or a 
whole—is both dependent upon other units while subsequently enjoying its autonomy; 
because as Bergson explains, the space of the mind hosts “deep seated psychic 
phenomena, the cause of which is within us and not outside” (Creative 5). As such, the 
autonomous unit has its internal cycles, but these internal cycles are eventually 
externalized as an extension of matter into space, thus shaping other dependent-
autonomous units, or building blocks. The cycles of space—infinite progress and 
infinitesimal regress—are not merely uncountable, they are unending. Bergson’s 
description of the mind in space is strikingly similar to the entelechial thinker’s mind-
space: potential-cum-actual requires “the active intervention of the mind” (Time 94), and 
so long as there is human consciousness, universal space—the continuum of durations—
there exists a heterogeneous aggregate which is a united space—the homogeneous whole: 
all which has existed and exists, and all of which could exist: this is the infinite.  
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Chapter 5. 
Conclusion 
 As readers, we have the chance to be the great philosophers of consciousness—
the ones who strive for knowledge, who seek wisdom, and who find a passion: these 
ideals already exist, but first we must recognize them as immanent within the self. I 
borrow the endeavour suggested by Alfred, Lord Tennyson: “To follow knowledge, like a 
sinking start, / Beyond the utmost bound of human thought” (31-32). Tennyson also 
offers a formula for life, to which I will return. 
 I have presented three extraordinarily diverse texts, each with their own sort of 
“personality,” so to speak. We have considered a short story by Lawrence Durrell, one 
whose content reflects the “anti-everything” attitude that is present in many of the Villa 
Seurat literary texts, although I argue that it is not anti-everything, because the product is 
of something. The literary product of the young Lawrence Durrell models an attitude of 
“freedom to,” rather than the more prominent “freedom from,” as Europe became the 
battlefield of the Allied and Axis forces—the complete rule over the individual. Anti-
everything is pro-something; this pro-something, for Durrell’s story, is a defiance of the 
politics of patriotism, and an adherence to the politics of the self: the faithfulness to one’s 
own beliefs and convictions, and a blatant disregard for the imposition of political 
authority on the fleeting population of truly autonomous, self-governed beings. 
 Deleuze underscores the value and potentiality of the literary text; it is “a logic of 
‘Life’ (xiii), and in spite of the quasi-surrealist and non-cohesive nature of Durrell’s 
narrative, Lawrence guides readers through the labyrinth of the mind. A logic of Life 
need not be “good sense,” which Durrell mocks in his “Heraldic Universe”; instead, we 
should consider Deleuze’s phrase as the logic for a life, thus allowing the logic to fit the 
individual mind, rather than the individual mind attempting to adhere to a universal and 
generic logic. In fact, we see that Lawrence’s possible world within the painting is a 
space where the “right” direction is intuitive, not prescriptive. Madness does not define 
Lawrence’s consciousness, but rather his consciousness creates a beautiful madness. 
Lawrence does not feel whole in his actual world, and thus we see the possible world as a 
space that facilitates the creative processes of new durations. Inside the painting 
Lawrence is the artist of his own world, and is thus the designer of his own experience—
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the experiential data of consciousness that defines each individual as a unit in itself, 
whose harmony is the combination of various internal durations and an external duration, 
which unites the individual with the universal duration—the continuum.  
 Durrell’s “Zero” exemplifies the nature of space; that is, there is internal space 
and external space; the former is specific, the latter is generic; and what is more, it is the 
former that acts as a stage upon which Lawrence defines his own self, the “I” that unites 
both his possible and actual worlds. Durrell also raises the question of what it means to 
have a zero, or null, value—he questions the nature and truth of nothingness. Is it 
possible that the void within the individual—which is missing a specific substance—is a 
place of potentiality? Words are designed to describe, but how can one describe nothing? 
This is simple: one can only describe nothingness based on the something-ness it lacks; 
and to lack some substance or another is predicated by the truism that declares nothing as 
something: the subject cannot be nothing—it cannot be affiliated with a verb (i.e. to lack, 
or to be void of)—unless it is first something. Thus we see that the subject intuits the void 
within, and begins to search for that which he or she believes will replenish the 
incomplete self. This act of replenishment is a process that takes place in possible worlds, 
because for each idea we ponder, and for everything we question, interrogate, or 
consider, we find the answer in the possible world. The answer is recognized by the self 
vis-à-vis the self: as the mind sorts the data of consciousness of both possible and actual 
worlds, it considers various alternatives, which implicates the presence of the possible 
world within. This presence is a possible world recognized by the self as potentiality to 
do x in y context. 
 To find within the depths of the mind the potentiality that each being possesses is 
the initial movement towards actualization; it is the acknowledgment of what could be. 
The next necessary act is to bring this idea into the process of entelechy within the 
mind—it is the act of self-amelioration, and as a consequence, self-definition in the actual 
world. But this self-definition is at the end of an entelechial cycle; I use the word cycle to 
suggest that the ever-evolving being of the aggregate of all durations in constant flux 
experiences the entelechy of consciousness in every moment of being. So long as there is 
consciousness in the actual world, a possible world will exist; and so long as there is a 
possible world, experiential data will rise into one’s consciousness; and the consciousness 
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in each being in each possible world will find the je ne sais quoi immanent within their 
own self, and thus ensues entelechy. It is the desire to act out one’s own upon the stage of 
life—the actual world. Every play has various characters, costumes and acts: no moment 
can ever be replicated by the principles of one that precedes it. 
 The je ne sais quoi is an interesting concept to consider, because it is not easily 
defined even in its manifest state in individual consciousness; yet on the other hand, 
when it is not identified, the individual is aware of its absence, or more specifically, its 
non-presence. It is the age-old feeling that “something is missing,” and it is only logical 
that this void of substance propels the creation of possible worlds, even if their genesis is 
not intentional. For Flaubert’s Félicité, those who surround her in the actual world of the 
narrative see her as odd, or simple; they see her as naïve, juvenile, and eventually senile; 
and readers are left to question whether Flaubert crafts Félicité as truly out of touch with 
reality, or if there is more that exists in the depths of this character. The question of 
Félicité’s true nature—is she mad, is she sane, is she simple, or stupid?—is really of no 
consequence when it comes to her own processes of entelechy. Self-amelioration is 
precisely this: it is an improvement of the self; it need not consider the judgments or 
questions of those surrounding the individual, because the self-definition that follows 
self-amelioration is a free act—it is the distinction between the “I” and the rest of the 
world. Thus we may conclude that if one wishes to define oneself, which necessarily 
implies individuation, then there is no need to conform, and there is no point in 
considering whether one’s own reality seems “normal” to those outside of our 
consciousness.  
 Self-preservation is instinctual, and if appearing “normal” is one’s sole focus, it 
can easily become self-defeating. That Félicité unwittingly crafts a world that no one else 
can comprehend speaks to her ability to ignore the socially created binary of normal-
abnormal. Indeed, it may simply be that in her blissful subjectivity Félicité is able to free 
herself from the confines of social institutions; and this is precisely why Félicité dies 
happily on her deathbed, laying beneath the two things she loves most: God and Loulou. 
 Potentiality, then, is not dependent upon intelligence and the ability to make 
advances that push the human race forward; potentiality is, quite simply, to know one’s 
own purpose and to live life with the passion of purpose. I say the passion of purpose, 
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because passion is the recognition of something internal, by which one may define the 
self. Moreover, there is no misguided purpose, as such; one’s actions can be misguided, 
but one’s purpose is indicative of the internal workings of the mind. As a result of the 
subjectivity in the possible-world setting, one’s purpose conceived by the self and for the 
self is not wrong, nor can it be incorrect. Such terms do not apply, because purpose is a 
subjective truth; it is much akin to Searle’s distinction between beliefs and opinions: 
beliefs can be incorrect based on factual data, whereas opinions are formed only via 
personal experience and engagement with the world; as such, in our inability to return to 
the moments of the past which define our opinions, we cannot assign a value-judgment to 
experience, because it is again one’s own subjective vis-à-vis with the universe. 
 Literary critics attack Flaubert’s Félicité on various levels. In either her ignorance, 
her naivety, her simplicity, or her senility, readers tend to see Félicité only for her 
superficialities; and this is the brilliance of Flaubert’s narrative. Potentiality—infinite 
potentiality—is defined by nothing but subjective consciousness; it is one’s 
consciousness of the self in the world, and the recognition of that spark of “something-
ness” that illuminates the world around us, because we have found our purpose. That 
being said, it is valid to argue that Félicité is senile in the end, and even that she is simple 
of mind throughout the story; but in Félicité, readers see a passion for life and a love for 
people, so it is no surprise that she bears an unbreakable bond with Loulou, both in his 
life and in his “afterlife,” so to speak. That Félicité is a maid—a “fixture,” as the narrator 
describes her in the beginning of the story—does not bar Félicité from living her life with 
passionate purpose, and in her passion readers see that even those who are simple of mind 
have the potentiality to create realities for the self that allow one to love the life that one 
lives in the actual world.  
 Félicité’s possible world—the world where a parrot has replaced the Trinitarian 
dove, and a world in which Félicité prays to a stuffed bird with the conviction that these 
prayers reach God via the parrot-cum-Holy Spirit—is her own reality, and those who 
exist in her actual world cannot say that this reality is wrong, or that it is out of touch. 
The true reality is that Félicité lives in a self-created world with which she engages, and 
to external observers her reality may seem odd, or crazy; but in fact, all experience is 
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valid regardless of whether it is completely rational, or entirely imagined. It is the data of 
consciousness, and this cannot be deemed correct or incorrect; it simply is. 
 What readers may judge as madness or senility in Félicité is in fact Flaubert’s 
removal of a binary embedded in the minds of most actual-world beings, whether it be 
the actual world of the literary text, or the actual world of the text’s readers. In crafting 
the character of Félicité as one who can be interpreted on various levels, the socially-
imposed binary of normal-abnormal is blurred; and for Félicité, this binary does not exist. 
In his introduction to Deleuze’s Essays Critical and Clinical, Daniel Smith explains how 
Deleuze used literary texts to traverse “the livable and the lived” (xiv), as well as 
mobilizing them “to free life from what imprisons it” (xv). If we were to consider 
Flaubert’s Un coeur simple as a prototype for freeing oneself from the shackles of 
socially imposed binaries, and as an example of how to “let the ego live” akin to the 
harmony which Bergson attributes to pure duration, then I would argue that life would be 
far simpler. And as I have stated in the Flaubert chapter, life need not be over-
complicated to be relevant or important; in fact, sometimes the simplest of lives are the 
ones lived by the most dynamic of people. Many of the complexities faced by individuals 
in daily life are the sources of inspiration for novels, and this is why literary texts—much 
like Durrell’s “Zero” and “Asylum in the Snow”—seem difficult to comprehend; and 
sometimes there can be no comprehension, because the data of consciousness 
reconfigured and recorded in fiction makes the content doubly confusing. The content has 
moved from one mind to another (i.e. the author), and then through the mind of the 
author to the page of a book, and then processed in a third mind, that of the reader. It 
seems, then, that Flaubert’s straightforward narrative—filled with details that require 
little processing on behalf of the reader—exemplifies Bergsonian duration. As a result, 
Félicité’s possible-world duration is in harmony with her actual-world duration, because 
she does not juxtapose these worlds, but sees them as one complete experience—the 
experience of her own consciousness—which is the development of a possible world to 
supplement an internal void. To follow, we see that this possible world transpires in 
Félicité’s actual world; though odd to others, it is familiar to herself. Félicité lives 
passionately, and thus she lives out her mission, her purpose: it is to love—simply. 
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 Flaubert’s prototype is one that can clarify our understanding of the world. Smith 
explains that “Marcel Proust suggested that his readers use his book as an optical 
instrument, ‘a kind of magnifying glass’ that would provide them with ‘the means of 
reading within themselves’” (xxi-xxii), and I want to underscore that the literary 
experience of readers offers much more than enjoyment: it offers an avenue through 
which readers can juxtapose fictionality with their own actual world. Again, we find 
potentiality. The opportunities for epistemic growth in readers is immanent in Flaubert’s 
text—and each opportunity is designed for that specific reader—because in uncovering 
that which assists us in understanding ourselves via the literary text, we are actually 
uncovering our own selves. One’s spatiotemporal position most often determines the 
substance that our consciousness recognizes; it is fictional, but it is substance 
nonetheless, because it is an experience that registers in our consciousness, and is 
solidified as a part of the self by memory, the signifier of consciousness. To emphasize 
the underlying truth—that spatiotemporal position informs potentiality, and potentiality is 
what assists consciousness in the act of self-definition—if I were to say I have a pet 
goose, this says nothing about me, an individual; rather, it signifies my encounter with 
matter in the actual world, and it is substantive matter based on the many items and 
events that compose my own self. What you see in my claim to this goose is not a vehicle 
through which you can characterize me, or apply some sort of term—simple, childish, 
etcetera; instead, you seem to have the objective lens that allows you to see my 
engagement with the experiential data that defines me. At the same time, there can be no 
such thing as an objective lens when it concerns the consciousness and possible worlds of 
others; it is impossible to know the labyrinth of my mind, just as I cannot possibly know 
yours. You may see me feeding the goose, yet I see myself through the eyes of a goose, 
and vis-à-vis myself, I enjoy a fantastic dinner. What you are able to witness is substance 
(the experiential data of myself with the goose) that becomes a building block of my own 
self—the “I” of the self-subsistent being—the “I” as a unit in itself. How this substance is 
described by those external to me is a non-issue relative to my aggregate self; I need not 
acknowledge external understandings of my reality in order to live this reality. In a sense, 
my perceived reality as observed by one external to my self is in fact the reality of the 
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one who observes; the perceiver’s comprehension of my reality relies on his or her own 
reality. 
 The self-identified and self-defined “I” is a unit in itself: it is comprised of the 
various events and experiences in consciousness, and these events are situated relative to 
each other, and relative to our sensorial or emotional responses as conscious beings. But 
the “I” is also a building block for something larger than itself. Heterogeneous in nature, 
the “I” becomes a homogeneous whole in its recognition of its own self; and this situation 
is likewise when the “I” becomes a part of many which compose a larger unit—a unit 
whose nature is heterogeneous, though in its identification as x, it secures a homogeneous 
status, and thus we continue to infinity.  
 The structures of expanding matter—the building block that expands in its 
division, as well as the building block that aids the expansion by addition—are apparent 
throughout Carroll’s Wonderland. The name in itself—Wonderland—beckons the 
potentiality and the passion required to actualize that which is momentarily possible, or 
potential. Given that the psychical matter of consciousness is continually given 
substantial form by way of entelechy, the structures of space are in constant flux. Each 
unit is in flux, and thus the necessary conclusion is that if a part of a whole is moving, 
then the whole—in its parts—is in motion; and that this flux expands outwards to 
infinity. This motion of substance in space is the energy of potentiality; it is the 
Bergsonian “mind-energy,” or the passionate undercurrents of the conscious awareness of 
that which could be. Wonderland is a space of the mind—it is a possible world imagined 
by Lewis Carroll that engages his readers with the promise of infinitely many 
perspectives concerning this fictional world. What I mean by this is that Wonderland 
begins as a possible world in the mind of Carroll, and Carroll can be considered a 
Euclidean point—the unique in-itself being upon the continuum of space—and we know 
that each point upon the continuum divides to infinity, which necessitates the infinite 
division of the sub-durations or micro-worlds, like Wonderland. Carroll’s possible world 
becomes a point in itself, though it remains a building block of Carroll’s own experience 
in life through the passage of space. A point that is of a larger point is still composed of 
infinitely many parts, but the logic behind this is not blatantly obvious. As readers of 
fiction, or as beings observing the substantial forms or building blocks of the actual world 
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surrounding us, we are infinitely divisible, which means there are infinitely many parts to 
each being. But we cannot suppose that the nature of an infinitesimal is in its quantity: an 
infinitesimal divides to infinity, but we cannot claim to know that it has infinitely many 
parts, because this would require complete objectivity—and omnipotence not enjoyed by 
finite beings. Therefore, what we are able to conclude with the most confidence is that 
given the constant state of flux in all dimensions of space, and upon all planes of space—
the mind-space and universal space together—potentiality exists, and matter is in the 
constant cycle of entelechy in the conscious being. Thus we see that so long as there is 
consciousness, there is the expansion of matter—possible and actual, as well as psychical 
and physical. The energy or passion of potentiality fuels the individual—the unit-in-
itself—and consequently, the individual fuelled by potentiality returns the energy to its 
source by expanding the data of consciousness, bringing it into an identifiable form upon 
which we bestow a name—we grant this new matter its autonomy. But with each 
expansion, there must be potentiality, because without this energy, entelechy could not 
continue in its infinite cycles; and in expansion and the production of new substantial 
forms in the actual world, these new units that are building blocks of the universe 
contribute to the economy of energy—the passage of matter expanding infinitely to 
infinity, though never reaching the borders of the infinite. These borders do not exist, and 
consequently they are non-transcendental; there is simply nothing to transcend. But this is 
not a loss, no—this non-existent limit is indeed the guarantee that the data of 
consciousness within the mind-space will press forward in cycles of infinite progress and 
infinitesimal regress. The non-existent limit is in itself unbounded space. 
 Infinite progress and infinitesimal regress are adverbs that attempt to describe the 
evolution of consciousness in each being, as well as the aggregate of all conscious beings. 
Progress and regress appear to oppose each other—their counterparts. However, if we 
consider them not as binary terms relative to their other, but instead as two systems 
through which the conscious being understands the nature of the universe, we find that 
the outcome of the cycles is exactly the same in terms of their nature. Where infinite 
progress is an apparent expansion of matter in space, with each building block creating 
something bigger than itself, infinitesimal regress is also a source of multiplicity, or the 
infinite worlds within worlds division. In the process of division, we can consider the 
117 
 
 
 
conceptual underpinning as a process of expansion due to the individuation of each 
building block that composes a whole. In turn, each building block individuated as a unit 
in itself, while concurrently existing as a part of a whole, reveals its own substantive 
form—its own building blocks, which are also worlds within worlds. The process of 
division that individuates parts of a whole contributes to the multiplicity of substantial 
forms in space; and we see, then, that infinite progress—also a contributor to spatial 
multiplicity—expands to infinity, as well. This idea seems counter-intuitive based on the 
system of mathematics which the majority of us learn in our formative years, but this is 
because mathematics is a semiological system—it has no substantive form if there is no 
consciousness to recognize the potentiality that it signifies. 
 Just as mathematics is an institutionally-created system—a manmade and socially 
accepted system—so too are the cycles of infinite progress and infinitesimal regress. 
These systems are challenging to visualize, because our minds insist on the logic of 
western mathematics. It is when we break free from the “logic” imposed on the 
individual—a logic whose nature is to provide definitive truths that are replicable and 
verifiable—that is, the empirical evidence that x-discovery is now what it will be in one 
hundred years. Logic imposes finitude, and finitude eliminates the possibility of 
potentiality. It seems that too often in the pursuit of the truths the logic which provides 
the tools to name something and assign to it some value or temporal location relative to 
another numerical truth is self-defeating. There could be no Wonderland if Lewis Carroll 
accepted the limitations of Victorian Oxbridge mathematics, specifically Euclidean 
mathematics;67 because as soon as he would acknowledge that Wonderland is impossible, 
the avenue of potentially and the expansion of psychical data is lost—; or more to the 
point, it is not lost, because it never existed. 
 In “Asylum in the Snow,” Lawrence Durrell—the alter-ego of the author—refers 
to his alter-ego, Hamlet, who thinks in “many clever dimensions,” and we see in 
                                                 
67 The issue with Euclidean mathematics in the Victorian period is that they could only account for three dimensions. 
Non-Euclidean mathematics began to rise, but these innovators, who would eventually discover a fourth dimension, 
were chastised by the scholars of mathematics, hence the reason Carroll published with his pseudonym. One point of 
clarification is that the Euclidean points to which I refer are in fact one dimension, but each point is unique in its nature. 
If we mobilize Euclidean points as a conceptual explanation of infinitesimals—whose nature is both infinite and 
unique—then we find that though these points are singular dimensions, their infinite nature implies that they can be 
divided to infinity; essentially, this is a complete denial of Euclidean mathematics, because it suggests the possibility of 
infinitely many dimensions in space based on infinite expansion, and implies that one infinitesimal of one dimension 
can create of itself infinitely many dimensions. 
118 
 
 
 
Durrell’s short story an explicit truth: that there are many dimensions to one being, which 
is apparent in the layering of alter-egos in Durrell’s short story. If we were to take the 
author Durrell as a Euclidean point, or the ontology of the worlds within worlds 
developing in his mind-space—we would see that he develops an alter-ego, Lawrence 
Durrell, in this fictional possible world. What is more, the first-order alter-ego, Lawrence 
the narrator, has his own alter-egos, and these alter-egos continue to expand, because 
each alter-ego that is of the first-order or initial alter-ego has its own clever dimensions. 
Therefore, Durrell-the-author illustrates infinitesimal regress as a process of extension in 
space to create a multiplicity. Durrell-the-author figures into the corpus of twentieth-
century literature, which is larger than Durrell’s collected works as a unit which is of the 
author. Importantly, any reader fluent in the western canon of literature knows that 
Hamlet is the tortured prince in Shakespeare’s tragedy. This is not revelatory—it is 
glaringly obvious; but just as I describe Alice’s visualization of Wonderland, where the 
blades of grass are implicit in consciousness, and would be noticed only in their absence, 
so too is the case of Hamlet in the contemporary reader of the western literary canon. 
Hamlet is not strikingly out of place, because he has become a common literary currency 
and the prototype for the tortured protagonist; this retrieval of a Renaissance character is 
thus not an antiquated allusion, but rather a reference to a proper name that signifies a 
specific type of being. Nonetheless, Shakespeare prevails: hundreds of years later, his 
name and all that is affiliated with it—all that is of Shakespeare as a unit in himself—is 
relevant, and this is because he is a building block of a larger discourse concerning 
literature. 
 Potentiality is a force of nature that is embodied by the conscious being, and 
roused to action in that being’s mind-space; it is inherent to any and all matter that we 
encounter in space, whether it is immanent data awaiting recognition to enter entelechy, 
or it is actualized matter present in the actual world; the state of being of x-given matter is 
a nominal issue of temporality, because in the larger picture the aggregate of matter of all 
sorts is the product of potentiality. In turn, the potentiality that bestows upon matter its 
substantive form gives way to further potentiality; it is an infinite cycle, and whether the 
cycle is one of infinite progress or infinitesimal regress is an institutional issue. That is, 
cycles of progress and regress are conceptual vehicles through which we can contemplate 
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a universe whose ontological genesis occurred at some given point in infinite space. But 
we must take one final step in order to comprehend what it is that inspires the potentiality 
of the mind-space, through which we understand the nature of our own consciousness. 
 I have used upon the metaphysics of both Leibniz and Bergson, although there 
exists a seeming problematic relationship that may erect a binary in the continuity of our 
understanding of the metaphysical nature of our existence via Leibniz and Bergson. 
Where Leibniz argues that the continuum is composed of infinitely many parts due to the 
fact that it invites and fosters an infinite cycle of division, Bergson insists that 
consciousness and pure duration are indivisible continuities (Mind 9), which seems to 
oppose the continuum of infinitesimals. If it were true that duration is akin to one 
indivisible sweeping movement through space to infinity, then Leibniz’s continuum may 
appear to jar this continuity; but at the same time, if homogeneous and impersonal 
duration is space, and necessarily the record of everything in existence, then there is no 
way to account for each individual life, and each possible world of each mind expanding 
in space. Both Leibniz and Bergson suggest implicitly and explicitly the infinite nature of 
space, but that which allows two metaphysicians with seemingly opposing ideas to agree 
that the grand scheme of things—infinity—the ultimate of non-transcendentals, is simply 
that their reasoning intersects in the infinite potentiality of the mind. Leibniz’s continuum 
of infinitesimals is the framework upon which I rely to offer a clearer understanding of 
Bergsonian duration, which is, according to Bergson, synonymous with space. But how 
can we conceptualize space? We know that there is matter, and that the existence of 
matter relies upon some phenomenon that differentiates a car from a horse, and permits 
us to revisit the moments of frustration as we learned to tie our shoes—a memory that 
may occasionally surface as we now tie our shoes. Space exists, but we know this only 
because of the relationship between matter, and the mind’s perception and recognition of 
matter as substance that exists with apparent form, or could exist when provided the 
opportunity to seize that form. Thus, I liken the continuum of infinitesimals—a concept 
that can be explained in the semiotic system of quantitative language created by 
conscious beings, with the purpose of understanding the various natures of the matter we 
can and cannot see.  
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 Let us return full-circle to Deacon, who argues that “even though quantum 
phenomena are often described in terms of possible physical properties not yet actualized, 
they are physically present in some as-yet unspecified sense” (3). These quantum 
phenomena are one example of matter that enters the scope of consciousness, with the 
potential to become actualized physical properties apparent to the skeptics of psychical 
data and possible worlds. The being represented in mathematics as an infinitesimal upon 
a continuum, which, when brought into philosophy can justifiably be interchangeable 
with space, is the conscious being—the unique Euclidean point—upon a continuum that 
is in fact the visual and mathematical articulation of space. Space is duration, which 
necessarily implies that everything upon the continuum (i.e. the aggregate of all matter in 
all states that expands constantly, thus shedding the limiting nature of finitude) is the 
matter that exists in and as a result of the presence of space. Therefore, the infinitesimal 
becomes the being in consciousness, and it is interchangeable with the infinitesimal—a 
symbolic formulation of a phenomenon which defies a definitive explanation of its 
nature. It would logically follow that since an infinitesimal divides infinitely, and in 
doing so its extension in space contributes to the multiplicity of matter, then the 
individual—the anthropomorphic version of mathematical terminology—also has the 
potential to expand infinitely in space. In terms of the individual-infinitesimal, this 
extensity is the direct result of an individuated duration whose consciousness leaves its 
trace upon the fabric of universal space. This trace is of a being whose corporeal finitude 
cannot repress the infinite potentiality of its own mind-space. Furthermore, the 
individuated duration of this being is a homogeneous duration representative of a being 
composed of many parts; and in order for this individual to exist in the collective 
consciousness of the actual world, he or she must combine the internal durations of the 
various possible worlds with the actual world relative to that specific individual. 
 We can see that the individual who signifies his or her homogeneity with the 
pronoun “I,” is a being composed of the building blocks of his or her consciousness 
through time in space. Bergson argues that there must be harmony between the events 
registering in our consciousness; he insists with good reason that our mind does not 
juxtapose our daily events, but rather it sees them as a continuous whole, hence the 
pronoun “I”: the aggregate of one unit-in-itself. To follow, then, is that this being can be 
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considered a heterogeneous part of a larger whole, and in this context, the larger whole is 
infinite space, which we find is in constant flux due to the ceaseless expansion of matter 
resulting from the energy of entelechy fuelled by potentiality. To state the obvious: we 
know the concept of space by its very name: space; likewise, we know ourselves as 
beings in consciousness, and we refer to ourselves as a whole: “I.” If “I” implies a 
homogeneous continuity of one consciousness, then I would argue that the formula of this 
approach is applicable to the word “space.” Thus we find that space is homogeneous, as 
Bergson argues consistently through his life’s work. 
 Bergson elucidates a phenomenon that is difficult to conceptualize; but just as 
important is Leibniz’s explanation of the infinitesimals, where each is infinitely divisible, 
and each and every point divides to infinity, ad infinitum. Between Bergson and Leibniz, 
it appears logical to conclude that these philosophers were offering variant perspectives 
on the same idea: the building blocks of the universe. The idea is to understand the nature 
of our universe in space, and since space cannot be considered a totality from which we 
can isolate its many parts, we must begin with the smallest of phenomena: a single 
individual in consciousness. This individual is a fragment of the infinite, and this 
individual experiences the sweetness of unbounded space as dolcezza, the recognition of 
one’s self in the grand scheme of space. 
 In the introduction to this paper, I discuss the anamorphic art that inspires 
Descartes revelatory contribution to the Scientific Revolution: that we cannot know the 
entire truth of one thing from a single perspective. Between Lawrence Durrell, Gustave 
Flaubert, and Lewis Carroll, we find a multiplicity of perspectives; we find endless 
possibilities to imagine x in the context of an asylum, or through the eyes of a simple 
soul; and our invitation to enter the space of Wonderland is the opportunity to experience 
a world where a deck of cards divides itself into beings akin to people, and where a Hare 
takes endless tea times with the corresponding endless discourse permitted by a possible 
world that allows the glossary of human beings to be shared with a rabbit. Deleuze argues 
that the literary text can pose as a point of departure for thoughts and ideas which are 
applicable to the actual world of readers of fiction. This is a compelling argument with 
which I must agree, because if the mind is infinite in potentiality and is capable of 
creating a possible world of non-actualized matter awaiting entelechy, then this possible 
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world of the novel—this fiction—is in itself new data, and from this data there are 
infinitely more possibilities. These are Leibniz’s “worlds within worlds,” and these are, 
too, Bergson’s internal durations of the self; the fiction we create becomes a building 
block of our own experience as a conscious being in space, and thus the trace or 
fingerprint we leave upon the fabric of existence must include all events and all data of 
that being, who knows itself as “I.” 
 The building blocks of human experience must include the data of possible 
worlds, because if these spaces did not exist, the advances we attribute to science—like 
Godwin’s Man in the Moone—a discipline which boasts of its “applicability,” could not 
occur. Innovation is the product of potentiality, but each individual with the subjective 
mind-space cannot rely on finite empiricism; where the sciences fail, we find that 
language and literature together are the sole path towards a deeper knowledge of a 
universe understood primarily by what the factual data of science can prove. Innovative 
progress, therefore, must rely on the space in which empiricism cannot tread—the mind-
space of infinite potentiality. Space records the trace and presence of each and every 
individual through the passage of time, so it seems that the knowledge of the nature of 
infinity is an epic journey, like that of Ulysses—who inspires Tennyson’s recognition of 
the relationship between knowledge and potentiality: “to strive, to seek, to find” (163), 
though most important is Tennyson’s ultimate imperative: in the quest for each and every 
truth, we cannot yield. 
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